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Foreword
In a widely noted speech to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo in May 2010, Secre-
tary of Defense Robert M. Gates warned that “the Navy and Marine Corps must be
willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies,
new threats, and budget realities. We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo
that heaps more and more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms—
thereby risking a situation where some of our greatest capital expenditures go toward
weapons and ships that could potentially become wasting assets.” Secretary Gates spe-
cifically questioned whether the Navy’s commitment to a force of eleven carrier strike
groups through 2040 makes sense, given the extent of the anticipated superiority of the
United States over potential adversaries at sea as well as the growing threat of antiship
missiles. Though later disclaiming any immediate intention to seek a reduction in the
current carrier force, Gates nevertheless laid down a clear marker that all who are con-
cerned over the future of the U.S. Navy would be well advised to take with the utmost
seriousness.
We may stand, then, at an important watershed in the evolution of carrier aviation, one
reflecting not only the nation’s current financial crisis but the changing nature of the
threats to, or constraints on, American sea power, as well as—something the secretary
did not mention—the advent of a new era of unmanned air and sea platforms of all
types. Taken together, these developments argue for resolutely innovative thinking
about the future of the nation’s carrier fleet and our surface navy more generally.
In Innovation in Carrier Aviation, number thirty-seven in our Newport Papers mono-
graph series, Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles examine the
watershed period in carrier development that occurred immediately following World
War II, when design advances were made that would be crucial to the centrality in
national-security policy making that carriers and naval aviation have today. In those
years several major technological breakthroughs—notably the jet engine and nuclear
weapons—raised large questions about the future and led to an array of innovations in
the design and operational utilization of aircraft carriers.
Central to this story is the collaboration between the aviation communities in the
navies of the United States and Great Britain during these years, building on the inti-
mate relationship they had developed during the war itself. Strikingly, the most impor-
tant of these innovations, notably the angled flight deck and steam catapult, originated
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:53:42 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
with the British, not the Americans. This study thereby also provides interesting lessons
for the U.S. Navy today with respect to its commitment to maritime security coopera-
tion in the context of its new “maritime strategy.” It is a welcome and important addi-
tion to the historiography of the Navy in the seminal years of the Cold War.
C A R N E S L O R D
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
xiv T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Introduction
This study is about innovations in carrier aviation and the spread of those innovations
from one navy to the navy of a close ally. The innovations are the angled flight deck;
the steam catapult; and the mirror and lighted landing aid that enabled pilots to land
jet aircraft on a carrier’s short and narrow flight deck.
This study is different from our previous study of innovation in the development and
use of aircraft carriers, U.S. & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941, which
compared innovation in carrier aviation in the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy in the
years before World War II. At the time, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy were compet-
itors. The two navies did not share technical information and in fact worked to hide
their advances from one another, despite the fact that they had cooperated closely dur-
ing World War I. Only in the winter of 1940–41 was there a renewal of the close profes-
sional contact between the naval aviators of the two nations that had first blossomed in
1918. Those initial cooperative relations grew into a very strong relationship during
World War II, when British carriers were often equipped with mostly U.S.-made air-
craft and many British pilots trained in the United States.
After World War II the cooperation continued, and as we show in the pages to follow, it
had major benefits for both navies—but especially for the U.S. Navy, which had the
resources to construct the large carriers and carrier aircraft that came to be seen as “the
world standard” starting in the mid-1950s. Indeed, the cooperation between the U.S.
Navy and the Royal Navy after World War II facilitated an eventual dramatic improve-
ment in the USN’s carrier aviation, as we shall show.
Though this is a study of innovations and the diffusion of innovations, it is really a
study of professional people—civilian and military pilots, civilian and military engi-
neers, and leaders of military and civilian organizations. The effort to put modern jet
aircraft on aircraft carriers depended on courageous, dedicated, and clever individuals
in both Great Britain and the United States. These individuals did their work within
organizations established to develop and field modern naval aircraft, especially the U.S.
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Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), along with its industrial suppliers, and—in
Great Britain—the Royal Aircraft Establishment, the Royal Navy, the Ministry of Air-
craft Production, and British aircraft manufacturers. In addition, the key players—
individuals and organizations—in our story acted within different legal and official
requirements, especially regulations and the laws governing the spending of public
funds on military procurement and research and development. Finally, the innovators
in both the United States and Britain needed the support of the major political institu-
tions of their respective countries.
There are, then, three lenses through which we examine the events central to this story.
The first lens focuses our attention on the role of individual perception and analysis.
Why and when did innovators identify their problems and take action to solve them?
Why was it that the three essential innovations were developed in Britain first? Why
didn’t the U.S. Navy develop these innovations first, or at least in parallel with the
Royal Navy? How and why did these innovations spread from the Royal Navy to the
U.S. Navy? The second lens focuses on what happens inside an organization. It’s not
enough for an innovator to come up a new idea or with a new application of an exist-
ing technology. The leaders of the innovator’s organization need to recognize that the
innovation solves a problem or shortfall, and then they need to support its develop-
ment and demonstration. These leaders need to do this despite the press of everyday
affairs—despite the attention they must devote to routine matters that require their
attention. The third lens examines the interplay of institutions that contain the organi-
zations in which the innovators worked. These institutions and interconnections
include the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, and the processes by which civilian political
institutions (such as the U.S. Congress) influenced naval policy.
The Importance of the Past as Prologue
In World War II, the aircraft carrier proved itself as the dominant naval weapon,
especially in the U.S. campaign against Japan in the Pacific. When World War II began
in 1939, no navy that fielded carriers possessed more than a limited number of them.
The U.S. Navy, for example, had five first-line carriers. By the end of October 1942,
only three of the five were still afloat. But a huge construction program pumped out a
fleet of American carriers by war’s end: seventeen large new carriers (with another
seven to follow after the war), eight light carriers (with another two under construc-
tion), and seventy-seven escort carriers (an additional seven would be completed after
the war). There were also three new armored-flight-deck carriers under construction
for the U.S. Navy, giving it both the largest and the most modern carrier force
by 1946.
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Cooperation between the carrier forces of the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy had begun
in the winter of 1940, when the RN invited the USN to send observers to its carriers.
These observers reported that the Royal Navy had combined radar warning with the
control of defensive fighters by specially trained naval personnel in “fighter direction”
ships (usually carriers) to blunt Italian air attacks against RN carriers in the Mediterra-
nean. In the USN, using the radar-equipped carrier Yorktown in exercises in July and
August 1941, then–rear admiral William Halsey and his staff validated the RN’s
approach and laid the foundations for what became a very effective form of fleet air
defense by the summer of 1944.1
Equally important were technical contacts between the two governments, especially the
“Tizard Mission” of September 1940. Sir Henry Tizard, who had been a pilot in World
War I and had later been instrumental in the development and construction of Britain’s
air-defense radars in the late 1930s, led a delegation of British technical experts to
Washington to reveal to the War and Navy departments a number of new devices,
including the cavity magnetron and Frank Whittle’s turbojet engine. This exchange was
“much more than a means for transferring hardware; it also involved the exchange of
intellectual property of all types.”2 Tizard’s mission did more than set the stage for a
variety of scientific and technical cooperative efforts. It also set a precedent of coopera-
tion that persisted even after the war was over.
The British and French governments had already been purchasing U.S.-made aircraft,
starting in 1939. However, with “the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 and the Defense
Aid program which grew out of that legislation, the United States government undertook
the financing and direction of the production of planes for the use of our allies-to-be.”3
But production of planes for the Royal Navy and sharing of scientific and technical infor-
mation were only part of the story of close cooperation between the USN and the RN
during the war. The U.S. Navy also trained a number of RN Fleet Air Arm pilots.
This effort was sponsored in the summer of 1941 by the Navy’s senior aviator, Rear
Adm. John H. Towers, then chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Towers went so far as to
make sure that Fleet Air Arm recruits sent to the United States had access to the latest
and best training aircraft, even if it meant shortchanging U.S. Navy needs. The result of
this program was significant: “The Towers scheme was hugely important to the Fleet
Air Arm. By November 1944 it was providing 44 percent of the pilots required by the
Royal Navy. In particular, the Fleet Air Arm had come to rely on the scheme to turn out
the pilots needed to fly the American aircraft on which it increasingly depended.”4 The
results of this training program, coupled with U.S. aircraft provided through Lend-
Lease, can also be illustrated by considering British carrier attacks against Japanese-
controlled oil production facilities in Sumatra in January 1945. In one attack, of the
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 3
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124 British carrier aircraft involved only twelve had been developed and produced in
the United Kingdom. All the rest had been produced in the United States, and most of
those were flown by Fleet Air Arm pilots trained in the United States.5
After the war, Fleet Air Arm pilots who had been trained in the United States formed a
club called the “British Pensacola Veterans.” There is evidence that many members of
the club strongly supported “the Anglo-American special relationship, especially dur-
ing the tensions of the Cold War. That special relationship was not just a matter of
national self-interest and formal alliances: it existed in the hearts and minds of individ-
uals.”6 It was also deliberately fostered by officers on both sides, especially Admiral
Towers, who, according to his biographer Clark Reynolds, had “such great respect” for
the Royal Navy.7
After World War II
The situation in naval aviation after World War II was in three important ways similar
to that after World War I. First, the huge increase in research and development (R&D)
spending during the war had produced a fistful of important aviation innovations,
including effective jet engines, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air-launched rockets,
ground-based radars to track aircraft, new aircraft designs (such as the delta wing), air-
borne radars, and improved facilities at existing and war-built R&D centers. Second,
rapid demobilization after war’s end had sent masses of former servicemen back into
civilian life and had cut dramatically the output from aircraft manufacturers while
slashing the sizes of their workforces. Third, spending on defense declined severely just
as senior military officers wished to invest in the new technologies produced by
wartime R&D.
Again, as after World War I, there was a national-level argument in the United States
over how military aviation should be organized. The U.S. Army’s aviators won their
campaign to have Congress create a separate aviation service, and the U.S. Air Force
(USAF) was formally established in 1947. Thereafter in the years immediately after
World War II the Air Force and Navy disputed the future role and organization of mili-
tary aviation in deadly earnest, and the status of carrier aviation was always at or near
the center of these disputes.
One factor, however, was entirely new: the introduction of nuclear weapons. For a time
after World War II, it looked as though nuclear weapons had changed the whole face of
war. Given the great size and weight of the first generation of nuclear weapons, it was
clear that only large aircraft could carry them; therefore aircraft carriers and their
planes seemed irrelevant, even useless. The debate over which military arm should
carry nuclear weapons began almost immediately after their first use in August 1945
4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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and continued throughout the period that we examine (1945–55). This debate strongly
affected the development of U.S. carrier aviation.8
As a reaction to the increasing importance of its own aviation arm, the Navy during
World War II had restructured its own aviation organization. In Washington, in a
major organizational change, staff elements of BuAer had been reassigned to the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). This reorganization moved Navy aviation
in a direction almost opposite to that taken after World War I. When the Bureau of
Aeronautics was created in 1921, its official responsibilities had included developing
requirements for new aircraft; drawing up the Navy’s budget for aircraft procurement,
maintenance, training, and R&D; manufacturing specialized components and even
whole aircraft at the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and creating
and controlling the training (and to some degree the promotion) of naval aviators.
These broad powers made the chief of the bureau one of the most visible and
influential Navy officers in Washington.
It was many of these responsibilities that were transferred out of BuAer during and
immediately after World War II, and the bureau was left mainly with the functions of
procuring aircraft and aircraft ordnance, setting the Navy’s aviation research agenda,
and working with the Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) to plan the design of new air-
craft carriers and the modifications of existing carriers. In short, OPNAV removed
most of BuAer’s policy-making authority, as well as the responsibility to search for or
create the evidence that would support Navy aviation policies. As we shall show, these
changes in structure and authority moved BuAer personnel away from thinking about
aviation operations and focused their professional attention on developing and procur-
ing high-performance aircraft. That change in focus also altered the way that senior
officers in OPNAV and members of Congress would assess the work done by BuAer
and its industry contractors.
The period after World War II was therefore extraordinary in many ways—indeed, in
more ways than had been true of the period immediately after World War I. The level
of uncertainty for naval aviation personnel was incredibly high. Could surface ships
survive nuclear attack? Would high-speed, high-endurance submarines drive surface
warships from the oceans? Would developments in radar lead to the invention of
“death rays” that would kill the pilots of high-flying aircraft? Could a carrier’s intercep-
tors defend it against attacks by supersonic bombers? If the Soviet Union—whose pri-
mary military power rested in its army and land-based air forces—posed a grave
danger to the United States, was a powerful navy even needed, or should scarce defense
resources go to the Air Force and Army?
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In November 1946, Vice Adm. Robert B. Carney, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Logistics, noted in an “eyes only” memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations,
Adm. Chester Nimitz, that “current trends in the weight, size, speed, and characteristics
of aircraft may have a serious adverse effect on the utility of existing carriers and even
on the overall importance of carrier aviation in the future.”9 That was a formal way of
saying, “Carrier aviation—our most powerful tool in the Pacific in World War II—will
pass its prime as an operational tool unless carriers grow as new aircraft grow.”
Even before Carney penned his concerns to Nimitz, John L. Sullivan, Acting Secretary
of the Navy, had urged President Harry Truman to allow the Navy to convert its large
carrier force to a nuclear strike force by altering the carriers and their largest attack air-
craft to deliver existing nuclear weapons.10 At about the same time, a note circulated
inside OPNAV suggesting that the Royal Navy was preparing to modify at least some of
its carriers so that they could launch and recover the very heavy bombers required to
lift large nuclear weapons like that used against Nagasaki in August 1945.11 What this
sort of evidence shows is that the level of strategic and technological uncertainty was so
great right after World War II as to be almost overwhelming at times. Naval personnel
in both the United States and Great Britain had to attempt to see their way forward in
the face of numerous technological, strategic, political, and financial challenges.
From our perspective, what makes this period so interesting (and also so difficult to
study) is the lack of “main organizational players” in the U.S. Navy of the kind that we
discovered in doing the research for our earlier book. In the 1920s and ’30s, the Bureau of
Aeronautics was a strong bureaucratic actor within the Navy and the key obstacle to the
unification of all military aviation in one executive department. In the 1920s especially,
BuAer was markedly experimental, supporting the installation of aircraft on submarines,
aircraft carriers, surface ships (mostly cruisers and battleships), and even on aircraft-
carrying rigid airships. After 1943, however, BuAer lost its commanding position in the
Washington arena, and the process of making naval aviation policy became shared among
different Navy offices. The “paper trail” of decisions is therefore harder to follow.
Obscuring the decision-making process even more for the postwar years was the
decline in the influence of the Navy’s General Board and of the Naval War College. The
former was a focal point of decision making in the years between World War I and
World War II. The board, which reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy, reviewed
the rationales for ship designs, which meant that it also reviewed the linkages between
any major innovation and the military requirements it was designed to meet. The secret
hearings held by the General Board were forums where major strategic, operational,
and technical issues were discussed by senior officers and technical experts. The board
survived efforts of Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King—Navy commander in chief and Chief of
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Naval Operations during the war—to eliminate it entirely, but it lost its standing as the
place where serious issues were discussed, argued about, and then (usually) resolved
through a process of weighing hard evidence. As a result, the postwar discussions
among officers from BuAer, the Bureau of Ships (which designed carriers), and
OPNAV did not match the quality of the board’s prewar proceedings.
The Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, had pioneered war gaming even
before World War I, but under post–World War I presidents such as Rear Admirals Wil-
liam S. Sims and William V. Pratt the college explored the possibilities of naval (espe-
cially carrier) aviation in a deliberate and disciplined manner that produced
hypotheses that often framed the annual “fleet problems.” But during World War II, the
responsibility for solving operational and tactical naval problems shifted to the fleet
commands, especially to the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. For example, the concept of the
combat information center (CIC) for U.S. Navy carriers grew from experiments in the
summer of 1941 and from experience in the battles of Coral Sea and Midway in 1942.12
The CIC for surface ships was first developed by an officer serving on a destroyer in the
fighting around Guadalcanal in the fall of 1942 and was then strongly supported by
Admiral Nimitz, and—very soon thereafter—CIC procedures were taught to new per-
sonnel in schools adjacent to the combat zone by the combat veterans themselves.13
Because of the rise in the influence and responsibility of the Pacific Fleet staff, the
Naval War College did not regain in 1946 the responsibility it had had before World
War II as the source of systematic and innovative tactical and operational thinking.
Thus by 1946 three of the four “players” critical to innovation in Navy aviation before
World War II (BuAer, the Naval War College, and the General Board) had lost their
functions, and that loss had deprived the Navy of a major innovative “tool.”
But the changes had not all been for the worse. In World War II, naval aviators in the
U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy again worked closely together and began a process of
reciprocal visits and exchanging information that would help both services over the
next ten years. The U.S. Navy also came out of the war with a powerful, experienced
carrier force and a cadre of officers confident enough to take on the challenges posed
by nuclear weapons and new technologies, such as jet propulsion. Finally, technologies
pioneered in World War II, especially jet propulsion, aircraft designed for supersonic
flight, and electronics, challenged the imaginations of the foremost aircraft designers
and aircraft propulsion engineers in U.S. industry. These individuals sought ever
greater aircraft performance within the boundaries set by available and future technol-
ogy, and the best naval aviators in both the United Kingdom and the United States
shared their enthusiasm.
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The Plan of the Monograph
Readers will have to tolerate our tacking back and forth as we trace all the threads and
outline their interrelationships. Ours is a complex story. Pieces of it have been told
before—for example, in retired Vice Adm. Jerry Miller’s Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft
Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation, published by the Smithsonian Institu-
tion in 2001, and aeronautical engineer Tommy H. Thomason’s U.S. Naval Air Superi-
ority and Strike from the Sea. But to our knowledge no one has up to now put the pieces
together in the way that we will in the pages to follow.
We will take major issues one at a time, from the development of reliable and powerful
jet engines to the work of engineers trying to design and install on carriers the cata-
pults and arresting gear required to launch and recover ever heavier and faster aircraft.
We will also link these issues. When we began this study, we thought that those linkages
would stand out once we examined the material available in archival and other sources.
For example, we had read in several places that when British naval aviators showed
their counterparts in the U.S. Navy the concept of the angled flight deck, the Americans
saw its value almost immediately and embraced it. That seemed to make the process of
adopting an innovation within the U.S. Navy straightforward. But matters turned out
to be more complex than that, as we shall show.
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BuAer before World War II
Before World War II, the Bureau of Aeronautics was a unique institution within the
Navy. Its leaders were charged with developing and procuring aircraft; training pilots,
crewmen, and maintenance personnel; working with Army aviators and the National
Advisory Committee on Aeronautics to advance aviation research; and codifying avia-
tion combat doctrine and routine flying procedures. Command of BuAer was in the
hands of Navy officers, almost all of whom were qualified pilots.
As in the case of the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd), officers in charge of and
manning the divisions of BuAer came from service in the fleet and returned to fleet
assignments when their tours in the bureau were over. Also like BuOrd, BuAer had
charge of a large government-owned industrial establishment, in BuAer’s case the
Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia. But BuAer’s primary aircraft suppliers were pri-
vate firms, such as Grumman, Douglas, Consolidated, Curtiss, and Martin. The Naval
Aircraft Factory built aircraft and other equipment (such as catapults) that the pri-
vately owned industrial base could not or would not provide.1 To get high-performance
aircraft, BuAer’s basic strategy was to promote the development of high-horsepower
aircraft engines and then invite the private aircraft manufacturers to build various
types of planes around them. BuAer’s periodic design competitions had led to
improved piston-engine fighters and bombers for the Navy’s carriers.
In 1937, what might be called the “aviation community”—composed of civilian and
military pilots, engineers in the aircraft industry, a few scientists in universities such as
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and aircraft and airline industry
executives—was still relatively small. Officers in BuAer often were friends of their
counterparts in industry. The exchange of information among them was usually rapid
and informal, despite government regulations that formalized the process for procur-
ing aircraft. In just a few years, this community would swell with a new generation of
pilots, engineers, technical specialists, and executives. Within a decade, officers and
civilian engineers in the U.S. Navy would be set on the task of bringing jet aircraft into
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the Navy’s carrier force. None of these people could see that future in 1937—or even in
1940. Almost all were focused on developing, fielding, and flying the latest piston-
engine planes.
In 1937, BuAer was led by a rear admiral. His immediate deputy was a Navy captain.
Below them in the hierarchy were two major organizational branches—the Executive
Branch, with divisions for planning, training, and Marine Corps aviation, and a Mate-
rial Branch, with divisions for engineering, maintenance, lighter-than-air vehicles, and
procurement. BuAer also contained an administrative section and a financial division.
In January 1937, the Plans Division developed the requirements for new aircraft, in
consultation with the Engineering Division. Working with the Flight Division, the offi-
cers in these other two offices served as intermediaries between the fleet and the air-
craft production firms, translating fleet requirements into specifications that the
Procurement Division would issue as the bases for periodic design competitions.2
Using this organization, the Navy had taken carrier aviation from its infancy to its
adolescence. In the early 1920s, simulations at the Naval War College based on BuAer
projections had shown the military potential of a “pulse” of striking power delivered
by a carrier’s planes. By 1929, using for the first time in a major fleet exercise the big
carriers (and converted battle cruisers) Saratoga and Lexington, carrier commanders
had shown that the potential of carriers suggested by the Naval War College simula-
tions was attainable.3 After that, what the Navy’s aviators wanted from their bureau was
more powerful aircraft with longer ranges. With two new carriers (Yorktown and Enter-
prise) under construction in 1937, officers like Cdr. Marc A. Mitscher, who headed
BuAer’s Flight Division, were working to provide them the best possible airplanes.
Both new carriers were designed for the pattern of flight operations first worked out on
the experimental carrier Langley in 1925. Aircraft returning to the ship were taken
aboard over the stern, then pushed forward to a “deck park” near the bow. A wire bar-
rier was then hoisted into place behind the parked aircraft. It protected the aircraft in
the deck park from being damaged by any plane that missed the cross-deck arresting-
gear wires while attempting a landing. Once all planes were aboard, they were moved
back to the after end of the flight deck and readied for their next sorties.4
Rapid Progress in Aircraft Performance Just before the War
Navy aviation benefited from the rolling cycle of war games, fleet exercises, and aircraft
improvements in a number of ways. One of the most important was in the procure-
ment of aircraft from private manufacturers. For example, the first carrier (Ranger)
designed as such from the beginning was not large enough to carry the torpedo planes
that had been flown from the much larger converted battle cruisers Lexington and
1 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:53:43 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Saratoga. In 1934, therefore, as a means to give Ranger a serious strike capability, BuAer
asked various manufacturers to submit designs for a new dive-bomber. Northrop won
the competition in 1935 with its design of what became the XBT-1. This aircraft
reached operational squadrons in April 1938. A modified version of this plane would
become the famous Douglas SBD Dauntless of World War II fame.5
In 1931, when Ranger’s design was approved, the potential of torpedo planes seemed to
be very limited. Yet the fleet problems suggested that an effective torpedo plane, oper-
ated in conjunction with bombers and fighters, posed a distinct threat to even the larg-
est ships. Moreover, advances in aircraft engine technology indicated to officers in
BuAer and to the members of the General Board that an improved torpedo plane could
be built. Accordingly, BuAer issued a solicitation for torpedo plane designs in 1934. The
strongest response to the solicitation was a design by Douglas Aircraft of the Navy’s
first monoplane attack aircraft—later christened the TBD Devastator. Though limited
in range when carrying a thousand-pound torpedo, when it appeared the plane seemed
a good match for the new carriers Yorktown and Enterprise.
The rapidly improving performance of radial air-cooled piston engines for carrier air-
craft in the 1930s led to dramatic changes in aircraft performance, as illustrated by the
following two charts. Figure 1-1 shows the steep increase in fighter speed from 1927 to
1941 for the three navies (USN, RN, and Imperial Japanese Navy) that possessed carri-
ers. Figure 1-2 depicts the increase in service ceiling for selected fighters over the same
period. This performance increase gave carrier aircraft dramatically improved fighting
power.
Incremental improvements in engine horsepower, the switch from biplanes to mono-
planes, and the effectiveness of hydraulic aircraft controls and streamlining yielded
dramatic improvements in performance.6 The fleet problems showed that it was essen-
tial for the Navy to take advantage of these improvements.
To do that, BuAer sponsored another dive-bomber design competition in 1938. The
winners were the Curtiss XSB2C-1 and the Brewster XSB2A-1. The first became the
well-known SB2C Helldiver, which was to be produced in great quantities in World
War II. The Brewster design was developed as the SB2A Buccaneer, which was ordered
as a prototype in April 1939, produced in limited quantities during the war, and never
saw combat.
The dive-bomber competition was followed by one in 1939 for a new torpedo bomber.
That competition produced two rival designs: Grumman’s XTBF-1 Avenger and Chance
Vought’s XTBU-1 Sea Wolf (which was eventually produced by Consolidated Aircraft).
Grumman signed the contract to produce the Avenger prototype in 1940, and the air-
craft made its first flight in August 1941. The Sea Wolf ’s loaded weight was greater than
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the Avenger’s, and its range with a torpedo was less, so the Avenger design was chosen
by BuAer’s evaluators as the basis of the bulk of Navy carrier heavy strike aircraft pro-
duction during World War II. As in the case of the dive-bombers, the growth in capa-
bility from 1934 to 1939 was impressive. The Devastator design of 1934 could range
only seven hundred miles carrying a thousand-pound torpedo. The TBF Avenger (the
1939 design) could fly 1,200 miles with a bomb or torpedo load of 1,600 pounds.7
Holding to its three-year dive-bomber design cycle, BuAer sponsored a third dive-
bomber competition in 1941, before the United States entered World War II. Two pro-
totypes came out of this competition: the Curtiss XSB3C-1 and the Douglas XSB2D-1.
Curtiss stopped development of its prototype at the end of 1942. Douglas signed a con-
tract in 1941 for the development of its prototype and flew the plane for the first time
1 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
FIGURE 1-1
Fighter Speed, in Knots, for Selected Fighters—Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and
Imperial Japanese Navy
Fairey Flycatcher Boeing F2B-1 Nakajima A1N1
Hawker Osprey III Grumman FF-2 Nakajima A2N1
Hawker Nimrod IIS Grumman F3F-1 Mitsubishi A5M4
Blackburn Skua Grumman F4F-4 Mitsubishi A6M2
Gloster Sea Gladiator
Hawker Sea Hurricane
Source: Norman Friedman, Carrier Air Power (New York: Rutledge, 1981), app. 2.
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in April 1943, as the BTD-1. A modification of the BTD-1 eventually became the
XBT2D-1 Sky Pirate in 1944, and a further modification of the Sky Pirate became the
famous Douglas AD-1 Skyraider, ordered into production in April 1945. The process
created in the 1920s to tap the results of war games and fleet exercises to set the
requirements for new aircraft had worked.
Challenges to BuAer Starting in 1941
By 1941, Marc Mitscher had been promoted to captain and was assistant chief of BuAer
under the bureau’s nationally known head, Rear Adm. John Towers. Other younger avi-
ation pioneers had also been promoted. Alfred M. Pride, a catapult designer, was now a
commander and the staff officer representing Rear Admiral Towers on the Aeronautical
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FIGURE 1-2
Service Ceiling, in Feet, for Selected Fighters—Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and Imperial
Japanese Navy
Fairey Flycatcher I Boeing F2B-1 Nakajima A1N1
Hawker Osprey III Grumman F2F-1 Mitsubishi A5M4
Hawker Nimrod IIS Grumman F4F-4 Mitsubishi A6M2
Gloster Sea Gladiator
Hawker Sea Hurricane
Source: Friedman, Carrier Air Power, app. 2.
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Board, where his task was to facilitate Army–Navy cooperation. Capt. DeWitt Ramsey
was head of the Plans Division in BuAer; his counterpart in the Procurement Division
was Cdr. Lawrence Richardson. Mitscher, Ramsey, and Richardson were part of an
“inner circle” advising BuAer chief Towers, along with Capt. Sidney Kraus, head of the
Material Branch in BuAer, and up-and-coming Lt. George Anderson, who would even-
tually (in 1961) become Chief of Naval Operations.8 A bright young engineer by the
name of George Spangenberg worked directly under William Z. Frisbie, the respected
head of the Design Coordination and Contract Airplane Design section in BuAer’s
Engineering Division. Spangenberg described Frisbie “as the senior technical advisor to
the command structure of the Bureau of Aeronautics.”9
These officers and civilians were preoccupied with the tasks of preparing the U.S. Navy
for participation in a coalition that would fight and win World War II. Some numbers
reveal the extent to which Navy and Marine Corps aviation changed between 1937 and
1941. In 1937 the Navy had 972 combat aircraft, 113 transport and utility planes, and
161 trainers.10 The figures for 1941 were 1,774, 183, and 1,444, respectively. In 1937 the
Navy had 1,260 pilots; the Marines had 142. In 1941, the Navy had 4,112 pilots, and the
Marines had 480.11 When Rear Admiral Towers was appointed chief of BuAer in June
1939, he had under his command sixty-six officers and 171 civilians. By the summer of
1941, he had 176 officers and 518 civilians, many of them crammed into the rather
primitive BuAer spaces in “Main Navy” on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C.12
Towers and his subordinates faced wide-ranging and ambitious requirements. They
had simultaneously to ramp up the production of aircraft, recruit and train hundreds
of new pilots, construct new bases for training and for combat use, and find ways to
distribute the aircraft being produced among the Army, Navy, and foreign buyers (then
mainly Great Britain, France, and China). They also had to fund research and develop-
ment of new aviation technologies. All of this had to be done in peacetime, often
against strong congressional opposition. In 1940, for example, Admiral Towers could
not persuade Congress to fund a five-year program of Navy aeronautical research,
“especially in the revolutionary field of jet propulsion.”13
Selected Navy officers discovered just how important that research could be, when they
were briefed by Sir Henry Tizard and his colleagues in Washington in September 1940.
The “Tizard Mission” showed the Americans a working cavity magnetron. The Naval
Research Laboratory had already developed and tested lower-power air search radars,
so the American officers and scientists knew how important the cavity magnetron was.
(To exploit its potential, the Americans would set up what became known as the
Radiation Laboratory at MIT. Together, researchers at the laboratory and engineers
in such firms as General Electric would develop and produce a series of effective
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microwave radars.) Tizard’s staff also showed their American counterparts the specifi-
cations of the turbojet engine developed by Frank Whittle. That led the National Advi-
sory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) to cooperate with the Army and Navy in
expanding the limited research into jet propulsion starting in the summer of 1941.14
The key point, however, is that American army and naval aviators and their civilian col-
leagues had their hands full in 1941. In his detailed biography of BuAer chief Towers,
historian Clark Reynolds notes that “Towers was lukewarm to diverting funds, person-
nel, and precious time to unproved concepts.”15 Given all the work Towers and his com-
mand had to do to prepare for war, the admiral’s reluctance to support “unproved
concepts” should come as no surprise. Towers, his subordinates, and their successors in
BuAer faced a huge task—acquiring thousands of first-rate aircraft and the pilots to
man them, as well as the maintenance personnel to support a huge naval air force. The
1,774 combat aircraft force of 1941 mushroomed to one of 29,125 combat aircraft by
1945. The number of Navy pilots jumped from 4,112 in 1941 to 49,819 in 1945, and the
number of Marine pilots increased from 480 to 10,276 in the same time period. The
number of enlisted personnel needed to support this dramatic growth went from
13,691 (both Navy and Marines) in 1941 to 337,718 in 1945.16
The First Signs of an Impending Crisis
The Bureau of Aeronautics had developed “standard operating procedures” in the years
before World War II to harness the skills of scientists, engineers, and airplane manufac-
turers on behalf of carrier aviation. BuAer’s design competitions and its investments in
piston-engine development promoted incremental but dramatic improvement in the
performance of fighter and attack aircraft. Yet the process of learning to operate these
constantly improving aircraft from carriers, and then using the planes to defeat an
enemy, was dogged by great uncertainty.
For example, in 1935 and 1936 there was a serious debate among carrier aviators about
the proper design of fighter aircraft for carrier squadrons. Carriers were mainly offen-
sive weapons. In 1935 and 1936 (and even in the spring of 1941), no navy knew how to
protect a carrier from an effective strike staged by opposing carrier-based bombers. If a
carrier had lots of fighters for defense, then its strike potential went down. If its strike
potential—indicated by the number of bombers and torpedo planes it carried—was
high, then its airborne defense was weak. Navy aerial strike doctrine in 1935 was clear:
“In naval warfare control of the air is obtained through destruction of the enemies [sic]
carriers, tenders, and bases, as his air strength can be reduced much more effectively in
this manner than by attrition in the air.”17 That implied using fighters as escorts for the
bombers and not as defensive weapons, especially given the fact that existing fighters
were hardly faster than the bombers they were supposed to shoot down.
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At the same time, the fleet’s aviators wanted BuAer to continue fighter development “in
order to be in a position to capitalize on it should developments warrant.”18 As the
commander of the fleet’s carrier squadrons put it in a memorandum to the Com-
mander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in April 1936, “The need for speed [in fighters] cannot be
overstressed. It is the first and fundamental requirement in a fighting airplane and no
other characteristic is of equal importance in the design.”19 Put another way, “protec-
tion of aircraft formations is not an efficient or desirable use of single-seat [fighters].”20
The U.S. fleet commander in chief, Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, endorsed the letter with
these comments: “I agree with every word. Sound, logical & unanswerable.”21 In May
1936, Admiral Reeves sent a confidential letter to the Chief of Naval Operations,
through the chief of BuAer, stating his views in strong language: “No fleet commander
can give carrier space and personnel to squadrons of so-called fighters that cannot
destroy enemy planes and are equally worthless for other uses. And yet, no fleet com-
mander can submit passively to the attacks of enemy bombers. THE FLEET MUST
HAVE AIRPLANES THAT CAN FIGHT OTHER AIRPLANES.”22 The Naval War College
war games and the actual fleet problems had led Reeves to this insight.
BuAer’s response, however, was not initially positive. Officers in the Plans and Engi-
neering divisions took issue with the commander in chief ’s argument as they reviewed
his proposal in late May and June 1936. Commander Mitscher, then head of the Flight
Division in BuAer, summed up the bureau’s concerns by saying that “one fighter squad-
ron per carrier should be discontinued until this argument is settled. Keep sufficient
fighters on say [sic] two carriers to carry on the development.”23 To keep development
alive, the Plans Division of BuAer asked the Engineering Division in October 1936 to
conduct a preliminary design study of a supercharged twin-engine, heavily armed
fighter.24 Rear Adm. Arthur B. Cook, BuAer’s chief, took the next step in February 1937,
by directing the assistant chief of BuAer to plan on developing a “two-engine single
seat fighter.”25 Accordingly, the bureau issued a “Request for Competitive Designs and
Proposals” to industry in March 1937 that called for a two-engine, single-seat fighter
with four .50-caliber guns, a landing speed of 65 mph, and an economical speed range
of a thousand miles.26
Industry’s response was not seen as satisfactory. Part of the difficulty lay with the
bureau, as Captain Kraus, head of the Material Branch, pointed out to the assistant
chief of BuAer on 23 July 1937: “The maximum speed of prospective shore-based
bombers is derived from supercharging at high altitude. In order to utilize carrier-
based fighters against them, the fighters must be supercharged to equivalent altitude.
The Bureau design of two-engined fighters did not adopt this means of obtaining per-
formance.”27 However, the basic problem wasn’t BuAer’s. Instead, it was the fleet’s. Fleet
air commanders wanted the landing speed of carrier aircraft kept to 65 mph without
1 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:53:48 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
power—that is, the pilot, on getting the “cut” signal from the landing signal officer,
was supposed to shut down his engine just before his plane engaged the carrier’s
arresting gear. As Captain Kraus pointed out, this requirement was keeping BuAer and
industry from developing very high-powered aircraft with supercharging and high
wing loadings.
What was needed as the basis of an adequate carrier-based interceptor was supercharg-
ing (for high-altitude performance) and high wing loading—which meant a heavier
twin-engine plane that landed with its engines still turning over. As Kraus put it, “The
use of power in deck landings permits the twin-engined design to develop its inherent
superiority in performance.” Moreover, “it does not follow that the operating units
would not be willing to adopt a different landing technique in exchange for outstand-
ing results in performance.” As Kraus wrote, “The consistent use of power in landing is
believed to be a reasonable development.”28
But if the heavier, twin-engine aircraft (fighters or bombers) were to land with power
on in order to give their pilots more control, the whole concept of the deck park for-
ward on the flight deck would have to be reconsidered. As noted above, a plane that
missed the arresting-gear wires would be stopped by the wires that formed a barrier
across the flight deck and shielded aircraft that had already landed. But if a relatively
large plane, landing with its engines running, hit the deck at a speed greater than sixty-
five miles per hour and bounced over the arresting-gear wires stretched across the deck,
it might hurdle over the barrier as well and pile into the planes parked forward. Kraus
was well aware of this possible danger, and as a result he recommended that “experi-
ments in deck landing with existing twin-engined aircraft regardless of their military
suitability are indicated, if only for prudence.”29
Here was a clue to the future of carrier operations: larger, heavier, more powerful
planes landing at higher speeds with their engines still running. Kraus did not favor
this option in 1937. He wanted an aircraft like the F8F Bearcat that Grumman devel-
oped in 1944—a lightweight but high-powered single-engine plane with a rapid rate of
climb, a powerful armament, and a relatively low landing speed. But industry had yet to
produce the sort of engine that could power such a plane, and there is no evidence that
senior officers took Kraus’s memorandum for what it was—a vision of a very different
future for carrier operations.
Instead, BuAer kept after the concept of a small, light plane with high speed and
enough endurance to serve as a defensive fighter. NACA’s Director of Aeronautical
Research supported the effort, saying in April 1940 that “a fighter-type airplane can be
designed, using a radial air-cooled engine, which will weigh between 4,000 and 5,000
pounds and will have a speed of 400 miles per hour.”30 BuAer’s Plans and Engineering
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divisions had been studying the feasibility of such a design, and they summed up their
analyses in a July 1940 memorandum to BuAer chief Towers.31 As the memorandum
pointed out, the key to high performance in an interceptor was the engine, and the
most powerful of the recent engine designs—pushing two thousand horsepower—were
heavy and consumed a lot of fuel. To get a lighter, smaller plane, the Navy would have
to either find a way to get great power from a dramatically lighter engine or accept sig-
nificantly reduced endurance from a plane that carried less fuel. In addition, the inter-
ceptor would need a heavy armament, and the machine guns and their ammunition
would add to the plane’s weight. In short, the combat requirements of high speed, rapid
rate of climb, firepower, and endurance led logically to a larger, heavier airplane like the
XF4U-1—and even beyond it to heavier twin-engine designs. To make matters worse,
these powerful aircraft would have to land (with engine power off) at relatively high
speeds—at least 75 mph.
The design of the airplane was beginning to tax the physical capabilities of existing and
planned carriers and their equipment. In July 1940, the heads of BuAer’s Plans and
Engineering divisions knew what they wanted: “a further extension in range and power
of our striking force, involving basic ranges of 1,500 rather than one thousand miles
with fuel for a minimum of 2,250 miles in all types, and more effective and powerful
offensive weapons.” They also believed that “advances in power plants and aerodynam-
ics” would allow them to attain the goal of “providing a homogeneous carrier force
which can strike a heavier total blow at a greater distance.”32 They did not discuss the
operational and technological implications of their efforts to develop improved air-
planes for long-range attacks. Yet this was just the kind of question that the General
Board had assessed and reassessed all through the 1930s. BuAer’s division heads—
focused as they were on aircraft performance—did not see operational and technologi-
cal trade-offs as the challenges they would soon become.
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BuAer in World War II
During World War II, the Bureau of Aeronautics tried to accelerate its peacetime pro-
cess of development. This effort largely failed. In peacetime, the transition from an
attack-aircraft design competition to the first operational aircraft took about three
years. Unfortunately for the Navy and BuAer, this schedule could not be compressed,
because the fleet’s wartime requirements shifted dramatically while the aircraft indus-
try was trying to produce new prototypes and thousands of approved aircraft models.
For example, BuAer ordered prototypes of the Curtiss XBTC-2, an attack aircraft capa-
ble of carrying a large torpedo 1,200 miles, in December 1943. But as the August 1944
Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin pointed out, “changes in requirements and prog-
ress in equipment and materials during the two-and-one-half year period of develop-
ment . . . made the airplane obsolete in many respects.”1
This turn of events should not have surprised anyone in BuAer. One reason the devel-
opment of the XBTC-2 was delayed was that BuAer directed Curtiss in the summer of
1942 to put a surface-search radar into the XBTC-1 and XBTC-2 so that the planes
could more easily find enemy targets. This had been a “lesson learned” from the battles
of the Coral Sea and Midway. Unfortunately, early models of such radars were relatively
large and heavy, and placing them on the prototypes added so much time to the planes’
development and testing schedules that the XBTC-1 was canceled in 1943 and the
XBTC-2 was dropped from the Navy’s aviation program after the end of World War II.2
Moreover, there was a conflict between quantity (getting enough airplanes for the war)
and quality (getting airplanes that were good enough to hold their own with anything
that the enemy put up). As a consequence, the manufacturers adopted a strategy of
research and design that emphasized integrating improved components into produc-
tion aircraft. This strategy had two important implications. First, it fostered the accu-
mulation of improvements over short time periods, by which each new aircraft model
maintained a rough parity or increased its advantage against enemy aircraft. Second,
the strategy complemented the ability of U.S. industrial engineers to crank out a great
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many planes and trainers for newly recruited pilots. Demands for improved aircraft
were met quickly; mass production mattered more than revolutionary design. Curtiss,
for example, instead of investing its engineering talent and its capital in ventures like
the XSB3C-1, worked on refining and improving the SB2C Helldiver—developing and
manufacturing almost a thousand SB2C-1s, over 1,100 SB2C-3s, more than two thou-
sand SB2C-4s, and over nine hundred SB2C-5s.3 Similarly, Grumman poured talent,
time, and money into its TBF/TBM Avenger, producing TBF-2s and TBF-3s with more
powerful engines and various modified Avengers for photo reconnaissance and radar
search and warning.4
In short, developing brand-new aircraft was more risky than upgrading existing mod-
els. The large amount of information that flowed into organizations like BuAer from
the fighting forces overwhelmed the procedures that had been used to collect, analyze,
integrate, and transmit information that designers needed to create new airplanes. As
Navy historian Lee M. Pearson pointed out in 1951, “so various were the sources [of
information] that it is impossible to trace the flow of information [into BuAer]. The
official reports of task forces and CinCPac [Commander in Chief, Pacific], the action
reports of the squadrons, special reports, and interviews with officers upon their return
from the war theaters were among the chief sources.”5 BuAer civilian engineers and
their aviator colleagues faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they did their best to assess
what was happening in combat and use their assessments to improve developing and
in-production aircraft. On the other hand, once they nailed down a set of required or
desired specifications, they “fixed” what historian Pearson rightly called “the direction
of development” for at least eighteen months—no matter what was happening in com-
bat or promised to come out of laboratory research.6
An indicator of this problem is BuAer’s effort during the war to prompt industry to
develop large, very-long-range, single-seat attack aircraft. In 1943, the bureau asked
Curtiss, Kaiser-Fleetwing, and Martin to build the planned successors to the SB2C
Helldiver. The characteristics of the three prototypes are listed in table 2-1, along with
comparative characteristics for the in-production SB2C.7
2 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
CHARACTERISTICS
CURTISS
SB2C-1C
CURTISS
XBTC-2
KAISER-FLEETWING
XBTK-1 MARTIN XBTM-1
Design gross weight
in lbs.
14,720 17,910 12,728 19,000
Designed range
in miles
1,100 with
1,000-lb. bomb
1,200 with
torpedo
1,200 with
torpedo
1,200 with
torpedo
Prototype date 1940 1946 1945 1944
TABLE 2-1
Characteristics of Aircraft to Replace the SB2C
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With the exception of the Kaiser-Fleetwing XBTK-1, the single-seat successors to the
multiseat SB2C Helldiver were larger and heavier than the original. The XBTK-1 was
intended for use on escort carriers, and so its design reversed the trend toward larger,
single-seat carrier aircraft that could carry either bombs or torpedoes.8
BuAer’s 1943 requests to industry were a wartime improvisation.9 BuAer, acting on
what civilian engineer George Spangenberg termed “invaluable” information from the
fleet—from combat—was trying to provide the operating forces with planes that could
range farther and faster and carry more ordnance.10 But the 1943 initiative was based
on assessment of 1942 operations—that is, on carrier operations that preceded the
deployment of the SB2C Helldiver as the mainstay of carrier dive-bomber squadrons.
The peacetime cycle of design competitions, prototype testing, deployment, and assess-
ment of experience could not be followed during the war, and BuAer in 1943 was in the
unenviable position of trying to develop a successor to a dive-bomber (the SB2C
Helldiver) that had not even been deployed. As Spangenberg recalled, “most of the pro-
curement rules got suspended.”11
Very important were informal contacts between BuAer personnel and industry engi-
neers. These contacts were facilitated by the intelligence and technical experience of the
people on both sides of the relationship. Both Spangenberg and Douglas designer
Edward Heinemann, for example, noted in their respective memoirs the creativity of
Cdr. (later Capt.) Walter S. Diehl, who was the senior aerodynamicist in BuAer in
1941 and the author of a pioneering study entitled Engineering Aerodynamics.12
Spangenberg also held Heinemann in high regard. As he said in his oral history,
“Heinemann’s real strength was a good understanding of the entire airplane. He did a
superb job of trying to find out what the Navy needed and trying to give them what
they needed and he also had a superb engineering organization.”13 On his part,
Spangenberg aided Douglas by helping Heinemann’s assistant, Leo Devlin, learn how
Heinemann and his colleagues—acting as the Navy’s agents—could gain major benefits
from a comprehensive aircraft weight reduction and control program.14
Informal contacts and conversations between government and industry engineers did
not, however, completely displace the formal processes of acquisition. BuAer engineers
and Navy pilots fresh from operations kept control of the way that performance
requirements were drawn up, and the engineers working in industry had to design and
build to specifications and standards set by the BuAer staff. One exception to this was
the development by Boeing of the XF8B-1. As Spangenberg remembered, “The F8B was
started with an unsolicited proposal from Boeing,” whose chief engineer, Wellwood E.
Beall, had decided that he and his colleagues could produce a better long-range fighter
design if they were free of the Navy’s normally mandatory specifications and standards.
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“Boeing set the configuration,” according to Spangenberg, but the plane was, in his
words, “inferior as a naval carrier airplane.”15
A more recent study of this airplane’s history takes a different view—that the Navy
actually encouraged Boeing in the firm’s effort and that “Boeing generally made a good
faith effort to meet the requirements of a specification that was, in fact, unsound.”16
Our point is that this particular design was the product of an extemporized develop-
ment process accepted by BuAer officials because the routine peacetime process was
inadequate for wartime needs. As Edward Heinemann notes in his memoir, he and his
counterparts in industry therefore worked under intense “pressures of competition,
reinforced by the demands of war and, in no little way, patriotic overzealousness.”17
BuAer aggressively pursued ever larger and heavier aircraft both before and during the
war. This trend also extended to fighters, as table 2-2 shows.18
The trend is clear: with the exception of the F8F-1 Bearcat, the fighters got heavier and
larger, and their range grew. The Grumman F7F Tigercat was a twin-engine airplane,
and the Boeing XF8B-1, though designed as a long-range fighter, was seen by BuAer as
a fighter-bomber. The F8F-1 Bearcat was a deck-launched interceptor, designed to get
into the air quickly and climb to high altitude before enemy attack aircraft could over-
whelm a carrier’s limited defensive combat air patrol.
The growth in size and weight of Navy carrier aircraft is even more apparent when the
various Navy heavy fighters and bombers are compared with land-based Army bombers
deployed in combat in 1942. Table 2-3 compares the Army’s A-20A and B-25 bombers
with the larger Navy prototype and production carrier fighters and bombers.19
2 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
AIRCRAFT INITIAL CONTRACT GROSS WEIGHT (LBS.) RANGE (STATUTE MI.)
Grumman F4F Wildcat 1936 8,000 for the F4F-4 770
Grumman XF5F-1
Skyrocket
1938 10,000 for prototype 780
Vought XF5U-1
Flying Flapjack
1939 16,700 for nonflying
prototype
700
Vought F4U Corsair 1938 12,000 for F4U-1D 1,000
Grumman F6F Hellcat 1941 13,000 for F6F-5 945
Grumman F7F Tigercat 1941 25,700 1,200
Boeing XF8B-1 1943 20,500 2,780
Grumman F8F-1
Bearcat
1943 9,400 1,100
TABLE 2-2
BuAer’s Fighter Aircraft Characteristics, 1936–43
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Navy aircraft developed during the war became rough equivalents of the early-war Army
models. They grew progressively larger and heavier and carried very impressive ordnance
loads. Indeed, they even began to outgrow the ability of the CV 9 (Essex)–class carriers to
launch and recover them safely and efficiently.
Events in 1942 suggested to BuAer’s leaders that even larger carrier aircraft were
required, and so the bureau officially asked Grumman to develop a twin-engine tor-
pedo bomber for use from carriers.20 This was the XTB2F-1, which only in 1944 was
assembled as an engineering mock-up so that Grumman and BuAer engineers could
get an accurate estimate of the plane’s weight and dimensions. If built, it would have
had a loaded weight of about forty-five thousand pounds and a range of approxi-
mately three thousand miles (although sources differ on the XTB2F-1’s estimated
range). Its wingspan would have been slightly greater than that of the B-25 (seventy-
four feet versus sixty-seven feet seven inches) and its length about the same (fifty-two
feet). With a height of just over twenty-one feet, it could not have fit into the hangar
deck of a carrier of the CV 9 class, and its estimated weight was too great for that car-
rier’s flight deck, elevators, and arresting gear.21 But it could carry four two-thousand-
pound bombs or two torpedoes. That is, it had almost three times the range of the B-
25 Mitchell and over twice the ordnance load. Put another way, it was a carrier-based
bomber with operational (versus tactical) range and firepower.
This emphasis on operational range and firepower can be traced to the Doolittle Raid
from carrier Hornet in April 1942, but later wartime experience reinforced the desire to
develop a long-range carrier strike aircraft that could tap the operational mobility that
the U.S. carrier forces developed in 1944 through the use of underway refueling and
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 2 7
AIRCRAFT
YEAR PROTOTYPE
COMPLETED
DESIGNED GROSS WEIGHT
(IN LBS.)
RANGE (IN MI.) WITH
ORDNANCE (IN LBS.)
A-20A Havoc 1939 19,750 525 with 2,400
B-25 Mitchell 1940 26,208 1,300 with 3,000
SB2C-1C Helldiver 1940 14,720 1,110 with 1,000
TBF-1 Avenger 1940 13,667 1,215 with 2,000
F7F Tigercat 1943 25,720 1,200 with 2,000
XBTC-2 1946 17,910 1,245 with 2,000
XBTM-1 1944 19,000 1,200 with 2,000
BTD-1 1945 18,140 1,480 with 2,000
XF8B-1 1944 20,700 1,070 with 2,000
TABLE 2-3
Comparison of Navy Aircraft with Army 1942 Models
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replenishment. In his report on the operations of his carrier task forces off Okinawa in
the spring of 1945, for example, Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher noted that his carriers had
“operated daily in a 60 mile square area East of Okinawa, less than 350 miles from
Kyushu,” where they were vulnerable to both air and submarine attack.22 With longer-
range aircraft, his carriers could have maneuvered both to avoid attack and also to sur-
prise Japanese defenders with air attacks that came from ocean areas other than those
near Okinawa.
After the war, Mitscher added another argument in favor of large carriers with very-
long-range attack aircraft. As he wrote to Adm. DeWitt Ramsey, “The only two times I
was really in trouble with the task force occurred in the first and second battles of the
Philippine Seas [sic], in which battles my forces were dispersed to such an extent that
we could not concentrate and it proved a considerable handicap in my future move-
ments. I was impressed with the absolute necessity of quick concentration, particularly
when operating against so many shore bases.”23 This is an example of what today is
referred to as “operational art”—the combining of concepts such as maneuver and fire-
power and their application through the theater-level use of forces. It was the vision of
carriers able to strike enemy targets from long range and then move quickly over great
distances to recover their long-range aircraft that had inspired U.S. naval aviators for a
long time. Only with the combination of modern carriers, long-range aircraft, and
underway replenishment was this vision realistic. Unfortunately, as Mitscher knew, the
really long-range aircraft were late in coming. The Doolittle Raid, instead of being a
harbinger of massed strikes by large, long-range carrier aircraft, remained just a hint of
what might be done.
The trend toward ever larger and heavier carrier aircraft was to some degree masked by
two developments. The first was the modification of existing designs in response to
wartime experience. In late 1944, for example, Grumman proposed to BuAer that the
firm modify the existing TBF Avenger into a single-seat attack aircraft, the XTB3F-1.
BuAer had originally suggested to Grumman that the large F7F Tigercat fighter be con-
verted into a torpedo bomber. Grumman’s response was to emphasize the potential of
the proven Avenger. BuAer accepted that argument, and the XTB3F-1 became the AF
Guardian after World War II. The second—and very important—development was the
use of carrier fighters as bombers. The F4U-4 Corsair, for example, could carry a maxi-
mum of two 1,000-pound bombs, though it usually flew with no more than one. In
effect, the Corsair did double duty as both high-performance fighter and attack and
ground-support plane. It filled a role that, in 1942, BuAer had thought could be filled
only by new bomber designs.24
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There were other consequences of wartime development. One rarely mentioned was
the provision of new catapults for the fleet, light, and escort carriers by the Naval Air-
craft Factory’s Ship Experimental Unit. The factory’s “engineering department had
responsibility for the design and manufacture” of catapults (including those for cruisers
and battleships), but the Ship Experimental Unit actually tested and installed them.25
During the war, engineers at the Naval Aircraft Factory “continued to look for alterna-
tives to the hydraulic-pneumatic catapults [then in use], which were heavy and had com-
plicated cable-and-sheave systems requiring careful adjustment and constant
maintenance.”26 Of the two primary but tentative alternatives to existing catapults, one
was driven by electricity and one was built around the concept of a “slotted cylinder.”
In December 1944, BuAer directed the catapult developers to begin work on a small
slotted-cylinder catapult to launch target drones. This work was to pay major dividends
after the war, when “existing hydraulic catapults had reached the limits of their capac-
ity.”27 But the point to keep in mind is the reservoir of experience that engineers at
the Naval Aircraft Factory and its experimental station built up during their years of
work on aircraft catapults. A partial list of their efforts—covering only the flush-deck
catapults for aircraft carriers and the slotted-cylinder type used for launching target
drones—is given in table 2-4.28
BuAer had also encouraged the Naval Aircraft Factory to develop large catapults
mounted on barges that could launch heavily loaded seaplanes. In 1942, for example,
the factory had produced the Type XH, Mark III, a hydro-pneumatic device that could
accelerate a sixty-thousand-pound aircraft to 120 mph over a 248-foot track.29 But the
catapult weighed nine hundred thousand pounds—450 tons—and so the engineers at
the factory searched for a far less bulky aid to takeoffs. What they came up with was
JATO (jet-assisted takeoff), involving disposable chemical accelerators or rockets
attached to the airplanes. The success of the JATO units eliminated the need for a large
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 2 9
CATAPULT TYPE YEARS LENGTH (IN FT.)
CAPACITY
(LBS. PER MPH) WEIGHT (LBS.)
Hydro-pneumatic,
Type H, Mark II
1936–37 55 7,000 at 70 50,000
Hydro-pneumatic,
Type H, Mark II,
Mod. I
1942–45 73 11,000 at 70 65,000
Hydro-pneumatic,
Type H, Mark IVB
1942–45 96.6 18,000 at 90 233,000
Slotted cylinder
XAT, Mark II
1945 33 300 at 70 5,855
TABLE 2-4
Catapults Developed by the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1936–45
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and extremely heavy catapult. JATO units would be very useful after the war, especially
with early jet aircraft.
There is one additional consequence of wartime aircraft and related equipment devel-
opment that we must mention: the effects on people responsible for doing the work. As
Lee Pearson pointed out in 1951, the orderly process of prewar design competitions,
prototype development, and prototype testing was drastically modified because of the
pressure to produce thousands of aircraft and because of the desire of the fleet and
BuAer to make best use of improved aircraft design and technology and the lessons
learned by combat pilots.30
These twin pressures often shaped the careers of relatively inexperienced young offi-
cers. Pearson cites the experiences of BuAer’s Lt. Cdr. Joseph N. Murphy, who had
started in BuAer’s Engineering Division as a lieutenant and was selected to head scout-
bomber design at the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. Pearson argues that
Murphy personally began the process of analysis that shifted BuAer from a focus on
slower, two-man, unescorted dive-bombers and torpedo planes to one on single-seat
escorted attack aircraft that could carry heavy bomb loads from the CV 9s.31 Pearson
points to a January 1942 conference of officers from BuAer’s Plans and Engineering
divisions as the point at which BuAer personnel reached a consensus about the future
of attack aircraft mission requirements. That consensus led to larger, heavier, single-
seat attack aircraft that could launch torpedoes as well as drop bombs. Indirectly, the
January decision, endorsed by Rear Admiral Towers in February 1942, led to the post-
war Douglas AD-1 Skyraider and the Martin AM-1 Mauler.
BuAer carried its prewar organization into the initial months of World War II. When
Lieutenant Commander Murphy was making his case for a fast, single-place attack
plane in late December 1941, the head of the Experiments and Developments Section
in BuAer’s Engineering Division was Cdr. Leslie C. Stevens. The head of the Engineer-
ing Division was Capt. J. E. Ostrander. Ostrander, Stevens, and Murphy had to coordi-
nate their work on a new attack-aircraft concept with the Plans Division, the Operating
Requirements Branch of the Plans Division, and with their own Engineering Division
colleagues who were specialists in aircraft engines and aircraft structures.32 As Pearson
points out, this coordination took place through face-to-face conferences within BuAer.
But such conferences placed a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of rather young
officers and their civilian colleagues. The aforementioned Joseph N. Murphy, for exam-
ple, was a lieutenant in April 1941, a lieutenant commander by February 1942, a full
commander by late November 1942, and a captain by war’s end. Such rapid promotion
was common in World War II, but it came despite a lack of participation in multiple
design competitions. The cycle of competitions—from prototype selection to tests of
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prototype aircraft, to full-scale production, and then to evaluation of operational expe-
rience—was designed to deliver to the fleet tested and proven aircraft. The pace of war-
time decision making, with a series of conferences serving as an arena of negotiation
among representatives of BuAer’s branches, forced compromises with the prewar pat-
tern of identifying requirements, soliciting potential solutions from industry, and then
carefully testing prototype aircraft. The documentation of the process of developing
new aircraft was often so ad hoc, hurried, and informal that even Pearson, the official
historian, had problems tracing the course of events. Perhaps it is amazing that the
process “worked” at all.
In his memoir, Edward Heinemann describes an incident that could probably stand for
many of the hurried and contentious interactions between BuAer officials and their
industry counterparts during the war. In late 1943, Douglas wanted to capture the con-
tract to build the successor to the SBD Dauntless and the SB2C Helldiver. Douglas
engineers, led by Heinemann, developed what became the BTD Destroyer. But there
were two other competitors, Martin (with the XBTM) and Kaiser-Fleetwing (with the
XBTK). In June 1944, all three competitors sent their design teams to meet with senior
BuAer officials, including the assistant bureau chief Rear Adm. Lawrence B. Richardson
and William Z. Frisbie, George Spangenberg’s boss. When Heinemann’s team got its
chance, it argued that the Destroyer was best, but “as the hours droned on it seemed as
if we were going around in endless circles without resolving the issue.”
Heinemann therefore boldly decided to scrap the BTD Destroyer and ask Rear Admiral
Richardson and his staff to accept something new. He asked for thirty days’ grace while
his team came up with a producible design; the admiral gave the Douglas team one
night. Heinemann first grabbed a phone and convinced Donald Douglas to go along.
Then he and his team went to work. The next day they presented their design concept
to the BuAer officials, and soon they were told they could take the funds slated for
further BTD development and apply them to their new design concept, the BT2D,
which became the XBT2D-1, which in its turn became the very successful postwar
AD-1 Skyraider.33
Heinemann’s story deliberately portrays himself, his design team, and others at
Douglas in a positive—even heroic—light, and we are sure that at least some of his
competitors had similar experiences. But his description of the atmosphere of wartime
competition, development, and decision making is revealing. BuAer’s traditional (since
its founding in 1921) approach to development had been to foster both design and
production competition within the small but talented aircraft industry. BuAer had also
directed its private suppliers to develop their designs around specific engines. BuAer
policy was to invest in engine development as a means of pulling aircraft design along.
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Engines were the critical factor—the engine was the driver of overall aircraft perfor-
mance, and more powerful engines gave designers an incentive to come up with larger
aircraft that could carry heavier loads over greater distances. Despite the near chaos
that resulted from BuAer’s efforts to meet the challenges of mass production, mass
training, and support for a massive naval air force, the basic approach to stimulating
industry turned out to be sound for the purposes of World War II.
But the war also led to a new engine concept—the jet engine—and harnessing it for
Navy carrier operations proved to be a major challenge for the officers and civilians in
BuAer who had “won their spurs” by directing wartime quantity production of mostly
proven engine and airframe technologies. In doing that, BuAer personnel had devel-
oped a mental “tool kit” different from that needed to foster radically new technologies
and operational concepts. They had successfully adapted their organization and its pro-
cedures to wartime demands and therefore saw no need later to create a new organiza-
tion or new processes and relationships to mature the many innovations produced by
scientists and engineers during the war years.
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The Potential of the Big Bomber
The previous chapter focused on BuAer’s wartime efforts to work with industry to
develop and field larger and heavier attack aircraft. This chapter will continue that
story, but with a focus on Navy efforts to deliver significant amounts of ordnance on
enemy targets at ranges not thought possible in 1939. The date to begin with is 16 April
1942, when USS Hornet launched sixteen Army B-25 medium bombers that attacked
Tokyo. The spectacular Doolittle Raid raised U.S. morale at a particularly bleak time in
the war. It also inspired the naval officers who watched the bombers take off. The
carrier’s commanding officer, Capt. Marc Mitscher, and Cdr. Apollo Soucek, Hornet’s
air officer, saw the potential for carriers to strike land targets from great distances,
achieving surprise and avoiding enemy counterattack. The ability of Hornet to launch
the B-25s also caught the attention of the Pacific Fleet commander (or CINCPAC),
Adm. Chester Nimitz.1
This combination of a carrier and large, long-range bombers posed a major threat to
land targets. Early in World War II carriers were perceived as powerful but vulnerable.
The flight decks of U.S. carriers were not armored—could not be effectively armored,
given the tonnage restrictions that had been imposed on their designs by treaty—and
in early 1942 fighters could still not be directed efficiently enough by their own carriers
to protect them from air attack. The vulnerability of carriers, plus the limited range
and bomb loads of existing attack aircraft, kept carriers from posing the same threat to
land targets as heavy land-based bombers like the B-17. By using B-25s, however, Hor-
net showed that a limitation on carriers as a threat to land targets could be overcome by
increasing the size of attack aircraft.
Hornet’s raid also showed the value of operational surprise—that is, strikes from very
long range. Such strikes, mounted from outside the enemy’s warning network (that is,
before the days of effective wide-area radar surveillance), were far more effective than
those launched from close offshore. This operational surprise would enhance the capac-
ity of the few attack aircraft a single carrier could launch. As we pointed out in the
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previous chapter, this desire for long range led BuAer to award a contract to Grumman
to develop the twin-engine XTB2F-1. Before even a mock-up of that plane could be
constructed, however, U.S. carriers had developed techniques, through trial and error,
for attacking Japanese land targets in the islands of the South Pacific. Did this mean
that the future of “heavy attack” from carriers would not require new planes like the
XTB2F-1, just improved versions of such existing models of aircraft as the SB2C
Helldiver or the TBF Avenger?
Pilots and engineers could rely only on experience as a guide. For example, in 1942
Captain Mitscher was almost certainly aware of the role of strategic bombing as it was
understood by U.S. war planners of the time. At least since 1929 Navy and Army plan-
ners had wrestled with the question of how to end a war against Japan. The Navy could
offer blockade, which should be effective against an island country wholly dependent
on imports for almost all raw materials. However, there was always the possibility that
the Japanese would try to hold out, gambling that the United States would lack the
patience to enforce a lengthy siege.2 Invasion was never taken seriously, because the
Navy’s planners doubted that the United States could or would raise an army suffi-
ciently large to overrun Japan. However, they thought that Japanese cities, which were
largely made of wood and paper, would burn easily and hence would make good tar-
gets. In fact, the United States had tried late in 1941 to build up a strategic bomber
force in the Philippines specifically as a deterrent against Japan (there are reports of an
attempt to leak an exaggerated version of the bomber force’s strength on the eve of
Pearl Harbor, specifically to head off any Japanese attack on the Philippines). Typically
war plans envisaged an endgame in which Army bombers would be transported to
captured islands near Japan from which they could conduct an air offensive.
Watching the B-25s take off from Hornet, Mitscher probably realized that the carrier
offered an alternative to land-based bombers. By the time of the raid, BuAer was
actively working to provide a shipboard bomber (initially the Douglas XTB2D-1, then
the Grumman XTB2F-1) with an ordnance load at least equivalent to one of Doolittle’s
B-25s. We cannot locate records of BuAer involvement in the planning of the Doolittle
Raid, but BuAer officers would have been involved in certifying that the B-25s could
indeed take off from a carrier. A few days before the raid, as we noted in the previous
chapter, Grumman was asked informally to design a twin-engine carrier bomber, later
designated TB2F. Its design specifications suggest that it was far more a “level bomber”
(that is, intended to drop ordnance in level flight) than a torpedo plane; it was about
the size of a B-25. The bomber would have been too large to stow below decks, and it
seems to have been conceived for “special operations.” It was also too delicate to
catapult.
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BuAer decided to kill the project in April 1944 before moving beyond the mock-up
stage and committing the government to spend substantial sums. It decided to do so
because the Japanese had in the meantime developed radar, thereby denying any carrier
aircraft the chance to achieve complete surprise. Bombers would need fighter escorts to
penetrate alerted enemy air defenses, but the available carrier fighters lacked the neces-
sary range. One of the BuAer officers at the mock-up conference for the XTB2F-1
objected that the airplane would still be useful for special missions, but he was
apparently overruled.
That was not the end of this particular effort to put larger bombers on carriers. At the
beginning of March 1944, BuAer proposed converting a PBJ-1, which was the Navy’s
version of North American’s B-25 Mitchell twin-engine bomber, for carrier landings
and takeoffs.3 By the end of April, North American was converting a PBJ-1H (Bureau
Number 35277) for arrested landings and catapult takeoffs. Once suitably modified, the
plane was to be delivered to the Naval Air Material Center and tested on land to deter-
mine its minimum carrier-landing approach speed, how late in its approach it could
safely be given a “wave off,” and how pilots should engage a carrier’s arresting gear.4 On
30 October 1944, the Chief of Naval Operations requested that a PBJ-1B and an F7F-1
Tigercat be tested aboard the carrier Shangri-La (CV 38) in November, and on 10
November Rear Adm. DeWitt C. Ramsey, BuAer’s chief, directed the captain of
Shangri-La to devote a day to completing at least five catapult launchings and arrested
landings of the modified PBJ-1H. As Ramsey noted, “Tests of the subject airplanes
should be conducted without other airplanes on the flight deck and possibly with bar-
riers down because of expected unsuitability of the barriers installed for stopping twin
engine tricycle [i.e., with nose wheel and two main wheels] planes.”5
Also tested in this way was an Army-type P-51 Mustang fighter. According to the confi-
dential report of the trials, the B-25 was used to test the carrier-landing qualities of a
tricycle aircraft like the F7F Tigercat fighter, then being pushed toward production. The
P-51 was tested because it was a modern fighter with a liquid-cooled engine, hence pre-
sumably different from the air-cooled types the Navy then used. Neither explanation is
entirely credible. The Navy already had a prototype F7F for carrier trials (indeed, it flew
trials in the same series as the B-25 and the P-51), and it was unlikely that the B-25 had
very similar landing characteristics. The P-51 was then being considered for use as a
naval fighter, but it was soon dropped in favor of a jet that its manufacturer, North
American, was then developing.
At the time, however, the P-51 was the best U.S. escort fighter and hence the potential
answer to the problem that had, at least in theory, killed the big Grumman bomber. It is
difficult not to imagine that at some point in 1944 the use of carrier-based B-25s
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escorted by P-51s had been seriously considered. It had probably been dropped well
before the Shangri-La tests, and it had presumably been developed at a higher level of
classification. Its significance for this account is that it suggests continuing U.S. naval
interest in long-range carrier attack.
As we argued in the previous chapter, the crosscutting pressures generated by changing
operational requirements, advances in research and development, and the need for
large numbers of aircraft for combat and training disrupted the BuAer three-year
aircraft-development cycle. Heinemann’s memoir illustrates this point. In 1943, Capt.
Leslie C. Stevens, who had been head of the Experiments and Developments Section of
BuAer’s Engineering Division before being promoted and sent to the Pacific, returned
from the war theater, called Heinemann, and arranged a meeting in San Diego between
Navy and Douglas personnel to discuss the need for a new torpedo bomber.6 The con-
cept they developed was the large (eighteen thousand pounds empty, wingspan seventy
feet, length forty-six feet) Skypirate, which was tested in 1945. Stevens was, according
to Heinemann, “covering all bets, because the forecast need for a new torpedo bomber
was indeed genuine when he talked with us in San Diego.”7
However, as we have already pointed out, in June 1944 Heinemann decided to abandon
the conventional separation of attack aircraft into torpedo planes and dive-bombers
and to develop a plane that would carry its ordnance externally, have one pilot and no
gunners, and carry a heavy bomb or torpedo load. BuAer’s senior officers and civilians,
including Captain Stevens, agreed with this approach. BuAer approved Douglas Air-
craft’s mock-up of the new aircraft (the BT2D) at the end of the summer of 1944. In
the meantime, in an effort to improve the responsiveness of industry designers, BuAer
had offered to send “representatives to the Pacific combat area in order to gain first-
hand knowledge of flight operations,” and Heinemann was the first to go.8
Heinemann spent about two weeks watching carrier operations, interviewing pilots
and senior officers, and capturing his observations in a diary. Some of his particular
observations affected the detailed design of the BT2D, but what mattered more was
that experienced attack pilots agreed that carriers needed just two types of aircraft, “the
best possible fighter without compromising it with bomb loads, and a dive bomber
that [had] secondary capabilities of dropping torpedoes and working as a scout.”9
Heinemann also gleaned insights from Rear Adm. Arthur W. Radford and Capt. Fred-
erick M. Trapnell. The latter had been a test pilot at Naval Air Station Anacostia in 1941
and the first Navy pilot to test the experimental XP-59A Bell Airacomet—the first U.S.-
made military jet plane.10 Heinemann also interviewed the Royal Navy’s observer on
Ticonderoga, Cdr. F. H. E. Hopkins.11
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Heinemann’s memoir lists a number of detail modifications to the BT2D design that
were inspired by his interviews with Navy pilots, including eliminating the nose wheel,
dramatically reducing the empty weight of the plane (to enable it to carry more ord-
nance), changing the design of the wings (to improve low-speed landing performance),
and designing a cockpit that could withstand “forty-G crash-landing impacts.”12
Heinemann and his design engineers sometimes disagreed with the specifications that
BuAer’s design personnel wanted them to meet, but Heinemann’s contact with mem-
bers of BuAer and officers flying in the fleet gave him an almost unique ability to, as he
put it, “get on the phone to the proper official and solicit action.”13 Heinemann argues
in his memoir that it was the hard work of Douglas’s engineers, coupled with the rapid
back-and-forth negotiations between them and their counterparts in BuAer, that
allowed Douglas to take the BT2D design from paper to first test flight in just nine
months.14 George Spangenberg in BuAer had a slightly different view—that the pres-
sure of competition had taught designers like Heinemann the importance of disciplines
like weight control.15
To read Heinemann’s memoir, one would think that BuAer was focused almost exclu-
sively on manned-aircraft design and production. However, that was not the case. In
1936, Lt. Cdr. Delmar S. Fahrney of BuAer began development at the Naval Aircraft
Factory in Philadelphia of a radio-controlled pilotless aircraft for use as a target in
antiaircraft exercises.16 The success of that work gave Fahrney’s vision of a force of
remote-controlled “drones” (as he had named them) credibility, and the growing reli-
ability of television equipment suggested that drones might be used to attack targets
while the planes controlling them cruised beyond the range of antiaircraft guns. Suc-
cessful tests in April 1942 led Fahrney’s BuAer superiors to authorize the production of
two hundred drones, but the low speed (150 mph) of the first units “made for reduced
enthusiasm; the drone did not appear to many aviators to be a serious combat weapon,
capable of overcoming enemy defenses.”17 Though drones attacked Japanese targets in
July and then in September 1944, the drone squadrons that had been formed at the end
of 1943 were disbanded.
But drones weren’t the only new weapons developed by BuAer during the war. In 1940,
Fahrney, by now a captain, suggested that a carrier fighter such as the F6F Hellcat could
tow an armed glider that it could direct—using radio—against stationary targets.
Development work at the Naval Aircraft Factory began in 1941. The idea seemed to
have merit. A three-thousand-pound glider could carry four thousand pounds of
explosive, dramatically augmenting a carrier’s strike capacity. As in the case of the
drones, however, the glider bomb (christened GLOMB) was judged too vulnerable to
antiaircraft fire, and the program was canceled in 1945.18
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BuAer also developed two powered missiles, Gorgon and Gargoyle. The latter “was
inspired by the success of German guided missiles” used against Allied warships in the
Mediterranean in 1943.19 Four hundred were ordered in 1944. It seemed to offer a dra-
matic improvement in capability: “Gargoyle cost only $8900, and it required only a 35
lb. radio aboard its [launching] airplane; its wing span was only 8 ft. 6 in. It could pen-
etrate any existing armored deck, and was considered immune to antiaircraft fire in
view of its high diving speed.”20 Unfortunately for its developers, it was not launched
successfully until July 1946, and production was canceled a year later.
The Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance also entered the guided-weapons field in World War II.
In 1940, the newly established National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) began
collaborating with BuOrd on the development of reliable, powerful rocket motors that
could accelerate bombs to speeds that would allow warheads to penetrate thick con-
crete structures.21 That same year, the NDRC funded projects that explored missile-
control techniques and the potential of television guidance for powered missiles and
gliders.22 Out of this research came Bat, an active-radar-homing glider launched by
patrol planes against moving targets, and Pelican, an antisubmarine glider guided from
the aircraft that carried and launched it. Bat was “the only US Navy air-to-surface mis-
sile to enter combat, although Pelican . . . came close.”23 BuOrd also worked on missiles
to carry torpedoes, missiles to attack submarines, and Dove, a bomb guided to its target
by an infrared seeker.24
The BuAer and BuOrd guided-weapons programs were significant. As the Secretary of
the Navy pointed out in his annual report for fiscal year 1946, “At the beginning of the
fiscal year on 1 July 1945, the Bureau of Aeronautics was supervising contracts provid-
ing for over 61,000 combat and tactical airplanes and more than 14,000 ‘drones’ and
‘glombs,’ known as ‘missiles’ and ‘pilotless aircraft.’”25 That is, fully 18.6 percent of all
the Navy’s combat “flying machines” on order were unmanned. Crash programs of
research and development—programs made possible only by wartime spending—had
produced the beginnings of a guided-weapons revolution, but it would take decades for
that revolution to mature.
In the meantime, wartime production of carriers, pilots, and carrier aircraft had gener-
ated a powerful naval air force. In October 1944, Navy strategic planners had produced
a draft plan, HOTFOOT, for a carrier-based strategic bombing offensive against Japan.
By this time there were so many fleet carriers that even their relatively small bombers
(Avengers and Helldivers) offered substantial net firepower. Navy planners argued that
once the endgame had been reached, the carriers should be used for direct attacks,
because there would no longer be many amphibious operations to support and because
the Japanese fleet would probably be immobilized by the increasingly effective
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submarine blockade. In January 1945 Admiral Halsey’s Fifth Fleet raided Tokyo, in
effect testing the HOTFOOT concept. Although accounts of this raid suggest that it was
less than successful, HOTFOOT survived (as HOTFOOT III), the final version estimating
that carriers could deliver about half the weight of bombs that Twentieth Air Force B-
29s were delivering. To make HOTFOOT more effective, the planners suggested reversing
the trend, adopted to deal with kamikazes, of increasing carrier fighter strength at the
expense of attack aircraft.
By the spring of 1945 the end of the Pacific War was in sight, and that April the Navy
convened a high-level committee to discuss the character of the next aircraft carrier.26
By this time planners had some hard estimates of the performance of various guided
weapons; these weapons could greatly increase the effectiveness of the limited number
of aircraft a carrier could launch. In the Atlantic, the Germans were deploying new U-
boats that could probably overcome existing kinds of defenses. The sole counter to
such craft might well be attacks at the source, either by mining approach routes to the
open sea or by destroying boats in their pens. The latter was difficult, because the pens
were heavily protected by concrete. However, the British had demonstrated very heavy
bombs capable of accelerating to supersonic speeds and penetrating such havens. The
Army was developing bomb-guidance systems to steer such weapons right onto the pen
roofs. In a future war, it could hardly be guaranteed that land-based heavy bombers
would be in position to make such attacks—or, for that matter, that they would not be
so busy with other tasks that they could not be used that way. Carriers striking at fixed
targets might be a vital mode of fighting the next naval war.
Although the new carrier committee did not report formally until January 1946, by the
early fall of 1945 BuAer was arguing that the lessons of the European war included a
clear requirement for a deep-strike, carrier-based bomber capable of delivering eight
to twelve thousand pounds of bombs. The reference to Europe suggests a connection
with the U-boat problem (we can find no copy of a relevant study of the European
war). Of course, by the fall of 1945 it was also clear that only a large aircraft could
deliver a nuclear bomb, and the Navy was rejecting the Air Force’s attempt to secure a
nuclear monopoly.
However, it appears that the BuAer proposal was not primarily for nuclear delivery.
That made sense at the time. It seemed that there would never be many nuclear bombs
and that World War III, if it came, would be fought largely with conventional weapons.
The post-1945 U.S. Navy was struggling with the question of how to use sea power
against a land empire—the probable new enemy, the Soviet Union. The most obvious
use of sea power would be to maintain sea lines of communication with forces in
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forward areas, such as Western Europe, and to the U.S. Navy that meant countering the
new generation of submarines.
This conclusion, that the future lay with a large carrier bomber, was by no means
accepted widely. On 30 August 1945, Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, the Navy’s commander
in chief, had convened a series of Pacific Fleet panels to lay out the war’s lessons in such
areas as ship and aircraft characteristics, ordnance, radar, and radio (plus sonar). The
report on ship and aircraft characteristics, submitted in October, made no mention of a
heavy carrier bomber. It was concerned with amalgamating the dive- and torpedo-
bomber types, preferably into a new single-seat bomber. This was a call for a medium
attack bomber like the new BT2D-1 (later the AD-1) Douglas Skyraider. CINCPAC was
skeptical of the practicability of this proposal, due to failed attempts to develop a mul-
tipurpose carrier bomber over the previous twenty-five years. There was even some
hope that all carrier aircraft functions might be amalgamated into a single airplane,
such as the new Grumman F7F twin-engine fighter. Noticeably lacking in the report
was interest in jet aircraft.
This report, which might be read as a rather direct extrapolation of the aircraft that
had won the carrier war in the Pacific, contrasted dramatically with the accompanying
report on submarines, which pointed toward the postwar submarine revolution. The
surviving texts of submarine officers’ responses to a questionnaire for inclusion in the
Pacific Fleet report show considerable knowledge of what was happening in Europe, as
German submarine technology was revealed. The aircraft questionnaires seem not to
have survived, but in any case the aircraft discussion shows little or no concern with
recent European developments or, indeed, with the possibility of delivering atomic
bombs from carriers (a very important theme a year later). It suggests that Vice Adm.
Alfred E. Montgomery, commander of Navy air forces in the Pacific at the end of World
War II, was right when he noted with some concern that the lessons learned in the
great carrier battles against Japan were most likely “only applicable to this war, will
soon be obsolete and if absorbed will focus the naval mind to a point [2 September
1945] which will soon be in the past and therefore misleading.”27
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Royal Navy Wartime Experience and Analysis
Until at least 1936, the Royal Navy did not try to interest the British Air Ministry in the
development of high-performance fighters for its aircraft carriers, because the RN’s air
officers did not think that an effective combat air patrol could be mounted around a
carrier. By the time approaching bombers could be sighted and identified, it would be
too late. Consequently, the RN carriers that followed Ark Royal, which was laid down in
1935, had armored flight decks so that they could absorb punishment and still operate
attack aircraft. The advent of shipboard air-search radar in the first year of World War
II, however, changed the situation, and the RN procured Royal Air Force (RAF) and
U.S. Navy fighters and experimented with the central control of fighter defenses.
The RN also did not expect before World War II to have to operate its carriers against
waves of high-performance land-based bombers—as it would be forced to do first in
Norway in 1940 and then, in 1941, in the Mediterranean. The RN’s decision to con-
struct carriers with armored flight decks restricted the number of aircraft such carriers
could operate, so it chose to emphasize strike aircraft over fighters. The RN projected
the logic of its own decisions about carrier-based strike aircraft upon the Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN). Accordingly, it was surprised by the IJN’s very effective carrier-
based attacks in the Pacific and the Bay of Bengal in the spring of 1942.
The leaders of the RN responded to the challenges to the Fleet Air Arm posed by opera-
tions against the Germans in the Mediterranean and the Japanese in the Indian Ocean
by creating the Future Building Committee (FBC), chaired by the Deputy First Sea
Lord, in July 1942. The FBC was “the only organization within the Admiralty charged
with the overall review of British naval requirements,” and its deliberations supported
those of the Joint (i.e., Royal Air Force/Royal Navy) Technical Committee.1 At the end
of 1942, the Joint Technical Committee had accepted the idea that future strike aircraft
would be significantly heavier, and it recommended that all future carrier aircraft
therefore be designed to use rocket-assisted takeoff equipment. The committee also
approved an increased carrier-landing speed for all aircraft.2 In February 1943, the FBC
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
FO
U
R
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:53:51 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
specified that “carrier interceptor fighters should be the equals (in performance) of
their land counterparts,” which implied significant increases in the size and weight of
carrier fighters.3 In March 1943, the Aircraft Design Subcommittee of the FBC was split
off to become a distinct organization—the Naval Aircraft Design Committee. This
committee was an “early proponent of the catapult as the primary means of launching
aircraft” from carriers.4
Also in 1943, the RN’s famous test pilot Eric Brown successfully landed a combat-
loaded, twin-engine Sea Mosquito fighter on a carrier, and the Future Building
Committee recommended that the Mosquito design be modified to create a long-
range carrier fighter equipped with radar.5 The resulting aircraft, christened Sea Hor-
net, first flew in April 1945.6 In September 1944 the First Sea Lord, Adm. Andrew B.
Cunningham, asked the chief of the RAF’s Air Staff to provide the RN with Mosquitoes
modified for use on carriers. Admiral Cunningham was thinking in early 1945 about
long-range attacks from RN carriers against Japanese bases like Singapore.7 The
Admiralty asked for two hundred Sea Mosquitoes “for delivery in 1945 and 250 to
follow in 1946.”8
That same month (September 1944), the Naval Aircraft Design Committee recom-
mended to the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) that it develop a jet interceptor
for use from carriers. The members of the committee were aware that “such a fighter
would demand catapult-only launching and that no other aircraft could be within
thirty feet of it when its engine opened up to full power,” but they felt that the better
air-to-air performance of the jet would more than compensate for the problems
created by operating it from existing and planned carriers.9 By late 1944, the MAP had
stopped work on new piston-engine designs and was focused on jet turbines and
turboprops.10 In December 1944, the Naval Aircraft Design Committee “proposed that
future naval aircraft be designed without undercarriages, to land on soft (flexible)
decks,” and in February 1945 the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough
“concluded that any future high-performance naval fighter would have to be a pure jet,
and that requirements for takeoff, military load, and landing speed would have to be
modified.”11
Things were moving fast. By 7 June 1945, the Naval Aircraft Department of the RAE
had developed a “Proposed Programme of Experimental Work” for determining
whether a carrier could operate jets without undercarriages. The “target for flying trials
under seagoing conditions” was May 1946.12 This project was sent forward to the MAP
with an endorsement by the director of the RAE two days later.13 On 4 July, engineer
Lewis Boddington, who headed the Naval Aircraft Department at RAE, completed a
paper entitled “Assisted Take-off for Future Naval Aircraft,” which he presented on
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17 July to the Naval Aircraft Research Subcommittee of the Naval Aircraft Design Com-
mittee. He put his main point right up front: “The large increase in take-off speed
which will result from the developments in the aircraft and its power plant, and the
resulting necessity to remove the present free-deck take-off restrictions will demand
assisted take-off under all conditions.”14
Boddington’s paper laid out many of the engineering problems entailed by operating
jets from carriers, especially the need for catapult launchings that would not be so vio-
lent as to damage an aircraft’s structure and the need safely to recover planes landing
with their engines running. He argued, first, that “future aircraft will have no undercar-
riage and will land on flexible decks,” and, second, that “the solution of the problem
giving the best handling and deck operating conditions will be a landing deck immedi-
ately under which will be the take-off deck. Ranged aircraft for take-off will not
obstruct any landing operations.”15 By 12 July, the deputy director of RAE’s Panel on
Flexible Landing Decks had reviewed the feasibility of an approach technique for a car-
rier with an (as yet only conceptual) flexible deck and had decided to recommend trials
of actual landings using jet aircraft. (See chapter 7 for the “flexible deck” idea.)
On 18 September 1945, Boddington presented a second paper for the Naval Aircraft
Research Subcommittee, “Landing of Future Naval Aircraft.” As he observed, “The
object of this note is to briefly present the problems of landing on a carrier deck in the
future and discuss the effects on the equipment and carrier design.” His argument was
that the development of jet aircraft “will result in a new approach technique ending in
flight parallel to the deck and engaging the mechanical arresting gear under ‘flying’
conditions.”16 His paper provided the conceptual justification for the angled flight deck.
As he noted, “To cover for the baulked landing, the jet engine will be running at 90%
full revs. . . . Non-engagement of the wire will allow the pilot to take-off [sic] again
depending on the deck arrangements (barriers, parks, etc.) and the carrier design.”17 To
allow a plane that had missed the arresting gear to get back in the air safely, the flexible
deck that Boddington advocated would have to be located away from the deck park. His
solution—already proposed—was to have “separate landing and take-off decks.”18
Boddington also understood that jet aircraft would require more powerful catapults.19
In Britain, catapult development was shared between the Royal Aircraft Establishment
at Farnborough and the Engineer-in-Chief Department of the Royal Navy. About 1943
Farnborough began experimenting with a new kind of catapult (Type K) using a fly-
wheel to store energy.20 In 1946, the catapult engineers supervised by Boddington also
explored the potential of gas turbines as power sources for carrier catapults.21
As the Allied armies had surged across northern France in the fall of 1944, they had
encountered the fixed sites built by the Germans to launch V-1 missiles against
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London. The missile’s pulse-jet engine could not function until it reached a set speed,
about 150 mph. Thus the catapults built by the Germans were not too different from
what a streamlined jet, with a similar takeoff speed, might require. Unlike the explosive-
driven catapults then in use in the U.S. Navy for launching scout planes from cruisers
and battleships, the German catapult applied its force directly to the airplane. It was a
tube with a slot running along its upper side. A reaction in the tube pushed a piston
along it, and the piston was hooked through the slot to the airplane. In the German
case, the reaction was the decomposition of concentrated (“high-test”) hydrogen per-
oxide, which the British called HTP. This was one of several German applications of
HTP, others being as an oxidant in the Me-163 rocket fighter and as an oxidant in the
Walter closed-cycle U-boat. In each case, HTP showed lethal properties that more or
less disqualified it if any alternative could be found.
The British report on the V-1 catapult was written by C. C. Mitchell, at that time a
Royal Navy reservist but in peacetime a catapult designer in an Edinburgh engineering
firm that produced what the RN referred to as “accelerators” for use on carriers. He
had patented a slotted-tube catapult, which he called a “popgun” catapult, in 1938, but
the RN had not adopted it. After the war, while working for Brown Brothers (also in
Edinburgh), he realized that steam from a ship’s propulsion plant could substitute for
the dangerous HTP. He formally proposed such a catapult (it is not clear exactly when)
when trials of the Type K showed that the weight of existing hydro-pneumatic cata-
pults was growing faster than their capacity to launch aircraft at high speeds. After
1947 the British formally chose the slotted-tube steam catapult as the sole direction for
future development. By 1950, the prototype, christened BXS.1, was ready for testing on
HMS Perseus, a war-built light carrier now used for experiments.22
The Royal Navy used low-temperature, low-pressure steam on all of its existing carri-
ers, as well as those under construction. Low steam pressure made it easier to build a
gasket that would hold the steam inside a slotted-cylinder catapult as the steam drove
the piston—attached to the airplane—forward. However, low steam temperature and
pressure made for poor efficiency in ship propulsion. The U.S. Navy used much higher
steam temperature and pressure in its carriers’ boilers, which made them more efficient
thermodynamically and therefore increased the carriers’ endurance—a valuable capa-
bility in the Pacific War against Japan. Wartime contact with the U.S. Navy convinced
the British to develop a new generation of high-pressure steam plants for their late-war
and postwar fleets.
Because Mitchell’s catapult was adapted to the conditions of earlier British ships, it was
by no means obvious that steam was the appropriate choice if new British carriers
using higher steam pressures were built. Similarly, American observers of British
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catapult development knew that it was by no means obvious that a catapult adapted to
British steam systems would succeed on board an American carrier. Wartime U.S. Navy
boilers operated at about three times the temperature and twice the pressure of British
plants, and by 1950 the U.S. Navy was contemplating doubling the pressure used dur-
ing wartime, to 1,200 pounds per square inch.
British wartime analysis produced the conceptual foundation for the modern aircraft
carrier operating high-performance jet aircraft. Because jets accelerated slowly, jet air-
craft would need assistance at takeoff. Because jets landed at higher speeds and needed
to do so with their turbines turning over at close to maximum revolutions per minute,
the axial deck—with the deck park forward, shielded by a barrier—had to be modified.
In effect, the Royal Navy had defined the “problem set” by the end of the summer of
1945. From that point forward, attention focused on possible solutions.
The choice of the steam catapult coincided with the beginning of design work on car-
rier modernization. As originally envisaged, modernization would have combined a
steam catapult, new heavier-duty arresting gear, and a U.S.-style deck-edge elevator, the
latter to provide an easier flow of aircraft between hangar deck and flight deck. For the
British, the new elevator—the one major American-inspired element of moderniza-
tion—was by far the most expensive part of the project. It was incompatible with the
enclosed, protected hangars that had formed the cores of the existing British fleet carri-
ers. To install the U.S.-style elevator the British had to remove the carrier’s flight deck
and tear open its hangar deck. That they were willing to do so suggests the extent to
which they considered the U.S. wartime experience, rather than their own, the key to
the future.
In effect, the Royal Navy ended World War II with a policy of developing jet aircraft to
replace propeller-driven types; experimenting with the flexible and angled flexible
deck; and placing steam catapults in its new and modernized aircraft carriers. A lack of
funds limited the speed with which these innovations could be developed, tested, and
installed. However, incremental development of new equipment and techniques, rather
than concurrent development, allowed RN engineers and aviators to identify problems
and potential “dead ends” before large sums had been appropriated or spent.
A classic “dead end” they encountered was the “carpet,” or flexible, flight deck, which
was tested successfully at sea on the carrier Warrior in the fall and winter of 1948–49.23
The combination of the flexible deck and jet fighters without landing gear appeared
successful, but it had a major flaw. As Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, RN, who is
closely identified with the origin of the angled deck for carriers, put it years later,
It soon became obvious that there was a world of difference between one-off trials [of the flexible
flight deck proposed by Lewis Boddington] and practical front-line operation. Two major points
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needed to be resolved—how were aircraft with no wheels to be dealt with ashore? . . . The one other
big problem was how to ensure that speed of operation wasn’t to be sacrificed by imposing some elab-
orate mechanical substitute for the previous easy routine of just taxying [sic] forward into the deck
parks; and the vulnerability of the whole scheme was surely obvious.24
Moreover, it took a very skilled pilot to put his aircraft down on the “carpet” safely. For
example, in the first test of the flexible rubber deck at Farnborough at the end of
December 1947, RAE’s test pilot, Eric Brown, crashed his aircraft. Brown was fortunate
to survive, and his description of what happened is vivid:
After crossing the arrester wire the plane continued to swing nose-down towards the deck and
plunged into it with such violence that the nose completely vanished and penetrated right down to the
bottom layer. . . . Then it was thrown harshly up again in a nose-up attitude. I opened it up to full
power and was climbing away safely when I realized that the stick was jammed solid, with the eleva-
tors keeping the plane in a nose-up attitude. I throttled back gently and she settled on to the grass
ahead of the deck. The crash split the cockpit all round me.25
This initial accident, however, was followed by many successful attempts, once formal
tests began again at Farnborough in March 1948. Brown says in his memoir (Wings on
My Sleeve) that he made forty successful landings on the flexible deck at Farnborough
in the spring and summer of 1948.26 By November of that year, the light carrier HMS
Warrior had been fitted with a full-scale flexible deck, and Brown landed a small jet
fighter (a Vampire) on it. As his memoirs have it, “The plane’s belly scraped the wire,
the hook caught. The arrester wire and the deck had been deliberately set hard and the
chock was uncomfortable, though only for a split second.”27 Not all his landings were as
successful, but Brown nevertheless came away from the trials confident that the system
would work. He noted in his official report, “It may even be that future swept-back and
delta plan form aircraft will be forced to adopt this method of landing on carriers,
since all calculations point to serious wheeled landing problems on such aircraft.”28
Films of Brown landing his aircraft on the flexible deck were shown to staff in the U.S.
Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics when Lewis Boddington and two colleagues visited the
United States in March 1949. The British team members spent most of their time at the
naval aviation test center at Patuxent River, Maryland, the Naval Aircraft Factory in
Philadelphia, and five aircraft manufacturing firms—Grumman, McDonnell, Chance
Vought, Douglas, and North American. In his report of the trip, Boddington noted that
“discussions were at all times free and open” and that “in general, similar methods of
solving difficulties [were] in progress in both countries.”29 Facilitating this exchange of
ideas was Capt. Frederick Trapnell, who had commanded an escort carrier in World
War II and was in March 1949 the chief test pilot at Patuxent River.
The discussions among the technical specialists went into great detail and covered such
topics as carrier-landing approach techniques, the coordination problems associated
with high-speed approaches, the gravitational forces imposed on airplane structures by
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arrested landings and catapulted takeoffs, safe and functional barriers to shield the
already-recovered aircraft in the deck park from those still landing, the problems asso-
ciated with getting a jet to an adequate airspeed at the end of its catapult run, and the
difficulties of moving increasingly heavy aircraft around on a carrier’s flight deck.
Boddington and his colleagues observed that it was evident to officers in BuAer that
“the direct application of present requirements and methods for catapulting and
arresting is not satisfactory,” especially for large (hundred-thousand-pound) aircraft.30
This need to place very large aircraft on U.S. carriers was based on the formal require-
ment to develop nuclear-capable bombers. It drew the Americans away from the Brit-
ish, though the two navies otherwise shared the same basic problems that stemmed
from the innovations—jet aircraft, radar, and missiles—produced during World War II.
The parallels between the two navies in the immediate postwar period are striking.
Because of their wartime experiences, both naval air arms wanted larger, heavier, and
longer-range aircraft for their carriers. Both had officers and engineers who believed
that it was possible to develop ways to launch and recover high-performance jet aircraft
on carriers. Although, as Boddington observed, American engineers in aircraft firms
and military and civilian officials were working on similar problems, it was the British
who first grasped all the problems entailed in adapting existing carriers to jet aircraft.
Their initial solution to this set of problems—the flexible landing deck—did not sur-
vive careful scrutiny, but the idea of the slightly offset flexible deck led to the angled
deck, and it was the angled deck that opened the way for the large modern carrier.
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Adopting Jet Engines
Jet engines were the first British innovation the Bureau of Aeronautics adopted. This was
a clear case of deliberate technology transfer, and it sparked a revolution in aircraft-
engine technology in the United States. But the story of what happened after the initial
transfer is important and interesting, if only because it called into question BuAer’s
policy of funding engine development separately from airframe development. BuAer’s
practice had been to finance new engines and then furnish them to the aircraft makers,
such as Grumman, Douglas, Curtiss, and Vought. However, the engineering challenges
that faced the developers of jet turbine engines, combined with BuAer’s policy of rely-
ing on one or two main engine suppliers, almost derailed the modernization of the
Navy’s carrier air forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s.1
Why the Europeans Developed Effective Turbojets First
In the years before World War II, in the United States, the National Advisory Commit-
tee on Aeronautics, a federal research and development organization, was an important
source of innovations for the Navy, Army, and the various aircraft manufacturers.
Formed in 1929, NACA had developed a cowling that significantly improved the effi-
ciency of radial piston engines, which would otherwise have suffered badly from the
drag generated by their large frontal area. NACA also devised standard airfoil (wing)
sections, much as the British Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough did.
NACA formed a committee to encourage the development of turbojet engines after the
British revealed the existence of Frank Whittle’s design in the fall of 1940. Why then,
and not earlier? There are four basic reasons. First, prior to Army general Henry H.
“Hap” Arnold’s chance introduction to the Whittle engine in early 1941, there was no
American military demand for jet propulsion. Propeller-driven aircraft performed
acceptably, piston engines were reliable, and the commercial aircraft manufacturers
knew how to design airplanes around them. In addition, the existence of a great num-
ber of World War I–surplus “Liberty” engines—many never used—for sale at a fraction
of the cost of newer types of power plants stifled research. (For example, it was only in
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1934 that the U.S. Army was able to halt the use of Liberty engines in Army aircraft.
That was because Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia, a World War I veteran and
student of military aviation, inserted a rider into the appropriations act directing the
Army to do so.)2 These factors led to a “lock-in” of piston engines in civilian and mili-
tary aircraft and created insurmountable obstacles for those who wanted to study and
develop alternative power plants.3 Aircraft engine performance was investigated in
terms of existing speed ranges; most American power-plant engineers accepted propeller-
driven aircraft as a given.4
Second, reliance on piston engines was reinforced by studies suggesting that jet propul-
sion of aircraft was an unrealistic goal. It was not that American engineers were
unaware of the concept of the turbojet. In 1919, years before anyone demonstrated a
practical turbojet, European and American engineers had proposed using them as air-
craft engines.5 French and British experimental work in the field was published in the
early 1920s, and in 1922 the U.S. Bureau of Standards investigated the turbojet as a
means of aircraft propulsion. Two years later, Edgar Buckingham, the Bureau of Stan-
dards propulsion investigator, concluded that jet propulsion would be impractical for
either civilian or military purposes. He argued that the top speed of a jet-powered air-
craft would be only 250 miles per hour, fuel consumption would be four times higher
than in a piston engine with equivalent horsepower, and that the turbojet would be
more complicated than a piston engine.6
Thereafter proposals for jet aircraft cropped up persistently in the United States, but
subsequent studies completed at the Bureau of Standards and NACA confirmed
Buckingham’s 1924 conclusions that low speeds and high fuel consumption made jet
engines impractical. By the mid-1930s, however, some researchers in the aircraft design
community were beginning to question the likelihood of continued progress in
propeller-driven aircraft technology. In 1934, NACA researcher John Stack reported a
practical limit to speeds achievable by propeller-driven aircraft. A different power plant
would have to be employed if aircraft were to fly near or faster than the speed of
sound.7
Meanwhile, several U.S. manufacturers had embraced the turbine engine as a means to
supply pressurized air to railroad diesel engines. In July 1935, for example, the Ameri-
can Locomotive Company (ALCO) was granted a license by a Swiss syndicate to manu-
facture superchargers for ALCO’s diesels.8 Building reliable turbines as superchargers
posed many design and metallurgical problems for railroad-engine builders, but manu-
facturers kept investing in their development because their use promised to lower
engine operating costs while dramatically boosting the amount of power that a diesel
of given weight could provide.9 There was little or no understanding within the
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railroad or aviation engine industries that the blast of hot air from a gas turbine engine
would in itself provide the forward force needed to propel an airplane.
The turbo-supercharger is interesting technologically because it is just a step away from
a turbojet, at least in its configuration. In a turbo-supercharger, exhaust gas from the
engine spins a turbine. The turbine in turn is connected to a compressor, the output of
which enters the engine. In The Jet Pioneers, Glyn Jones describes in some detail the
work of General Electric’s (GE’s) supercharger developer, Dr. Sanford A. Moss. Moss
may have been the first person to build a successful gas turbine—in 1903, for his PhD
degree at Cornell University. Moss’s turbine was driven by the combustion of pressur-
ized air. After receiving his degree, Moss joined a group at GE building low-pressure
centrifugal compressors—one of the other two elements, after the turbine, of a success-
ful gas turbine or jet engine (the third element is a combustion chamber). When the
United States entered World War I, Moss and his GE associates were asked to develop
an engine booster for high-flying aircraft, and Moss chose to work on the turbo-
supercharger. It was tested successfully on Pikes Peak in June 1918.10
Jones suggests that the Army Air Corps barely kept Moss’s project alive after World
War I. The Army’s desire to field very-high-flying bombers revived the project after
1935, and prototype turbo-superchargers fitted to the engines of an Army bomber in
1937 enabled the plane to fly at thirty-seven thousand feet. GE was mass-producing
turbo-superchargers by 1940, having overcome problems of turbine-blade reliability,
but Moss himself never took the next step to turn his invention into a jet turbine.
The experience of Douglas Aircraft engineer Vladimir Pavlecka further illustrates the
difficulties that faced engineers who wanted to develop turbojet engines for aircraft.
According to Glyn Jones, in 1933 Pavlecka proposed using a gas turbine to drive a pro-
peller.11 Pavlecka was an experienced engineer; he had produced the design for the pres-
surized cabin for the commercial version of the DC-4. His superiors at Douglas
Aircraft forwarded his proposal to Pratt & Whitney, which sent it on to MIT, whose
staff concluded that it would be too heavy for use in aircraft. Pavlecka later joined
Northrop, which split from Douglas in 1939, and apparently wrote up a proposal for
using public funds to develop what became known as a turboprop engine. He sent that
proposal to the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics and to the Army in 1940. Jones concludes
that the Navy rejected Pavlecka’s proposal because its wooden carrier flight decks could
not withstand the heat of a jet’s exhaust. The Army also rejected the proposal, though
Jones believes that Pavlecka’s proposal to the Army may have supported those who
favored initial development of the Lockheed L-1000 axial-flow jet engine, first begun
in 1940.
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Third, no official in NACA or the military championed the need to build research facil-
ities and fund a team of researchers that could amass a body of knowledge about jet
propulsion and supersonic flight. There was no appreciation among these officials and
officers of the impact of what they did not know on their evaluations of what could be.
In Europe, scientists and engineers who investigated alternatives to propeller-driven
aircraft gathered in 1935 at the Fifth Volta Congress on High Speed Flight, the first
international conference devoted to the science of supersonic flight. Sponsored by the
Italian Academy of Sciences and held in Rome, the Volta Congress brought together the
world’s preeminent aerodynamicists, including the Hungarian-American Theodore von
Kármán. He was impressed with the reported research results on high-speed flight and
concerned about the lack of theoretical work in the United States. American engineers
produced first-rate empirical data regarding the design of subsonic aircraft and piston-
engine aircraft, but it was German or German-educated scientists who led the theoreti-
cal investigations of high-speed and turbocompressor phenomena. In terms of quality
of theoretical research on high-speed flight, the British were slightly behind the Germans,
and the Americans lagged badly.12
Not only were the Europeans doing the best theoretical research, they were building the
research tools to maintain their research lead. While attending the conference, von
Kármán visited the Italian research center at Guidonia and saw an Italian 2,500 mph
wind tunnel that was used to investigate supersonic phenomena. Upon his return to the
United States, von Kármán attempted to persuade Army Air Corps leaders to build a
supersonic wind tunnel, but they rejected his idea, arguing that it would be too expen-
sive, even assuming that any funds at all could be found to construct it. Von Kármán
urged NACA to build such a wind tunnel, but George W. Lewis, NACA’s executive
director, turned him down. Lewis’s argument was that there was no need to build a
wind tunnel capable of speeds greater than the existing NACA 650 mph tunnel, because
propellers rapidly lost efficiency at speeds greater than 600 mph. Lewis did not criti-
cally examine his own assumption that aircraft would always be driven by engines pow-
ering propellers.13
Fourth, neither U.S. aircraft firms, the Army, nor the Navy closely followed European
advances in aeronautics and aerodynamics. Prohibitions in the Neutrality Acts of 1935,
1936, and 1937, especially the 1937 law, prevented U.S. firms from dealing with any
belligerent nation except on a “cash and carry” basis. Even those interactions were
blocked by Congress in 1939, when it limited professional contacts between American
civilian aeronautical engineers working for the major manufacturers, such as Douglas,
Grumman, and Curtiss, and their counterparts overseas.
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Moreover, by 1939, the United States had the biggest airline network in the world, and
its largest airplane manufacturers (Boeing, Douglas, and Martin) produced the largest
and most advanced airliners. Given this record of achievement, the Army and Navy had
no reason to imagine that foreign aircraft innovations might revolutionize military avi-
ation in ways that American designers did not themselves foresee. That view was prob-
ably reinforced by intense French and British attempts to buy U.S. combat aircraft from
1938 onward.
In 1938, prompted by a report written by a Navy officer who had seen gas turbines in
Europe, the National Academy of Sciences set up a committee on jet propulsion.14 The
following year, according to BuAer’s Ten-Year R&D History, the Navy—mindful of
developments overseas—asked the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate gas tur-
bines for marine propulsion. It later added a request that they be evaluated for aircraft
propulsion. The academy’s report, which was printed in the Bureau of Ships’ Technical
Bulletin in January 1941, judged gas turbines far too heavy for aircraft use—sustaining
the view of NACA regarding gas-turbine technology. Theodore von Kármán, now a
member of the Navy’s board of engineers charged to review the applicability of gas tur-
bines to flight, later denied that he had attended the meetings on the subject or had
read the report and regretted affixing his signature to it.15
BuAer’s Ten-Year R&D History reports that the Army and Navy jointly funded a
Northrop turboprop project for a 2,500 hp engine, signing a contract to that effect on
30 June 1941, despite the pessimistic assessments of both the National Academy and
NACA. William Green and Roy Cross note that Northrop made its proposal in March
1939, calling its engine “the Turbodyne.” It was not a successful design.16
In a turbojet, the piston engine between compressor and turbine is replaced by a com-
bustion chamber, and compression ratio and outlet temperature are considerably
higher. Instead of helping a piston engine turn a propeller, the jet engine uses its
exhaust to push the airplane ahead. In 1939, General Electric was the dominant U.S.
turbocharger manufacturer. Though at that date GE had not yet developed methods for
mass-producing reliable turbine blades and for overcoming the disruptive effects of
turbine stall inside its superchargers, the firm was an obvious candidate to build a U.S.
jet engine, once the government had decided to enter this field.17
The Hunt for an Effective Jet Engine Begins
In sending the Tizard Mission to the United States in the fall of 1940, Prime Minister
Winston Churchill decided to present the Americans, who he expected would eventu-
ally enter the war, with the fruits of advanced British research. The best-known exam-
ple was the magnetron, which made short-wave (centimetric) radar possible. However,
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the mission also brought an account of jet propulsion, which was then under develop-
ment. In its official postwar history, the General Electric Company argues that it was
the first U.S. firm to develop a jet turbine—in response to a request from General
Arnold, as commander of Army Air Forces, in the summer of 1941. But Green and
Cross, in their The Jet Aircraft of the World, suggest that Lockheed had already decided
to develop a jet engine by that time. Lockheed christened its jet engine L-1000, and the
firm hoped to interest the Army Air Forces in a fighter (L-133) powered by its new
engine. Its reasoning paralleled that which had produced the first German engine: a
young German engineer, Hans von Ohain, sold the idea to the Heinkel aircraft com-
pany, which produced first a test airplane (the He-176) and then a prototype fighter
(He-280). Lockheed was not nearly so lucky. Its engine never worked well, and the
Army showed no interest in its futuristic fighter.
By early 1941, two events paved the way for the mass production of jet engines. First,
the Whittle engine—using centrifugal flow—was nearing the flight-test stage, the
prototype engine having run long enough to show that it had the necessary endurance
to power a combat aircraft. Second, the Lend-Lease bill, which ended the restrictions
of the 1939 Neutrality Act, came into effect in March, implying that the United States
would produce the weapons the British needed to fight the war. A further implication
for the British was that new technology should be shared. That included the new jet
engine, although it is not clear to what extent it was described to the Americans in
detail.
Accounts of what happened next vary. On 25 February 1941 General Arnold, then still
Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Air, asked Dr. Vannevar Bush, who headed the new
National Defense Research Committee, to form a jet-propulsion group. In March a
NACA committee was formed, headed by Professor William F. Durand, who had taught
Dr. Sanford A. Moss, the developer of U.S. turbochargers, at Cornell. Durand was also a
founding member of NACA. His special committee included representatives of the
Army, the Navy (BuAer), the Bureau of Standards (in effect, the government’s physical
research laboratory), Johns Hopkins University, MIT, and the three major U.S. turbine
makers (Allis-Chalmers, GE, and Westinghouse). General Arnold specifically barred
American piston-engine makers, on the ground that jet development would distract
them from the urgently needed production of masses of piston engines optimized to
fight the coming war.
By the end of June 1941, all three U.S. turbine companies had responded to secret
requests from the Army and Navy that they examine the Whittle engine and simulta-
neously develop their own concepts.18 Contracts were let in July, and soon GE was
working on the world’s first turboprop engine. According to the BuAer Ten-Year R&D
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History, all three companies proposed axial-flow engines. Westinghouse proposed both
a simple turbojet and a ramjet. GE proposed the already mentioned turboprop. Allis-
Chalmers proposed a ducted fan (turbofan). Contracts were negotiated in the fall of
1941.19 The Navy decided to back the Westinghouse and Allis-Chalmers projects; the
Army backed GE, whose engine was called the TG-100.20
Allis-Chalmers was asked by the Navy to submit a detailed proposal in November 1941
and Westinghouse that December. Allis-Chalmers received an eighteen-month develop-
ment contract in January 1942, but at the end of that time its design was dropped as
less promising than existing engines. Westinghouse received its first contract on 8
December 1941, for a nineteen-inch-diameter engine (called the Type 19). In 1942 it
became clear that its thrust could be increased considerably by increasing its inlet tem-
perature; the resulting Type 19A was the first Navy turbojet. Because it was conceived
as a booster, it had none of the usual engine accessories (e.g., a generator). However, a
modified version, the 19B, was equipped with auxiliaries (mounted on the outside) so
that it could be used as either a booster or a main power plant. This change was
embodied in a May 1943 contract. Aircraft were first designed around the 19B engine
in the summer of 1943.21 A further improved 19XB offered an increase of thrust to
1,680 pounds (1944), up from 1,360 pounds in the 19A and 1,200 in the original 19. By
way of comparison, GE’s I-16 produced 1,600 pounds of thrust (see below).
Once the design was well under way, BuAer became interested in the possibility of clus-
tering smaller engines in place of one or two large ones. Presumably the expected
advantage was that an airplane could gain range by cruising on part of its power plant
(later a selling point for the F2H Banshee, which could shut down one of its two
engines on combat air patrol). The result was a 9.5-inch-diameter engine (Type 9.5, or
J32), the main application of which was in the Gorgon missile. It was conceived as hav-
ing half the diameter of the 19-series engine, with a quarter of the thrust (because the
mass flow through the engine, which determines thrust, is proportional to the area of
the air intake).
By 1944 BuAer was interested in gaining more power, so it let a contract to Westing-
house for a three-thousand-pound-thrust engine. That required about 1.32 times the
diameter (twenty-five inches); improvements in efficiency made it possible for Wes-
tinghouse to offer the desired power in a twenty-four-inch package, the resulting
engine being called the Type 24. The BuAer history associates this engine with the Ryan
FR-1 hybrid-power fighter. The twenty-four-inch engine was later redesignated J34 (a
scaled-up redesign, offering 4,500 pounds of thrust, was the J46).
General Arnold had visited England in 1941. He was shown the prototype E28/39 air-
craft and was much impressed by British progress. Arnold selected GE as the lead
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American company to cooperate with the British, because it already had considerable
experience in centrifugal compressors and supercharger turbines. Details were pro-
vided to two American engineers in London on 22 July 1941, and in September an
agreement was made to provide the United States with full details of the British
engines, subject only to secrecy. GE was given plans of the British Whittle (centrifugal-
flow) engine, and ultimately it also received an example. The company used the term
“Type I supercharger” for this project, so its early engines were numbered in an I series
(e.g., I-16, I-40). The I-40—the designation presumably indicates a goal of four thou-
sand pounds of thrust—powered the first American-production jet fighter, the P-80
(later F-80) Shooting Star. Production of these engines was licensed to Allison in 1944,
and the engines were given J designations (the I-16 became the J31 and the I-40 the
J33). Allison later took over J33 development, ultimately increasing its thrust to 6,350
pounds. Allison also took over development of GE’s axial-flow J35, which was the
precursor to the successful J47.
The Durand committee divided up the development and production effort, the Army
supporting the GE centrifugal-flow engines derived from the British prototypes and
the Navy supporting axial-flow engines. However, the BuAer R&D history (late 1945)
suggests limited Navy interest in jet propulsion, on the ground that it was suited only
to a short-range interceptor, which was hardly what the Navy was after—it wanted
long-endurance aircraft, to occupy combat air patrol stations. In his history of early
Navy jet fighters, Tommy Thomason notes that the FH-1, the first operational jet
fighter, “had twice the internal fuel capacity of the contemporary F8F-1 [Bearcat].” But
“the jet had only 60 to 70 percent of the endurance of the piston engine fighter, even
though it carried twice the fuel.”22 This lack of endurance is why the Navy initially pre-
ferred mixed piston-jet aircraft like the Ryan Fireball (FR-1) to all-jet aircraft like the
Phantom (FD-1). However, the BuAer fighter correspondence files associate the Fire-
ball with a special requirement—an escort-carrier fighter, as an alternative to the
Bearcat, proposed before that aircraft—rather than with a general-purpose fleet-carrier
fighter. The Navy did contract with Curtiss for a mixed-power heavy fighter (F15C),
but this airplane was soon discarded. Grumman design files of this period show crude
sketches of both all-jet and mixed-power aircraft, but the company offered only an all-
jet fighter for the 1944 competition, apparently the first in wartime fighter design.23
The Hunt for an Effective Jet Engine Intensifies
We should discuss the difference between the two types of jet engine, because the choices
made in 1941 had important implications. A centrifugal compressor is simpler than an
axial one, because it has only one or two stages (the latter uses two such compressors
back to back). Centrifugal compressors were incorporated in the superchargers of the
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1930s. Such a compressor is short but requires considerable diameter; the way to increase
mass flow, hence thrust, is to increase diameter. Flow can also be increased by making the
compressor run faster, but ultimately the output of such an engine is limited by its diam-
eter. The engine also loses some power because the air flowing through it must, in effect,
turn a corner. However, until jet engines approached seven thousand pounds of thrust,
centrifugal flow was quite attractive.
The British and the Germans used centrifugal flow for their first jet engines, but the
Germans soon turned to the theoretically much more attractive axial-flow configura-
tion. In the axial-flow design, the air moves straight through the engine. Each stage of
the compressor (i.e., each ring of blades) adds a degree of compression, so that the net
effect of the compressor depends on how many stages it uses—as well as, of course, on
its diameter. Ultimately the axial configuration is more efficient and much easier to
scale up. Once engines were producing more than 7,000 to 7,500 pounds of thrust,
axial flow became universal.
The dominant theme in early British development was centrifugal flow, although there
was early interest in axial-flow engines. Inventor Frank Whittle sold the jet idea to the
Royal Air Force and subsisted for years on very limited public funding for it plus con-
siderable privately raised money. Only about 1939 did the British government begin
funding Whittle on anything like a sufficient scale. Once the war began, the govern-
ment enforced cooperation among possible producers, almost all of which developed
variations of Whittle’s basic themes.24 Thus, when Americans bought British engines,
though from different manufacturers, they were really buying much the same device in
different sizes.
GE began by copying Whittle’s W1 engine, and it then adapted a de Havilland engine
(the Goblin) to power the prototype of the first major U.S. jet fighter, the P-80 Shoot-
ing Star. Meanwhile Rolls-Royce developed a series of engines with “river” names: Der-
went, Nene, Tay. Once GE had successfully copied the Goblin (as the I-40), it became
interested in a more powerful engine (four thousand pounds of thrust). In response the
British designed the Rolls-Royce Nene, more powerful (five-thousand-pound thrust)
and lighter than the new GE engine, even though at that time the Air Ministry did not
envisage a fighter requiring that much power. This development proved fortunate for
BuAer, because it made possible a single-engine fighter at a time when it seemed that
the bureau’s engines would not suffice except in pairs.
The Durand committee was intended to coordinate U.S. research (and, probably, to
avoid wasteful duplication), but it was in a position very different from that of the Brit-
ish gas-turbine committee: it did not have a central R&D organization (like the Royal
Aircraft Establishment) the fruits of which could be distributed to manufacturers.
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Instead, American companies were encouraged and funded to do their own develop-
mental work, as they had been in the 1930s. BuAer’s practice was to foster engine
improvements and then offer the newly produced engines to the airframe manufactur-
ers, like Grumman, Douglas, and Curtiss. Axial flow was virgin territory, of which the
British were not supplying any prototypes. It says a great deal for Westinghouse that its
first axial-flow engine (J30) was running successfully at the end of 1943.
Indeed, BuAer’s success in fostering an entirely domestic jet engine in the face of
improved air-cooled piston engines (like the Pratt & Whitney 3,500 hp R-4360) and
opposition from its own engine specialists is surprising. The main problem with all
early jet aircraft, whether they had centrifugal-flow or axial-flow engines, was that they
lacked endurance because of high rates of fuel consumption.25 The cycle of aircraft
operations from carriers was:
• Launch a strike or patrols
• Move any aircraft still on deck forward, so that returning aircraft would have a space
in which to land
• Recover the aircraft coming back from their flights
• Move the aircraft parked forward back aft so that the carrier could begin launching
aircraft again.
As Thomason pointed out, “the relatively limited endurance of jets forced this cycle to
become significantly shorter and less flexible.” This imposed “a much stricter operating
timetable on flight operations than had previously been the case.”26
Moreover, jet engines were slow to accelerate. According to Thomason, “The Pratt &
Whitney R-2800 piston engine powering the Grumman F8F Bearcat would develop
about 7,000 pounds of thrust with a 13-foot diameter propeller at . . . takeoff power.
The total thrust in the first jets was less than half that, even when the engines were new,
and old was measured in tens of hours.”27 This relatively low power and the inability to
accelerate and decelerate quickly made taking off and landing in the early jets a very
different—and more hazardous—proposition than it had been in even heavy, powerful
piston-engine aircraft like the F4U Corsair. Is it any wonder that officers in BuAer’s
Powerplant Division had doubts about turbojets and preferred turboprop engines?28 As
longtime BuAer engineer George A. Spangenberg observed in his oral history, “The
Navy had a very real problem in attempting to get into the jet age.”29
The Westinghouse engine (J34) seems to have been specified for the Navy jet fighter
(specifically, night fighter) competition in 1944, though Spangenberg notes that
Grumman “surprised everyone by submitting a four engine arrangement with [Wes-
tinghouse] J30 engines.”30 It is intriguing that sketches in Grumman files appear to
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show designs built around centrifugal-flow engines. The implication would seem to be
that the facts of jet engines were disclosed to all major U.S. manufacturers but that
BuAer had no interest in using the engine that the Army was then adopting for its first
fighters (the P-59A Airacomet and then the P-80). The use of the phrase “all-American”
(as opposed to British-conceived) in a BuAer Confidential Bulletin account of the first
jet fighters suggests a sense that the U.S. alternative was inherently better.
The Grumman sketches may be explained by the 1943 visit of British engineers who
described the new British Halford H-1 engine (the de Havilland Goblin); it was to be
built starting in 1945 as the J36 centrifugal-flow jet engine under license in the United
States by Allis-Chalmers.31 Producing 2,700 pounds of thrust, the J36 was an alternative
to the General Electric I-40 installed in the Army’s P-80. It was also considered for use
in the Curtiss F15C. In Britain, de Havilland installed the H-1 Goblin in its Vampire
fighter. The H-1/J36 was superseded by GE’s improved I-40 (J33).
BuAer sponsored two Westinghouse engines, designated according to their diameters,
nineteen or twenty-four inches. Two nineteen-inch engines powered the first Navy jet
fighter, the McDonnell FD-1 (later FH-1) Phantom. Single twenty-four-inch engines
were used in the 1944 competition, the winners being the North American Fury (FJ-1)
and the Vought Pirate (F6U). Apparently the FD-1 was considered no more than a fea-
sibility experiment; BuAer’s official position was that it would not be a particularly
good carrier fighter, but it was produced in some numbers so that pilots could gain
experience with jet-propelled aircraft.32 At least some of these aircraft went to the
Marines, even though these jets could not possibly operate from the escort carriers the
Marines were then using.
Additional fighter orders in 1945 used multiple twenty-four-inch engines, as did the
1946 interceptor, the Vought F7U Cutlass (two engines). All of these engines were lim-
ited to about four thousand pounds of thrust. As seen at the time, the next step was for
Westinghouse to scale up the engine to about 7,500 pounds of thrust, the result being
designated the J40 (Westinghouse Type 40, for its forty-inch diameter). It was slated to
power the F3H Demon, which the Navy hoped (unfortunately incorrectly) would pro-
vide performance equivalent to that of the new land-based fighters. The failure of this
engine apparently killed Westinghouse as a jet engine builder. As Thomason put it,
“After successfully developing very capable jet engines literally from scratch in the early
1940s, Westinghouse lost its touch.”33 Spangenberg, who by 1946 was the assistant
director of BuAer’s design review office, agreed: the J40 was “one of the big powerplant
busts that the Navy had.”34 Douglas’s Ed Heinemann, who designed the F4D Skyray,
apparently suspected that the new engine might fail. He gave the plane’s structure suffi-
cient diameter to take an alternative, which proved necessary—the airplane used the
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new J57 (a Pratt & Whitney axial-flow turbojet). The F3H was redesigned to take a new
Allison J71.
GE, the primary competitor to Westinghouse, developed its own axial-flow engines,
first the J35 and then a production version, the J47, which powered such Air Force clas-
sics as the F-86 Saberjet and the B-47 Stratojet. These engines do not seem to have held
much attraction for the Navy, and it is not certain why. It is possible that Air Force
orders consumed all of GE’s productive capacity. All general BuAer program docu-
ments refer to the steady progression of Westinghouse axial-flow engines; it is not clear
that BuAer was even interested in any other manufacturer in the period immediately
after World War II. However, immediately after World War II there was no engine more
powerful than the twenty-four-inch type (originally called the 24C). At some point in
1946 the British Nene (which was produced under license by Pratt & Whitney) was
added to the list of engines that companies could offer in their proposals.
It also seems that BuAer suddenly realized that the fighters it had chosen in 1944 could
not match current land-based types. It had chosen Grumman to build a four-engine
night fighter, or intruder, the F9F, in a 1945 jet-night-fighter contest (the other aircraft
chosen was the twin-engine Douglas F3D Skyknight). Late in 1945 BuAer canceled the
F9F-1 but left the contract alive. Grumman designed a single-engine day fighter pow-
ered by the Nene engine, offering it in August 1946. It is not clear to what extent
Grumman had been encouraged officially or unofficially to develop such a design.35 It
was more powerful than the 1944 fighters but much less sophisticated aerodynamically
than the interceptors of the 1946 competition. In retrospect it seems to have been con-
ceived as an interim fighter, but that is not clear from records now available.
The interesting point here is that BuAer seems to have found in the British centrifugal-
flow engines a useful alternative to the Westinghouse axial-flow ones. It seems to have
been BuAer’s decision, because at least one company offered a 1946 interceptor pow-
ered by a Nene in June 1946, before Grumman offered the proposal for what became
the F9F-2 Panther. The Grumman airplane, in turn, had a fuselage big enough to
accommodate a centrifugal-flow engine and thus became a candidate for any follow-on
British engine. Pratt & Whitney became the U.S. producer of the Nene, collaborating
with the British manufacturer, Rolls-Royce, on the next type, the Tay (U.S. J48). Note
that none of the other BuAer projects could accommodate such bulky engines; the
bureau clearly saw the British engines as a stopgap until better axial-flow turbojets
came along. Again, as during the war, it had no particular reason to consider British
technology superior to American. It is perhaps interesting that the BuAer Confidential
Bulletin, which included a section on engines in every issue, devoted no attention to
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British engines in the years immediately after World War II, though the bulletin did
contain articles on Soviet and even Swedish developments.
It mattered that engines like the J40 worked, because they were frequently buried in
fighters’ fuselages. Altering a fighter design to accept an alternative engine with a differ-
ent diameter was not trivial, because the airplane’s aerodynamics would change quite
drastically, as would its weight balance. Any such drastic change equated to substantial
delay in an aircraft’s scheduled development.
Some background on the diffusion of engineering knowledge about jet turbines from
the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy may also be relevant. In 1945 the United States clearly
led the world both in carrier aircraft and in carrier operating techniques. Contact with
the Royal Navy had not revealed areas of British equality, let alone superiority, with the
sole exception of the armored flight deck—which the U.S. Navy adopted in its last
World War II carriers. The Royal Navy had purchased large numbers of American-
supplied Lend-Lease aircraft, but it was not in the position of approaching U.S. indus-
try hat in hand, desperate for whatever could be provided. C. R. Fairey, head of the
experienced aircraft design and production firm of the same name, spent the years
1941–45 as the head of the British Air Commission in Washington, and he supervised
the growth of the commission from a liaison office to a thousand-person staff, many of
whose members were resident in U.S. aircraft firms.36 British industry had produced
many outstanding aircraft just before and during World War II. As we showed in Amer-
ican & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941, the problem for the RN was
that it had not correctly anticipated the campaigns its carrier force would have to carry
out and hence had asked the British Air Ministry for what might be termed “the wrong
planes.” In addition, the RN never could devote the tremendous manpower and indus-
trial resources to carrier aviation that the USN did during the war; the gap between the
sizes and resources of the two carrier forces was dramatically in favor of the latter.37
In 1945 the victorious Allies scrambled to seize German technology.38 For example, the
multivolume Ten-Year R&D History of BuAer R&D, produced in about November
1945, consistently included sections on German developments alongside those describ-
ing BuAer’s. German advances in engine and aircraft design were a powerful stimulus
to aircraft designers in Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Cdr. Alfred B.
Metsger, who had a graduate degree from MIT and became BuAer’s chief fighter “class
desk” officer in October 1945, after serving as air group commander on carrier
Saratoga, quickly grasped the importance of both the jet turbine engine and the swept-
wing aircraft designs prototyped by the Germans during the war. Spangenberg recalled
years later Metsger’s strong and persistent advocacy of “pure” jets over the “mixed”
type like the Ryan FR-1 Fireball and turboprop designs.39 Spangenberg also notes that
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Metsger was opposed by colleagues such as Capt. Selden B. Spangler, who headed the
power-plant design branch within BuAer.40 Spangler was well aware of the limitations
of the early jet engines and did not want to gamble on what he saw as an uncertain
future. Westinghouse’s trouble with the J40 seemed to show that scaling up the power
of axial-thrust jet engines would not be as straightforward as the aircraft (as opposed
to the engine) designers expected. Spangenberg points out that tests with a P-80 fighter
flying simulated combat against a Navy F8F Bearcat “educated a lot of the people” in
the advantages of the jet fighter.41 Still, the concerns about the future of axial-flow jet
engines would continue. As Thomason recognized in his study of carrier fighter devel-
opment, all the major jet engine manufacturers had difficulty during and immediately
after World War II producing reliable, high-output turbine engines.42
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British and American Prospects after the War
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, . . . it was the spring of
hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had
nothing before us.
CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES
At the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Navy contracted “dramatically, the number
of naval personnel alone dropping from over 3 million to less than 1 million by June
1946. The Bureau of Ships canceled over $1 billion in wartime shipbuilding contracts,
over 7,000 vessels were declared war surplus, and 2,000 more were mothballed.”1 The
immediate postwar demobilization was followed by a longer-term decline: “The Navy
reduced aviation forces 80 percent to a total of 10,232 pilots, 56,767 aviation ratings,
and 20 aircraft carriers of all classes by the end of 1949.”2
Making matters even worse was the war-produced “bulge” of qualified younger naval
aviators, who now faced the prospect of slow promotion. As aviator Donald Engen
recalled, “In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many of the more senior naval aviators had
two or more opportunities for aviation commands while all officers were virtually
frozen in their current ranks until the personnel turmoil associated with the end of the
war could be dealt with.”3 In many U.S. Navy squadrons, as Adm. James L. Holloway III
would recall, “morale was at rock bottom and discipline was nonexistent.”4
For the Royal Navy, the years after World War II were, from the financial point of view,
even more catastrophic. As naval historian Michael Isenberg notes, “At the time of Pearl
Harbor, Great Britain had mounted a navy of 363 combat ships and 300,000 men, and
the Americans had 339 combatants and 353,000 men—the two fleets were at rough
parity. . . . Ten years after Pearl, the bell had tolled: Korea and anticommunism had
swollen America’s Navy from its immediate postwar doldrums to 958 combatants and
705,000 men. . . . The Royal Navy had only 175 combatants and 150,000 men.”5
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The cause of the RN’s severe decline was simple: “The British were bankrupt, with
overseas debts fifteen times their reserves of gold and foreign currency. Their export
trade [in 1946] was one-third the level of that in 1939, and their visible exports could
finance only 10 percent of their overseas requirements.”6 The government of the United
States had not helped matters when it abruptly cut off Lend-Lease aid to Britain within
a month of the end of World War II in the Pacific.
Both postwar navies—the USN and the RN—had suffered in financial and personnel
terms, but the U.S. economy had not suffered the way that the British had. Indeed, the
American economy had actually grown in real terms during the war. This economic
growth meant that the U.S. Navy had more actual and potential financial resources
available to it.
Moreover, aviation within the U.S. Navy had strengthened institutionally, as a result of
its wartime performance. As Vincent Davis documented in his 1962 study of the Navy’s
postwar leadership, naval aviators came out of World War II with the strong support of
the Navy’s civilian leaders. In May 1944, in testimony to a congressional committee
studying postwar defense organization, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus
Gates argued that “it must be clear to all by now that the naval air force has proved to
be the most important member of the Navy team.”7 A year later, Navy secretary James
Forrestal described to a Senate subcommittee a true transformation in naval warfare:
One of the major purposes of the fast carriers’ interdiction strikes in advance of an invasion is to
knock out or pin down Japanese land-based air power all around our target. These battles of our
carrier-based air power against Japanese land-based air power now comprise one of the great struggles
going on in the Pacific. It really points up the question, Can sea air power cope with land-based air
power? I think the answer is obvious in the fact we are coping with it and we have beaten it.8
Forrestal backed up his endorsement of this new concept of naval aviation’s mission
with action to shift the center of gravity of the Navy from surface ships to aviation. As
the young aviator Donald Engen saw firsthand, there were immediate benefits for the
more senior naval aviators: “In the first major postwar promotion of Regular Navy line
captains to flag rank, fourteen out of the total of eighteen were aviators.”9 In fiscal year
1941, only 12 percent of unrestricted line officers were aviators. In fiscal year 1947, the
proportion had nearly tripled, to 34 percent.10 Funding for the Navy fell dramatically,
and a huge number of trained personnel left the service, but aviation was significantly
stronger within the Navy than it had been before the war.
But what about U.S. Navy aviators’ perception of the Royal Navy’s carrier force? It was
negative; most Fleet Air Arm aircraft by 1944 were U.S. designs, because many British
designs had not been successful. U.S. Navy aviators attributed the lack of effective Brit-
ish carrier aircraft to the two-decades-long control over all British military aircraft
development by the Royal Air Force. The U.S. Navy’s aviators argued that their wartime
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successes had stemmed from the control their own air arm had exercised over develop-
ment, procurement, and training. They did not support the campaign by the Army Air
Forces or, later, the U.S. Air Force to incorporate all fixed-wing military aviation into
one service.11
Cooperation between American and British scientists and engineers had been close
since April 1941, when the British government had set up a special office in Washing-
ton to facilitate the exchange of technical information.12 Moreover, the U.S. Navy had
been allowed to place liaison officers on RN carriers in the Mediterranean in the winter
of 1940–41, with positive consequences for the USN, and the carrier forces of the two
navies had traded information and insights when they had the opportunity during
the war.13
As Vincent Davis, Jeffrey Barlow, and other researchers have noted, U.S. Navy aviation
policy after World War II was most influenced by four developments: the advent of
nuclear weapons; the beginning of the Cold War; the political and bureaucratic conflict
over service roles and missions; and rapid technological change. We add a fifth factor—
the administrative changes that drew the policy-making responsibility out of BuAer
and placed it in OPNAV and that weakened the General Board. Perception and support
by senior officers of innovations in carrier aviation had to occur within this highly
charged and changing bureaucratic, technological, and administrative environment.
Memoirists like retired vice admirals Jerry Miller and John T. Hayward have made it
very clear that the attempt to show that carriers could launch nuclear strikes and the
anxiety and anger that stemmed from the “strategic bomber versus carrier” struggle
dominated other issues.14 As Hayward recalled, “From 1946 on, building the carrier-
based big-bomber force [to carry nuclear weapons] evolved along two parallel, interac-
tive lines. One focused on hardware; the other, on hiring and training able people. In
both, we were ‘pushing the envelope,’ as pilots say.”15
As we have pointed out, the organization of Navy aviation had also changed during the
war. The authority and role of the Bureau of Aeronautics had been weakened by the
creation of the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air (DCNO [Air]) in
August 1943.16 As Rear Adm. Julius A. Furer put it in his book on wartime Navy admin-
istration, “Broadly speaking, naval aviation planning, training of flying personnel,
logistics, planning and aviation operations were now responsibilities of DCNO(Air).
BuAer was responsible for all that related to the aviation materiel of the Navy, includ-
ing ‘designing, building, fitting out, and repairing Naval and Marine Corps aircraft,
accessories, equipment, and devices, connected with aircraft.’”17
At first, the separation seemed beneficial. For example, Rear Adm. John S. McCain, who
served as BuAer chief from October 1942 to mid-August 1943, shifted from the bureau
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to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as the first DCNO (Air). Capt. Arthur
Radford, who had been Director, Training Division, in BuAer, went with McCain to
OPNAV, where he headed several review boards that hammered out a comprehensive
program of aircraft production, maintenance, and pilot training.18 Again, what facili-
tated the development and implementation of policy was the fact that senior officers
knew one another well. Complementing this familiarity was the fact that younger
officers tended to rotate into and then out of BuAer or OPNAV (and of course into
and out of fleet assignments), so that the shared experience gained from time spent in
both organizations gave midcareer officers a common understanding of the problems
facing naval aviation. But there was also the chance that aviation officers in the postwar
Navy would gradually and quietly settle out into two camps—one focused on making
policy in OPNAV and the other concentrating on relations with aircraft and engine
manufacturers.
The Battle over Service Unification
What Barlow calls “The Fight for Naval Aviation” in the years between the end of
World War II and the start of the Korean War in 1950 was just as challenging and a lot
more psychologically punishing than the effort to create a nuclear strike force for the
Navy. “Unification” in fact covered two issues, and both demanded the time and the
energy of the Navy’s highest-ranking officers. The first was service unification—the
idea that the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. forces could be improved significantly
if all the services were unified under one commander and his staff. The second was the
U.S. Air Force argument that it would be more efficient to place all fixed-wing aviation
in one service than to spread it among the three military departments (Army, Navy, and
Air Force).
The political and bureaucratic struggles over service unification and over service roles
and missions have been studied in detail, and we won’t review all the relevant research
here. But it’s important to get at least a flavor of the intensity of these past disputes. In
December 1947, for example, Adm. Chester Nimitz, retiring as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO), argued, “It is improbable that bomber fleets will be capable, for several
years to come[,] of making two-way trips between continents . . . with heavy loads of
bombs. . . . In the event of war . . . , if we are to project our power against vital areas of
an enemy across the ocean before beachheads on enemy territory are captured, it must
be by air-sea power.”19 Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, the first Chief of Staff of the new Air Force,
promptly fired back: “If the Navy is trying to spend hundreds of millions of dollars
building aircraft carriers of a hundred thousand tons to move thirty-six bombers
somewhere close to the hostile shores to deliver devastating attacks, it shows an utter
lack of realization of what the hell strategic air and what air power is.”20
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Vice Adm. Arthur Radford, an aviator who was also the new Vice Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, well knew the challenge that he and other Navy leaders faced. As he told the
CNO in August 1947, “The most serious mistake that we can make in the Navy at this
time is to assume that everything insofar as naval aviation is concerned is alright. . . . It
will take bold and aggressive leadership after careful advance planning to combat the
Air Force arguments and drive.”21
This dramatic confrontation between the Navy and the Air Force would scar the feel-
ings of personnel in both services and consume much precious time and attention. The
effort expended on both sides of the battle is a classic example of a high “opportunity
cost.” Senior aviation officers in the U.S. Navy were unavoidably preoccupied by their
urgent efforts to beat back the Air Force arguments for “unification” (in both senses)
and by their equally intense—and ultimately successful—campaign to create a carrier-
based nuclear striking force.
For example, why didn’t the U.S. Navy pioneer the concept of the angled flight deck for
carriers once it realized that jet aircraft would land on carriers at higher speeds than
had World War II piston-engine planes? Part of the answer has to do with the different
ways that the U.S. Navy
and the Royal Navy
planned to use aircraft
carriers after World War
II. As a retired USN avi-
ator, Rear Adm. Paul T.
Gillcrist, put it in his
memoir, the Royal
Navy’s postwar carrier
concept emphasized
using fighters to protect
convoys from air attack,
“whereas the U.S. Navy
emphasized strike and
air defense operations.”
These differing postwar
operational concepts led
to different operating tempos for the carriers of the two navies. The British used “a
measured round-the-clock type of operation.” By contrast, U.S. carriers had to produce
surges of sorties for major strike operations, which meant that they wanted plenty of
deck space to line up sizable numbers of attack aircraft prior to strike missions.22
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A Grumman F9F Panther jet lands on Essex (CV 9). The athwartship barrier is up, but
from the pilot’s view he’s landing into a deck full of aircraft.
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British carriers did not have to generate the volume of sorties that U.S. carriers
accepted as normal.
These operational differences meant that the RN could accept an angled deck with a
four-degree offset, while the USN could not. As Gillcrist noted, “When an eight-degree
angled deck was examined, however, much less deck area forward of the landing area
had to be given up, and the obvious operational benefits of the angled deck became
much more attractive.”23 Adm. James S. Russell, then a captain in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, also “wasn’t completely sold on” the angled deck until he
“realized its great virtue in handling jets, with which we’d had all sorts of trouble.”24
(See appendix B.)
Immediate Postwar Carrier Concepts
At the end of 1944, Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher, the most successful carrier-force com-
mander in the Pacific in World War II, advocated the creation of an informal board to
recommend a new carrier design to DCNO (Air).25 In effect, he wanted an organization
that would function
much as the General
Board had in the inter-
war years. As one would
expect of Mitscher, he
had been evaluating the
performance of both his
carriers and the aircraft
flying from them. His
call for a careful assess-
ment of combat experi-
ence was echoed in May
1945 by Commander, Air
Force, Pacific, the “type
commander” of Navy air
forces in the Pacific, who
wrote to the Chief of
Naval Operations to press for the modification of the Essex-class carriers still under
construction. Specifically, he wanted the centerline aircraft elevators in the Essex class
replaced with deck-edge elevators.26 In this he was thinking in tune with BuAer, which
in the same month had returned to earlier studies of the possibility of launching and
recovering large, long-range bombers from new and existing carriers.27
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What every pilot feared—missing the arresting gear and vaulting over the barrier. The
F2H-1 is headed for two Skyraiders parked at the forward end of the flight deck of
USS Coral Sea (CV 43). The flight deck crew members are running for their lives.
U.S. Navy, courtesy of Captain Charles T. Creekman, Jr., USN (Ret.)
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Nearing completion
were three large (over
forty-five-thousand-ton
displacement) armored-
deck carriers whose
design had been based on
earlier experience with
carrier-versus-carrier
combat at Midway in
June 1942. These ships
would be the first U.S.
carriers constructed with
armored flight decks.
They would also have
large aircraft comple-
ments—over a hundred
planes. The question was
whether they would
satisfy both the “lessons learned” by Mitscher and the demands placed on any carrier
by the new and promising jet aircraft.
To come up with some answers, Capt. W. T. Raisseur, who had commanded an escort
carrier in World War II and had become head of the Aviation Military Characteristics
office in DCNO (Air) in early 1945, conducted a thorough analysis of war experience
and complemented it by consideration of the impact of newer, heavier aircraft on car-
rier design. As his notional aircraft he chose the F7F twin-engine fighter and the pro-
posed BT3D turboprop attack plane.28 Raisseur’s analysis considered the carrier air
group (fifty-four F7Fs and thirty-six BT3Ds) and the carrier as a single system. What
did that system have to do? It had to generate sorties. To generate enough sorties in a
given period of time, it had to be able to launch aircraft from several catapults simulta-
neously. Those aircraft would need deck space on which to wait their turns at the ship’s
catapults. The need for deck space would require the carrier’s designers to place the air-
craft elevators at the edges of the flight deck, and one of the aft catapults would have to
be canted to port.29
The special board Mitscher wanted within OPNAV, reporting to DCNO (Air), to
consider any new carrier designs was in place by June 1945, and Captain Raisseur sub-
mitted his analysis to it at the end of that month. Early in July the members of the
board endorsed his analysis and his concept of a carrier that had “a radically rede-
signed flight deck and a new mode of operations.”30 Captain Raisseur’s basic ideas—
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The F2H-1 has collided with the two Skyraiders; it will push both overboard and then
go overboard itself. The driver of the jeep tractor on the centerline is miraculously
alive.
U.S. Navy, courtesy of Captain Charles T. Creekman, Jr., USN (Ret.)
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especially that a carrier could not be designed in isolation from a concept of what air-
craft it would carry and how they would be operated—would influence all future car-
rier designs.
In parallel with the work being done in DCNO (Air), engineers at BuAer’s Naval Air
Development Center in Johnsville, Pennsylvania, were developing characteristics for
carrier aircraft that would be powered by turboprop engines and therefore have longer
range and heavier bomb loads. Their studies led the chief of BuAer, then Rear Adm. H.
B. Sallada, to propose to the Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945 that the
Navy procure carrier-based bombers capable of carrying significantly larger bombs. As
Sallada pointed out, “Analysis of bombing results in Germany has revealed that lethal
damage to many targets required 12,000 lb bombs.” As a result, BuAer sought to dis-
cover “what extension of range and of bomb size in carrier-based aircraft can be
attained through technological advances in the foreseeable future.” BuAer’s assessment
was that “a definite program be initiated to extend greatly the limiting ranges and
bomb sizes of carrier-based aviation.”31 Sallada also proposed that “serious consider-
ation . . . immediately be given to the development of an additional type” of carrier
“that will accommodate aircraft of about 100,000 lbs with a 2000 mile radius.”32
Sallada’s recommendations that BuAer pursue the development of larger, heavier air-
craft with significantly greater bomb loads and that a new carrier be constructed to
launch and recover these planes were endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations at the
end of December. Sallada’s initiative was also supported by Vice Admiral Mitscher, by
then DCNO (Air), in January 1946, as well as by the informal board that Mitscher had
helped create. In February the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. DeWitt Ramsey,
an aviator, ordered the Bureau of Ships to begin studies of a new carrier design.33 As Nor-
man Friedman has discovered, BuShips developed a new design, called “C-2,” in April
1946 and placed its preliminary characteristics before the Ship Characteristics Board,
which reported to the Deputy CNO for Logistics (DCNO [Logistics]) that June.34
But in fact there were two new carrier designs under consideration. The C-2, based on
wartime experience, was an alternative to the new Midway type. A second concept car-
rier (CVB-X) was developed specifically for the very-long-range and very large attack
aircraft that would be able to carry heavy nuclear weapons like the implosion pluto-
nium bomb dropped on Nagasaki in August 1945. This second carrier concept, which
eventually became the design of the ill-fated United States, was also submitted to the
Ship Characteristics Board as a potential entry in the fiscal year 1948 ship-construction
budget.35 It is in this second design that the “threads” of the heavy aircraft, the carrier
designed to launch it, and the Navy’s concept of carriers as nuclear weapons systems
come together.
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The prospect that the carrier force could fill the nuclear strike mission led the Acting
Secretary of the Navy in July 1946 to write President Truman that “the high mobility of
the Naval Carrier Task Force combined with its capacity for making successive and
continuous strikes in almost any part of the world make this force a most suitable
means of waging atomic bomb warfare.” The president assented to this approach, and
in November 1946 the CNO “directed the DCNO(Logistics) to modify the three CVBs
[Midways] to permit the operation of AJ Savages carrying atomic bombs.”36 Navy lead-
ers thought, however, that they needed a new carrier, designed from the first to carry
both nuclear weapons and aircraft that could deliver them at long range. As Friedman
notes, “In a sense the navy could consider the presidential authorization for carriers to
project nuclear strikes an authorization for the big strike carrier.”37
However, the trade-offs between the C-2 and the CVB-X caused problems for the Gen-
eral Board. For example, the aviators wanted a flush (i.e., clear, flat, and unobstructed)
flight deck. The ship designers answered that at least a minimal “island” structure was
necessary to carry away the exhaust from the carrier’s fire rooms and to mount elec-
tronic antennas. The effort to resolve this dispute has obscured the fact that carrier
operations in World War II and BuAer’s parallel efforts to work with industry to
develop larger, more powerful, and longer-range carrier aircraft led to two new carrier
concepts right after the war. We will turn to later developments in the story of what
became United States after we broaden our view of the problems and promise of World
War II technological innovations.
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Two AJ-1 Savages on Hancock in late November 1955. The plane on the starboard catapult is being launched; that on the port
catapult is waiting its turn. Note the early-model jet-blast deflectors.
Navy Department, National Archives
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The Larger Revolution in Technology
Aviation wasn’t the only area to be changed dramatically by emergency wartime invest-
ments in new technology. In 1946, even if one sets aside the implications of nuclear
weapons for the Navy and for amphibious warfare, one thing was clear: the fleet that
had triumphed in World War II was now largely obsolete. Technological advances dur-
ing the war had produced many types of radars, improved forms of sonar, streamlined
submarines that could stay submerged and run at high speeds by supplying their diesels
with air from snorkels, jet aircraft that flew too fast for existing antiaircraft fire-control
systems to target, homing torpedoes of several types, missiles, more-sophisticated sea
mines, and larger, heavier antisubmarine weapons.
The hundreds of destroyers and destroyer escorts that had fought in World War II were
now too small; the light cruisers produced by the dozen after 1940 could not protect
existing aircraft carriers from attack by jet aircraft; battleships were no longer neces-
sary; aircraft carriers now in service were not large enough to launch and recover new
aircraft like the AJ-1 Savage; and most amphibious ships lacked the speed needed to
converge quickly on a beach and unload their cargoes before an enemy equipped with
high-speed submarines and jet aircraft could mount an effective defense. The postwar
Navy had plenty of active ships and even more in reserve, but most had been designed
before the great advances in technology brought on by the heavy investment in research
and development during the war and were therefore severely limited in capability.
What to do about this consumed much of the time of the members of the General
Board. In an effort to help the secretary and CNO set priorities for investment, the
board reviewed the impact of likely future technological developments in a series of
classified hearings in 1948 and 1949. In the hearings representatives of the Navy’s
material bureaus (its acquisition organizations, such as BuAer), OPNAV, the new Office
of Naval Research, and the Marine Corps offered their views about the direction of
future science and technology and about the implications of that future development
for the Navy.
These hearings give us a window on Navy thinking in this period of rapid, even chaotic,
technological progress. In one hearing, held to review the planned 1951–60 long-term
shipbuilding program, a representative of DCNO (Logistics) argued that future ships
should be designed “from the electronics standpoint.” That is, they should be built
around their electronics instead of having the electronics simply placed on board.38 This
had dramatic implications for new ships and for older ships that were modified. For
example, more space would be needed for workshops for new electronic systems, as
well as living spaces for the technicians who would maintain the new sensors and com-
munications equipment.39 Recruiting and retaining the technicians would also pose
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problems: Who would train them? How much would they be paid? Where would they
“fit” into a ship’s authority structure? And how would the data from the new electronic
sensors be analyzed and displayed? These were not trivial issues.
The demand for more electronic equipment would also put its developers on a colli-
sion course with the Navy’s own naval architects, who were committed to “cleaning up
the topside structure of ships.” Those who wanted more and larger antennas were at
odds with those who wanted less “clutter.” This was especially true on carriers, where
there was already “insufficient room for proper antennas, both communications and
radar.”40 As one senior officer on the team representing the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Logistics noted, “We have discovered no new basic techniques in elec-
tronics which would lead us to believe that we can obtain greatly improved perfor-
mance over the radars of World War II without a corresponding increase in the size
and weight of radar components.”41
As this same officer observed, “A forward-looking, imaginative outlook is required
which views the ships as a system, really, rather than a combination of systems.”42 The
implications of this perspective were dramatic for carriers. For example, larger aircraft
with faster approach speeds required a new carrier-controlled approach (CCA) system,
but this new system—then still under development—needed “six clear channels of
communications” and the antennas to support them.43 In addition, “foreseeable aerial
task groups may require as many as 20 simultaneous transmitting and receiving chan-
nels aboard a carrier, which means a critical antenna design problem for the carrier.”
Moreover, future carriers would have to have, for safe air navigation, “a minimum of
two special radars, six simultaneous communication channels and an additional con-
trol center which will approximate the present” combat information center.44 These
requirements were pushing up carrier size and displacement and presenting the Navy
with a problem—which was, to state it simply, continuing pressure on carrier costs.
A captain from BuShips had more bad news for the members of the board: “Before
looking ahead 15 years, let us look back the same number of years and we will find the
surprising fact that communications in the Fleet was in a healthier condition than it is
today. . . . Formerly a ship carried communication antennas worthy of the name. Today
we find metallic spikes called whips feebly probing the ether, and relegated to locations
where, surrounded by every known enemy of a radiator or collector, they exemplify the
present day expression that everything on our ships radiates except the antennas.”45 The
way around this problem was to use the ship’s superstructure as an antenna, but that
approach again set the electronics engineers against the aviators, who wanted a flush-
deck carrier large enough to let them safely land their faster jet aircraft—and of course
their nuclear-capable AJ-1 Savages, too.
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The board was also reminded that ship designers had to find spots on superstructures
for detectors that could alert a crew to the presence of radioactive dust and debris.
Radioactive contamination was a particularly vexing problem for carriers, because of
their large flight decks and their need to recover more and more expensive and sophis-
ticated aircraft as those planes, low on fuel, returned from missions. Carrier flight
decks could be washed down, but building systems to do that into existing and planned
carriers would require more money, consume precious space, and push up overall dis-
placement in and atop carrier hulls that were not designed for such loads.
What about cooperation with the British? Their carrier force faced the same basic
problem of adopting both new aircraft (jets) and new electronics. Was cooperative
development part of the solution to the problems facing both navies? In November
1948, representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations informed the board that the Royal Navy was studying anti-
aircraft missiles and was “well advanced in experimentation with a flexible, rubber and
pneumatic landing deck for airplanes . . . to permit employment of very high perfor-
mance, wheelless [sic], jet fighter aircraft.”46 Two years later, in October 1950, the board
asked Rear Adm. C. F. Coe, DCNO (Air), about this British idea, and Coe’s assistant
noted the response of Rear Adm. A. M. Pride, then chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,
that it was “tough enough to operate planes on a carrier without trying to operate
them in a mattress.”47 This offhand dismissal of British work would not preclude later
trials of the “mattress,” as we shall show, but Pride’s attitude was that of a man beset by
too many problems at the same time—a condition we believe was widespread
throughout the senior ranks of the postwar U.S. Navy.
In 1948, the problems the British faced in finding the resources for research, develop-
ment, and production were clear to staff of ONI. As an ONI officer told the board,
“While the United States and Britain led the world at the close of World War II [in
radar technology], the British . . . are at present making very little progress, and except
in so far as U.S. equipment is made available to them and unless their present policy
changes, they may well lag considerably behind the United States and even some other
countries by 1960.”48
Yet BuOrd and BuAer maintained close contact with their counterparts in the Royal
Navy. The RN had two officers assigned to BuOrd in Washington, and BuOrd had an
officer “attached to the Naval Attache’s Office” who was an “ex-officio member of the
British Ordnance Board.”49 One goal of this cooperative arrangement was the develop-
ment of effective close-range air defense for carriers.50 BuAer too worked closely with
the Royal Navy. In fact, the British tried to persuade BuAer to take over funding and
management of their flexible flight deck in 1950, but BuAer turned the offer down. As
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a representative of the DCNO (Air) told the board that October, the pneumatically
inflated flexible flight deck “doesn’t look like what we need now.”51
But something certainly was needed. As a BuAer officer told the board in November
1948, “the trend in carrier aircraft weight and speed has been upward at an accelerated
rate for the past 20 years. Fighters of 1927 were 3,000 lbs., those of 1949 nearly 20,000
lbs., the escort fighter of 1955 will probably be 50,000 lbs. Attack aircraft during the
same period have risen in weight from 5000 to 50,000 lbs., and [one likely future]
design will be about 100,000.” Our tables and charts (see appendix B) show how accu-
rate this linear extrapolation was. This growth in aircraft weight and size required
stronger and heavier carrier decks and elevators, higher hangar decks, and, as the
BuAer representative noted, “more powerful catapulting and arresting machinery.”52
Accordingly, BuAer was developing more powerful catapults. But the hydraulic cata-
pults were heavy. One capable of launching a 100,000-pound aircraft at 150 knots
“would approach 800 tons.” To get around that, BuAer was banking on the “slotted-
tube catapult,” weighing “only a third as much.” It was supposed to be ready in 1952 or
1953. Unlike the existing hydraulic catapults, the slotted-tube type required explosive
fuel—“approximately 1000 lbs. of powder, or about 150 lbs. liquid-oxygen gasoline, or
nitromethane, per shot.” BuAer’s representative reassured the board that the slotted-
tube catapult had been used successfully by Germany in World War II to launch large
missiles. It was not considered exotic technology, though, of course, some of the mem-
bers of the board knew that rapid-oxidizing catapult fuels did not belong on a carrier
likely to be damaged in battle.
Neither did large numbers of jet-assisted takeoff units that had been developed during
World War II. But the heavier aircraft would require larger JATO units or several of the
smaller, “standard” ones. Standard units weighed two hundred pounds each, and the
usual fitting was two per plane per takeoff. As BuAer noted, a large carrier with a hun-
dred aircraft could use upward of six hundred of these units each day, creating “quite
an ammunition stowage problem.” Making the JATO units larger would not eliminate
the risk of storing what were essentially rockets.
Also, of course, the larger aircraft required the development of more powerful arresting-
gear units and perhaps even a new barrier, “actuated by spaced powder charges under
the wire across the deck.”53 In 1948, BuAer did not see the need for such new devices, as
either entailing much technical risk or stressing the process of designing new carriers
or modernizing existing ones. Officially, “The Bureau of Aeronautics feels confident
that it can produce catapults and arresting gear for the period under discussion which
will be adequate for any aircraft it may build, that is, up to [aircraft] sizes permitted by
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the deck strength and other physical limitations imposed by vessels.”54 BuAer would
soon change its tune.
Immediate Postwar Cooperation with the British
Relations between the USN and RN during World War II had been close, especially in
technological and scientific areas. That “special relationship” continued after the war,
but not quite at the same level. At the end of May 1946, for example, the British assis-
tant naval attaché informed his boss, Adm. Sir Henry Moore, who served in what
remained of the wartime Combined Chiefs of Staff, that the U.S. Chief of Naval Opera-
tions had made it more difficult for him and other military members of the embassy
staff to talk freely with their American counterparts. This did not make sense to the
assistant naval attaché, because “access is much easier for American officers in London
to technical developments than it is for us over here.”55 When told by his U.S. Navy
counterpart that the Bureau of Ships “had given a great deal of information to the
Admiralty without receiving much in return,” he was quite surprised. As he wrote to
Admiral Moore, the American officer had “admitted frankly that in many other direc-
tions, the U.S. Navy Department had learned far more from us than they had given in
exchange, but added that many officers in the Bureau of Ships were not in the position
to appreciate this fact.”56
Admiral Moore considered this apparent lapse in cooperation so potentially serious
that he sent a letter making just that point on 3 July to the Secretary of the Admiralty.57
The latter promised, in his reply of 15 July, to take the matter up with the RN’s
Engineer-in-Chief (EIC) and the Director of Naval Construction (DNC). The director
replied first, on 27 July 1946. He observed that the then chief of the Bureau of Ships
had led the U.S. Navy’s technical mission to London even before the United States had
entered the war and that “there is no doubt the Americans had at that time much to
learn from us in respect of nearly every type of ship. Since then although we have con-
tinued to supply them with information it is inevitable they do not find much that is
new since all important lessons have been absorbed by them.”58 Moreover, “they are
investing staff and money for naval research much more largely than we are and the
thought naturally follows why should they, by collaboration, finance the research for
the British Navy and incidentally for British Industry.”59 At the same time, he wanted to
make sure that Admiral Moore understood that there was still a “channel for the
steady flow of information in both directions”—that is, from the RN to the USN and
vice versa.60
The EIC responded on 12 August, and he supported the points made by DNC. As he
pointed out, “It is perfectly true that in the high pressure high temperature field [for
steam turbine propulsion] we have received much valuable information from the
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Americans.” But during the war, the USN “had the benefit of all our war lessons,” and
“since then they have been given all machinery information and data for which they
have asked.”61 Yet he also admitted that “it is the paucity of our research and develop-
ment facilities and efforts which keeps the U.S. Navy from full collaboration.”62
Despite obstacles and differences, the exchanges—both of information and of delega-
tions—continued. For example, in November 1948, two members of the Admiralty’s
Naval Construction Department visited Washington to study the latest developments
in carrier construction and the use of catapults and arresting gear on carriers. As the
two engineers noted in their trip report, “On every subject dealt with there was a very
full and free discussion, and . . . no information was withheld. We obtained a mass of
information, drawings and pamphlets, including the only set of plans of C.V.A. 58 [the
carrier United States] outside America.”63 Their American hosts were indeed candid.
They informed their British guests that the United States was a “normal” carrier rather
than “a specialised carrier designed for a particular objective” and that “future Fleet
carriers must be able to operate the largest types of aircraft of increasing ‘take-off ’ and
landing speeds.” This implied that “we shall reach a stage when all aircraft will have to
be catapulted.”64 In addition, the USN officers agreed that “the complete development
of AEW [airborne early warning]” was “essential.”65
The report of this mission to the United States was an excellent review of the U.S.
Navy’s progress and problems in the field of carrier aviation. The British engineers
learned that the USN was developing a slotted-tube catapult—the one described to the
General Board by the Bureau of Aeronautics that same year.66 They also were given the
maximum aircraft “takeoff ” weights for the existing carriers: sixty-two thousand
pounds for Midway, fifty-two thousand for Oriskany, and twenty-seven thousand for
the unmodified ships of the Essex class.67 Information on the loaded AJ-1 Savage was
also given them, as were the particulars concerning the modifications to Oriskany.68
They held detailed discussions with their American counterparts in BuShips and BuAer
concerning arresting gear, barriers to capture planes that missed the arresting-gear
wires, and catapults. They even spoke with engineers at BuAer’s Naval Air Material
Center (NAMC) about arresting-gear hooks for aircraft, discovering that NAMC staff
members did not agree with the views expressed by BuAer personnel.69 This was indeed
“inside” information. But it was an important issue: Could existing arresting gear—the
hooks and the cables they caught—capture the faster-landing and heavier jets without
allowing the jets to slide to the left or the right?
Navy officers at the Patuxent Naval Air Station in Maryland showed the British the lat-
est Navy aircraft, including the F9F and the still-experimental F7U-1. As the two Admi-
ralty engineers remarked in their report, “The main particulars of most, if not all of
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these aircraft, are known to those concerned with Naval aircraft at the Admiralty and
Ministry of Supply.”70 What the British did not already have, however, were the landing
weights at given speeds for most of these aircraft; as their report noted, “records of
many of these landings were handed to us for our information and are now available.”71
From this information they inferred that “the Americans have a much more effective
control of the landing speeds of their Naval aircraft than we have for our own Naval
aircraft.”72
This mattered, because aircraft models changed faster than carriers and their equip-
ment, which meant that RN carriers not yet built might find it impossible to take
aboard and successfully arrest aircraft then on the drawing boards. It was the by-then-
familiar problem of finding safe and efficient ways of throwing jets off carriers and
then capturing them as they returned. The Americans were better at it because of their
aircraft, not because their catapults and arresting gear were superior. This ability to
analyze American developments because the Americans were so forthcoming is just
another sign of the continuing and close cooperation between the two navies, especially
in the field of naval aviation.
A Pandora’s Box of Technology
In the spring of 1947, then–lieutenant commander (later rear admiral) James D.
Ramage devoted his Naval War College thesis to the topic “The Atom Bomb and the
Fast Carrier Task Force.”73 Ramage could know little enough about nuclear weapons at
the time, because of the secrecy that covered the nuclear program, but his argument
was clear: with nuclear weapons, Navy carrier task forces could pose a significant threat
to targets on land. He argued, “The use of the atomic bomb not only will multiply the
destructive force of a carrier air group from forty tons of TNT to the twenty thousand
equivalent tons of TNT of the present atomic charge, but will also double the number
of fighters . . . that will be used to protect the force. Thus one of the chief weaknesses of
the task force, that of defense, is strengthened simultaneously with the multiplication
of the offensive power of the force by fifty fold.”74 In short, “The carrier task force
therefore is just entering into the outer fringe of its potential. . . . A small or medium
carrier based attack plane, heavily escorted, and operating from the movable airfields
of the fast carrier task force now has the advantages of destruction formerly held only
by fleets of very heavy bombers with the added advantages of extreme mobility.”75
Ramage, a decorated dive-bomber pilot and squadron leader in World War II, would go
on to play a major role in the maturing of Navy carrier nuclear-attack squadrons, and
he would rise in rank quickly.76 For him, the immediate postwar years were “the best of
times.” For his Royal Navy counterparts, that was not the case. Theirs was “the winter
of despair.” Hopes of a peacetime force of ten large carriers, seventeen light carriers,
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and eighteen escort carriers in 1946 were dashed by 1948.77 Even carriers of the Malta
class, ordered in 1945 and based on lessons learned during the war, were never built. In
1938, the carrier Ark Royal was considered adequate for aircraft in commission and
under development. It had two hydraulic catapults that could accelerate its sixty air-
craft to a launch speed of fifty-six knots, if they did not exceed a weight of twelve thou-
sand pounds. Ark Royal’s arresting gear could stop an eleven-thousand-pound plane
landing at forty-five knots within forty feet.78 The canceled Maltas would have operated
ninety aircraft each, mounted catapults capable of launching thirty-thousand-pound
aircraft at 130 knots, and possessed arresting gear able to stop a twenty-thousand-
pound aircraft landing at seventy-five knots.79
Our argument is that the innovations picked up by the USN from the RN—the steam
catapult, the angled deck, and the mirror landing aid—cannot be appreciated sepa-
rately from these larger developments, the “threads” that make up the story of postwar
carrier aviation and the background to it. There’s a “heavy bomber” thread that carried
over from World War II, as well as “threads” representing the need of jet aircraft for
catapults to get off the deck and for angled decks to get “home” safely, and the debates
over service unification, the unification of all aviation forces, and the optimal way to
deliver nuclear weapons. There’s also a “thread” for financing innovation and another
for the range of the innovations themselves. The latter covers a lot of ground—from
the introduction of effective jet (and then supersonic) aircraft, to nuclear submarines,
cruise and ballistic missiles, and even space satellites. World War II had opened a Pan-
dora’s box of technology, and both the USN and the RN struggled to take advantage of
all the ideas and inventions that had popped out of that box.
But very quickly after the war it became clear to officers and civilians in both navies
that the U.S. Navy had a huge advantage in terms of resources. The disparity in
resources, however, did not cut off close and confidential exchanges between the RN
and the USN. The two navies had established communication at multiple levels, and
the contacts persisted, despite the fact that the futures of the carrier forces in the two
navies were beginning to diverge sharply.
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The Flexdeck
The story of the flexible deck, or what some in Britain called the “carpet deck,” is inter-
esting, because it was an ingenious but failed innovation that helped move Royal Navy
aviators toward the angled-deck concept. The idea that led to the flexible deck was
simple enough—to improve the flying performance of jet aircraft by eliminating their
landing gear. An aircraft would be recovered back aboard the carrier by flying it softly
into an inflated mattress and catching an arresting-gear wire. Then a winch would pull
the plane onto a small dolly, from which the plane would be transferred to a catapult
and then, rearmed and refueled, launched for its next flight.
The idea seemed elementary, and it was conceptually attractive, particularly given the
high fuel-use rates and resulting low endurance of early jet engines. In the early jets,
designers were under great pressure to hold down the weight of the aircraft’s structure
in order to increase aircraft endurance, and the weight of aircraft undercarriages could
be traded for more fuel or ordnance.
The idea was well along in Britain by the early spring of 1945. Official records show
that the Royal Navy’s offices of the Director of Naval Construction and the Engineer-
in-Charge had already developed various concepts of what was then called a “sprung
deck” for use in existing carriers. The Royal Aircraft Establishment had already tried
out some of these ideas “in model form” and was ready to move ahead with full-scale
trials.1 The Royal Navy and the RAE sought the support of the Naval Aircraft Subcom-
mittee of the Aeronautical Research Committee of the Ministry of Aircraft Production,
which would have to fund the trials.
On 18 April 1945, MAP officials sponsored a meeting attended by Royal Navy, Air Min-
istry, and RAE representatives. Representing the RN’s EIC was Cdr. Colin C. Mitchell,
who—as we’ve already noted—held patents for the steam catapult. One of the RAE’s
representatives was Lewis Boddington, who years later shared credit for coming up
with the concept of the angled flight deck.2
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The head of MAP’s delegation opened the meeting by stating that MAP had decided to
apply the concept of jet aircraft operating without landing gear to the RAF as well as to
the RN. As he put it, “This aspect, then, must be kept in the minds of people concerned
with the Naval Application.”3 As we shall show, this insistence on the joint (RAF and
RN) application of the concept was to have a strong influence on future decisions.
The RN representatives did not challenge this statement of policy by their MAP coun-
terparts. The RN was aware that the approach was contingent on successful trials; if the
idea didn’t work, it wouldn’t matter that it had been initially proposed for both the
RAF and the RN. Rear Adm. M. S. Slattery, the Chief of Naval Research (CNR), noted
that “the first approach is to try to find a scheme which could be incorporated in exist-
ing carriers. . . . Such a scheme would be an interim measure which, if used with exist-
ing jet designs with their undercarriages removed, would teach us a lot and show the
way to the solution of the complete problem.”4 The admiral also asserted that “com-
plete mechanization” of carrier landings and takeoffs was “the ultimate aim” of the
informal consortium (composed of engineers from the Admiralty, the RAE, and the
private firms Vickers and Westland’s) that had been considering the idea.5 Finally, Rear
Admiral Slattery proposed two key measures of effectiveness that needed to be applied
to any development effort: “landing and take-off times at least comparable with those
at present[,] . . . 20 seconds and 30 seconds respectively.”6 Like the MAP decision that
any new concept would have to apply to both the RAF and the RN, this metric would
turn out to have a decisive influence on the assessment of the proposal to operate jet
aircraft without undercarriages.
Mr. J. L. Bartlett, speaking for the Admiralty’s DNC, noted several possible structural
alternatives. One was a “thin metal or steel deck in hinged panels supported by a large
number of low pressure shock absorbing air cylinders.”7 Another was a kind of air
mattress, which had the virtue of being able to absorb the impact of a landing jet with-
out damaging the aircraft’s structure. The key point that Bartlett made was that it
would take time, talent, and funds to narrow the alternatives down to the one that
should be pursued. The RAE did not then have satisfactory concepts for either the
“sprung deck” or the means by which aircraft would be taken from this deck and pre-
pared for launching.8
Commander Mitchell, the catapult specialist, noted to his colleagues that the RAE had
already determined that aircraft-carrier catapults would have to be upgraded if the
“sprung deck” were to be developed. As he observed, “the accelerators” on the RN’s
existing carriers were “capable of about 100 knots (including wind over the deck) and
new construction . . . aimed at a maximum speed of 110 knots (with wind over the
deck).” But the RAE’s engineers had determined that jets without undercarriages would
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require a catapult that could accelerate them to 125 knots; therefore, work on the
“sprung deck” would also entail improvements in catapult technology.9
The April 1945 meeting appears to have been the first interaction between technical
specialists and senior decision makers that focused on the interrelationships among the
new concepts of the steam catapult, the angled deck, and what came to be called the
“flexible deck,” or “flexdeck.” Because the MAP controlled overall wartime aircraft pro-
duction, the RN had to persuade it to fund further development of concepts such as the
“sprung deck.” The MAP supported the RAF and the RN’s air arm, insisting on a
program that would benefit both services. The RN, unlike the RAF, had “targets,” or
metrics, for “undercarriage-less” jets operating from existing and future carriers,
because the RN practiced, as a matter of operational doctrine, rapid takeoffs and land-
ings from its carriers.
The stage was set for development and testing. According to Eric Brown, work began in
the summer of 1947 on a “carpet deck” at the RAE’s facility at Farnborough.10 Once the
prototype—“composed of five layers of vulcanized rubber, above three layers of NFS
hoses, inflated at varying low pressures”—was completed, it was subjected to a series of
tests, one of which was to have a Vampire jet manned by Brown dropped on it from
various heights by a crane.11 By the middle of December of that year, the flexible deck
was ready for trials at RAE. Once the weather conditions were right, Brown was ready
to land his Vampire on it.
Though Brown had
successfully practiced
approaching the flexi-
ble deck, his initial
landing was a failure.
A ramp was posi-
tioned at the forward
end of the flexible
deck so that the
tailhook of an aircraft
approaching just
above the ground
would slide up the
ramp before engaging
the arresting gear, sus-
pended just above the
flexible deck itself.
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 9 1
A Fleet Air Arm Vampire on the “flexible rubber carpet” at RAE Farnborough. Note the air-
filled “sausages” that support the flexible rubber deck.
Fleet Air Arm Museum
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Unfortunately, there was also a ridge where the ramp met the deck, and Brown’s
tailhook “caught in the ridge and was flung up against the fuselage, and the tail booms
of the Vampire hit the ridge.”12 The tailhook lodged in its housing—something that
should have been impossible—and Brown’s Vampire “pitched nose-down towards the
deck,” scraped over the arresting-gear wire, dug right down into the rubber hoses, and
then “was thrown harshly up again in a nose-up attitude.”13 Brown’s Vampire couldn’t
accelerate enough to get back into the air, crashing into the ground forward of the flex-
ible deck. Brown was not hurt, though the “crash split the cockpit all round me.”14
As Brown noted in his autobiography, “We had full camera coverage of the accident”
and “found that my approach speed had been a little lower than normal but should
have been safe enough”—yet it wasn’t. Further tests revealed the problem: “In the
approach speed range which we had been using any increase in engine power caused a
change in airflow behaviour around the wing-root air intakes which aggravated rather
than improved the lift.”15 It took ten weeks to fix that and other problems, and Brown
made a “perfect” landing on the flexible deck on 17 March 1948. The program was still
not out of the woods, but Brown and others successfully conducted sea trials of the
flexible deck from May to November 1948.16 At the same time, engineers at the RAE
assessed the advantages of “undercarriage-less aircraft” as significant: “With constant
endurance the present weight of armament can be doubled.”17
But there was still the MAP requirement that the new system be applicable to the needs
of the RAF, and that became a sticking point. By the end of September 1950, the RAF
had decided that “the complications of catapults and mats” were “operationally unac-
ceptable” for both Fighter Command and the force of long-range bombers.18 There
indeed were advantages in performance for aircraft without landing gear, but those
advantages did not outweigh the operational “costs.” As Group Captain S. R. Ubee put
it in a memo on 27 September, “I do not think we can contemplate any system that ties
fighter aircraft down to particular airfields.”19 By the end of October, the RAF’s position
was clear: “The Air Staff would be glad to see a demonstration of the complete cycle of
take-off, landing, ground-handling, refuelling and re-arming, and preparation for take-
off of a fighter type aircraft, without the use of an undercarriage.”20
British firms (Vickers and Supermarine) still supported the concept of the flexible
deck—even for land-based aircraft—but the RAF would not endorse the program
unless and until it could see a clear demonstration of its operational success on land,
and with numbers of aircraft, and it was not likely to see that, given the program’s fiscal
constraints. But the RN stayed with the program, despite the fact that test results could
not meet the standards for landing and takeoff intervals of twenty and thirty seconds,
respectively, set in 1945. A 1953 report of trials with three Vampire aircraft landing in
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rapid succession noted
that the shortest land-
ing interval was forty-
four seconds, though
suggesting that the
interval could be
reduced to twenty-
four seconds—still
just a bit short.21
In the meantime,
however, the concept
of the flexible deck
had caught the atten-
tion of both the U.S.
Air Force and the U.S.
Navy. In November
1952, the classified
Naval Aviation Bulletin reported that officers from BuAer had witnessed a demon-
stration of landings on the flexible deck at Farnborough and had “unanimously rec-
ommend[ed] that a comprehensive flexible-deck development program be begun in
the US, preferably in collaboration with the Air Force and the British Royal Navy.”22 A
year later, Lt. Cdr. Donald Engen, then detailed to RAE Farnborough to test the RN’s
visual-glide-slope development program, was directed to try out Farnborough’s 60-by-
144-foot flexible deck.
Engen expected to repeat the method pioneered by Brown in 1948. He would approach
the flexible deck in a modified Vampire (known as a Sea Vampire) at 105 knots with
the tailhook about eighteen inches above the ground. The hook would catch in the
arresting gear, the plane would plop down on the flexible deck, and then the plane
would be towed off the flexible deck to where a crane would lift it so that the pilot
could lower the landing gear and taxi away. Engen’s first landing went more or less as
he had hoped: “The arrestment of the forward motion of the airplane was not unlike
a normal carrier landing. The cushioning of the rubber bolsters was gentle enough,
but I was thrown around in the cockpit even though I was wearing a seat belt and
shoulder strap.”23
But his fifth try went awry. As the tailhook caught, Engen “allowed the Sea Vampire to
climb very slightly. With upward movement . . . , the Sea Vampire flew out until the
wire stopped it in midair, and I was thrown back down into the flex deck, which
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 9 3
This photo from Farnborough shows how the jet without an undercarriage would be
moved off the rubber deck and onto a trolley.
Fleet Air Arm Museum
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then . . . threw the Sea Vampire back into the air in a series of bounces.” The effect of
this bouncing on Engen was severe: “My body had literally flailed about the cockpit. . . .
I felt like a wet rag, with the pain bringing sweat to my forehead.”24 But this experience
did not cause Engen to turn thumbs-down on the flexible deck.
The USAF and USN proceeded with their tests. The Air Force was apparently con-
cerned that a surprise attack by Soviet aircraft on its bases in Europe would fatally crip-
ple the tactical fighter-bomber force assigned to support U.S. ground forces stationed
there. One way to avoid being caught by surprise was to have fighter-bombers that
could take to the air immediately on warning, and the USAF planned to mount combat-
loaded F-84G Thunderjets on mobile launchers designed for the large Matador cruise
missile. But these attack aircraft would be more effective if they were stripped of their
landing gear, and so the USAF examined the flexible-deck concept as a means to
recover such “zero-length launch” planes.
The USAF’s version of the RN’s flexible deck was four hundred feet long, but the extra
length (as compared to what the RN was using) did not protect the pilot of the first test
flight from severe injury. The engineering problem faced by the project team had been
to find a way to retract the F-84G’s flaps, which would be down during the aircraft’s
approach, once the plane’s tailhook had caught. The engineers had feared that bringing
the plane down on the rubber deck with its flaps extended might ruin the deck, and so
they had installed a system to pull the flaps up into the wings as soon as the plane
caught the arresting wire. Unfortunately, on the first attempt this system worked even
though the plane didn’t catch the wire, with the result that the F-84G bounced twice on
the mat and then crashed heavily beyond it. Though a second attempt to land an F-84G
on the mat was successful in December 1954, the pilot was violently thrown around in
the cockpit and badly injured. The USAF then abandoned testing.25
The Navy, proceeding in parallel with the Air Force, first sent two pilots to
Farnborough to gain experience landing on the flexible deck there. BuAer also had
Grumman modify two F9F7 Cougar swept-wing jets for tests planned for early 1955.
Both aircraft retained their landing gear, but both were also equipped with powerful
Pratt & Whitney J-48 engines.26 In an effort to protect its own test pilots and those of
the Navy from injuries of the kind suffered by their Air Force counterparts, Grumman
developed “a rigid torso harness, a formfit helmet with wraparound jaw protector, and
a device for rigidly connecting the helmet to the harness.”27 Though this apparatus suc-
cessfully protected the spines of the two test pilots who made the initial landings at
Patuxent River, one, Lt. John Moore, USN, made the following observation: “It was cal-
culated that with the harness on and the life jacket inflated (in the event of a water
landing), the buoyancy was slightly negative. . . . [I]n the event of a ditching and
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following the pilot’s safe egress from the airplane, he had but to remove the life jacket,
remove the parachute, remove the protective harness, reinstall the life jacket and inflate
it. It was expected that this could be accomplished while the pilot was standing on the
bottom of Chesapeake Bay.”28 Such sarcasm aside, Moore made a number of successful
landings on the 80-by-570-foot flexible deck.
Like the British flexible deck, the one constructed for use at Patuxent River was com-
posed of air-filled rubber “sausages,” or bags, that were eighty feet long and thirty
inches in diameter. The bags were stretched across the deck’s base and topped by “rub-
berized fabric mats” that held them in place. The Navy’s flexible deck, again like its
counterpart in Farnborough, had a front ramp (also composed of air-filled bags) and a
single arresting-gear wire. “To provide a slippery surface for landings, a compound of
silicon and water was applied to the deck surface by crewmen with swabs.”29
The first flexdeck landing took place on 18 February 1955, at a speed of 135 knots. The
last landing took place on 4 August 1955, and “the whole project was terminated 13
March 1956.”30 One reason for ending the program was the danger that landing on the
flexible deck posed to even the best pilots. Lieutenant Moore, after landing successfully
a number of times, pushed the envelope just a bit too far in an effort to find out how
the flexdeck would handle a heavily loaded airplane. He deliberately caught the
arresting-gear wire at the maximum height above the deck, but he also “let the right
wing drop slightly after hook engagement so that deck contact was made with a bank
angle of about five degrees right wing down.” His plane immediately dove into the
deck, pitched back up, rolled to the left, hit the deck again, and rolled to the right. As
Moore recalled, “The rolling and pitching continued until the Cougar came to a halt,
which seemed like about four days. It was a wild ride. Black rubber deck marks were
found on the upper surface of the right wing.”31
We have quoted from the reports of U.S. Navy pilots who tested the flexdeck, such as
Engen and Moore, because their reports sounded the death knell of this once-
promising innovation. As Moore recalled later, “Pilot skills demanded for successful
landings . . . were stretched close to practical limits and . . . the possibilities of success-
fully deploying a squadron of higher performance sweptwing jets on a Flexdeck aircraft
carrier by our Navy had to be considered unfeasible.”32
Yet the RN’s famous test pilot Eric Brown had not felt that way after his tests of the
flexible deck on HMS Warrior in 1948. In his official report, he argued that
the principle of flexible deck landing for undercarriageless aircraft is fundamentally sound. . . . The
experiment is probably ahead of its time in that it apparently does not offer much gain to the conven-
tional type of jet aircraft in service at the moment, but it should offer a lot to an aircraft specifically
designed for flexible-deck operation, provided that arrester gear development can keep pace with in-
creasing approach speeds. . . . It may even be that future swept-back and delta planform aircraft will
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be forced to adopt this method of landing on carriers, since all calculations point to serious wheeled
landing problems on such aircraft.33
In his memoirs, Brown admitted that going over to the flexdeck would have meant
acquisition of a very different fleet of carrier aircraft, along with the wholesale recon-
struction of numerous airfields—to say nothing of changes to existing and planned air-
craft carriers. He well knew that the British government could not afford all that.
But assessments of the flexdeck operational trials stimulated work on a major, lasting
innovation—the angled deck. To quote Eric Brown once more:
After the successful flexible deck ship trials on HMS Warrior, a meeting was held [in August 1951] at
the Ministry of Aviation to discuss issues that had been highlighted, one of which was how to land
and catapult aircraft as a simultaneous operation in view of the fact that no crash barrier was envis-
aged for the flexible deck.
During the meeting . . . , Captain Dennis Cambell was in the chair, and during discussion, made pencil
sketches on a pad in front of him without really appreciating the practical significance of his doodling
ideas. At the meeting was Lewis Boddington, the Head of Naval Aircraft Department at RAE, and his
quick mind saw the potential in the sketch proposals for normal carrier operations. Back at Farn-
borough he produced a design for ten degrees angled deck to be suitable for a carrier such as Ark
Royal.34
Cambell’s notes of the meeting, written on 9 August, state that “there was no pros-
pect . . . of a one-type carrier for undercarriageless aircraft only.” The attendees had to
come up with a design that would handle aircraft with wheels and those without.
Moreover, they agreed on two other requirements—that the “aircraft stowage and
operating capacity of the carrier must not be reduced” and that there would be no
“fundamentally different approach technique” with the new carrier design.35 As
Cambell recalled later, he had decided to withhold “my angled idea until it had become
clear to all that the paramount need in accepting the rubber mat idea was to retain the
deck park. When it was coming to be seen that no simple solution was in the offing, I
presented a large sketch . . . showing the mat and the four arresting wires offset 10
degrees to port.” Though, to quote Cambell, “the meeting’s reaction” to his proposal
“was a mixture of apathy and mild derision,” engineer Lewis Boddington took the idea
with him back to his office at RAE Farnborough.36 As we showed in chapter 4, Bodding-
ton was one of the conceptual pioneers in the Royal Navy’s efforts to adapt carriers to
jet aircraft. On 28 August 1951, Boddington wrote to both Cambell at the Ministry of
Supply and J. L. Bartlett at the Admiralty with a proposal to offset future carrier land-
ing decks by eight degrees.37
Though most contemporary naval aviators have no knowledge of the flexible deck or of
the role it played in the development of the angled deck, the story of the flexdeck is
important because it shows that the U.S. Navy was willing to follow the RN’s lead
despite the fact that the USN had more financial resources and its own research
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organizations. The USN’s decision reflects the uncertainty that surrounded tactical air-
craft operations in the early Cold War years. To overcome that uncertainty, the USAF
and the USN decided to spend research and development funds to “buy” knowledge,
realizing that it was cheaper in the long run to try out new ideas by investing in proto-
types than to make a commitment to an expensive program that might not pan out.
This willingness—even eagerness—to experiment is a key to innovation.38
But the issue that most concerns us is the constant desire of senior officials to reap the
benefits of innovations without paying the concomitant costs, and among the most
important of these costs are the time, energy, and money invested in innovations that
do not work out as anticipated. The flexdeck was one of these, and the lesson of its
development and testing is that—as we have said before in other publications—devel-
opers will inevitably “waste” resources on what appear to be promising innovations.
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Catapults
Choosing an Option under Pressure
After World War II, the USN’s catapult developers in the Naval Air Material Center
believed that existing hydraulic catapults could be scaled up to cope with jet aircraft. At
the same time, they also examined other alternatives, including the steam catapult
developed by their British counterparts at the RAE. As it turned out, the USN chose the
British alternative; it worked when it was needed. However, that choice apparently did
not entirely satisfy the NAMC developers or their colleagues in BuAer, because steam
catapults draw their power from a carrier’s boilers, and BuAer engineers did not want
catapult capacity tied so closely to the efficiency of a ship’s steam plant. In 1959, for
example, long after the decision had been made to adopt variations of the British steam
catapult, BuAer was still studying a new internal-combustion (C14) catapult designed
specifically for the nuclear carrier Enterprise (CVAN 65).
Introduction
The requirement that carrier aircraft equal the performance of their land-based con-
temporaries drove postwar Navy jet aircraft development. The new aircraft, as we have
shown, were larger and heavier than their piston-engine predecessors. This was espe-
cially true of the bombers, such as the AJ-1 Savage and the A3D Skywarrior, which car-
ried nuclear weapons. It was essential to develop catapults that could propel such large
aircraft off a carrier’s deck. As both American and British engineers began to realize,
“the operation of wire ropes and pulleys in hydro-pneumatic . . . systems was reaching
its limit.”1 The British, lacking the resources required to pursue multiple catapult con-
cepts, settled early on steam catapult. The Americans, with more resources and confi-
dent that incremental improvements to existing technology would be adequate,
adopted the British steam alternative once they saw it demonstrated successfully. As
they knew, failure to develop more powerful catapults was unacceptable; without a dra-
matic increase in catapult power, nearly the entire postwar U.S. naval aircraft program
faced collapse.
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The Problem
It took a few years for the problem to bite. To some extent a carrier could make up for
limited catapult performance by running into the wind. This had long been standard
practice. For example, the standard U.S. Navy specification sheets for aircraft postu-
lated takeoff runs into a twenty-five-knot wind over the flight deck. The performance
of existing catapults could also be enhanced. Thus war-built Essex-class carriers suc-
cessfully operated jet fighters and fighter-bombers off Korea in 1950–53. However, they
could not operate aircraft that were already under test, such as the new jet night fighter
(F3D Skyknight) and the new swept-wing fighters. For such aircraft BuAer could offer
the H8, the ultimate version of its earlier hydraulic catapults, planned for carriers con-
verted specifically for jet operations, beginning with USS Oriskany (CV 34). However,
H8 could not launch the A-3 Skywarrior, the first of the jet bombers envisaged under
BuAer’s postwar aircraft development program.
The Navy’s catapult developers were at the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia. A
wartime reorganization in the summer of 1943 made the factory and the associated
Naval Air Experimental Station subordinate to the Naval Air Material Center. BuAer
funded NAMC, and therefore NAMC engineers and test personnel responded to the
direction of BuAer. There were specialists in catapults in both organizations, and they
were supposed to communicate regularly. But the surviving documentation suggested
to us that the NAMC engineers persisted longer than they should have in trying to
improve incrementally the Navy’s well-understood hydraulic catapults.2
Until about 1951, delays in the long-range BuAer catapult program were tolerable, if
disappointing. By 1951, however, aircraft like the A3D (later designated A-3) were
about to enter production. Fortunately, the British steam catapult became demonstra-
bly mature by the spring of 1951, and senior American naval officers chose to acquire
the rights to it a year later. Yet BuAer’s catapult developers were dubious about the pro-
jected performance of the steam catapult, as we shall show. Until 1950 they had consis-
tently maintained that their efforts to upgrade existing catapult technology were
succeeding, and it appears that BuAer’s leadership was slow to appreciate just how seri-
ous the catapult problem was. The failure to produce a catapult powerful enough for
the new jets—especially the A3D—threatened to derail the Navy’s argument that its
carriers could and should play a strong role in deterring the Soviet Union.
Postwar, BuAer spent most of its money on engines and airframes. In the late 1940s
and early 1950s, the most critical problem must have seemed to be the new J40 engine,
which BuAer wanted to use in its new generation of high-performance airplanes, both
fighters (the F3H Demon and F4D Skyray) and bombers (the A-3). Though it appears
as though catapults were taken for granted at the top level of BuAer, it is more likely
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that these other problems—directly associated with aircraft development—took center
stage and absorbed the attention and energy of senior aviation officers.
Background
Although carriers had catapults almost from the beginning, they were little used before
World War II. It was simpler and faster for airplanes to roll down a carrier’s flight deck.
Even the heaviest aircraft launched in combat during the war, Doolittle’s B-25 bombers,
made unassisted rolling takeoffs. During the war, however, catapults came into their
own. The deck space available for a rolling takeoff under a plane’s own power was
limited by the practice of parking aircraft awaiting takeoff on the flight deck. It became
clear that a catapult could be traded for open deck space. That was particularly obvious
on board small escort carriers, whose catapults enabled them to operate relatively
heavy bombers, such as TBF Avengers. By the end of the war it was standard practice
for small carriers to launch Army aircraft during amphibious operations, so that the
aircraft could arrive ashore ready to operate. Such launches were generally by
catapult, and even aircraft as large as the B-25 and P-61 night fighter were adapted to
catapult launch.
The unstated but obvious implication was that given a powerful enough catapult, a car-
rier could launch any airplane whose structure could handle the acceleration involved.3
Conversely, using strong enough arresting gear, almost any kind of airplane could be
recovered. As we noted in chapter 3, in November 1944 the new carrier Shangri-La in
effect proved this point by launching and recovering the Navy’s version of the B-25
medium bomber, by far the heaviest aircraft yet to operate from a carrier.
By that time, BuAer was paying McDonnell to develop jet fighters, though not heavy
carrier bombers. Far more than conventional piston aircraft, jets might need catapults
to take off at all in the length of a crowded flight deck. Without propellers to create air-
flow over their wings, they needed higher speeds to generate enough lift. It also seemed
that jet engines might accelerate them relatively slowly.
Postwar Developments
Prior to World War II, Navy catapult developers designed two types of catapults:
powder-driven devices for accelerating battleship and cruiser floatplanes and hydraulic
catapults for carriers. In December 1944, BuAer initiated its postwar catapult program
by considering new sources of power. That month it issued a draft specification for a
new-generation catapult suited to jets.4 Like the British, BuAer saw the German-
developed slotted-cylinder catapult as a way to achieve the high power it wanted—but
only for various missiles then under development.5 Presumably NAMC personnel
became acquainted with this technology when German V-1 launch sites were overrun
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 1 0 1
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:00 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
by Allied forces in the summer of 1944. As we’ve seen, the German catapults were
powered by the steam produced when hydrogen peroxide decomposed in the presence
of a catalyst.
Ships had long used hydraulics as a way of transmitting power from their engines for
auxiliary purposes. Pumps driven by a ship’s engines drove fluids that in turn could
push pistons or drive turbines where they were needed. In a carrier catapult, the
motion of a piston near the catapult was magnified by wires running over pulleys. A
piston movement of a few feet at low speed translated into a much longer stroke at
higher speed. The power such a catapult could develop was ultimately limited by the
strength of the wire, which could snap under heavy loads. There was also another con-
straint that applied to catapults—the need to limit the weight of their machinery.
Initially the new catapult program was justified by the trend in aircraft design toward
greater weight and speed. Eventually, however, OPNAV’s Military Requirements Divi-
sion, responsible for setting the characteristics of new aircraft, realized that develop-
ment would stop unless more powerful catapults became available. On 11 January 1946
the Military Requirements Division sent the director of the BuAer Engineering Divi-
sion a note: aircraft weighing over twenty thousand pounds with takeoff stall speeds
over 100 mph could not be catapulted from existing fleet carriers (i.e., of the Essex
class), even with the usual relative wind of twenty-five knots. What limits would
expected catapults impose on future aircraft? Surely the chief of BuAer would want
to know.6
Aircraft designers certainly wanted to know. In June 1946, for example, Douglas
designer Edward Heinemann noted in a letter to BuAer that his firm’s two Navy proj-
ects—–the AD Skyraider attack bomber and the F3D Skyknight fighter—could be
launched by an Essex-class carrier using a catapult and wind over the deck, but only
barely. Heinemann and his staff were then working on the design of a new pilotless air-
craft designated “P/A V.” This aircraft was expected to weigh fifteen thousand pounds
but to stall at a relatively high speed, about 180 mph, which was significantly greater
than the stall speed of the XF3D, which was 107 mph (or knots—the source uses just
the number). Heinemann was afraid that existing catapults would not be able to accel-
erate the P/A V enough to get it into the air.7
During World War II the U.S. Navy had experimented with large catapults to launch
heavy seaplanes, the theory being that in this way the seaplanes could carry more than
their usual loads. One such catapult was installed on board a special barge, and in 1941
BuAer was seeking designs for a more powerful follow-on. The latter offered the sort of
performance that the bureau sought postwar but in far too large a package. In effect it
1 0 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:00 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
demonstrated that the hydraulic technology used before and during the war could not
now suffice.8
BuAer simultaneously supported three primary approaches to the new catapult. One
was to push existing hydraulic-catapult technology to the limit. A second was the slot-
ted cylinder. A third was an electric catapult, since a modern warship could generate
considerable electric power (the U.S. Navy already had experience with electric rather
than hydraulic power in its ships and aircraft). BuAer used both contractors and its
own catapult developers at the Naval Aircraft Factory in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. It
saw the hydraulic approach as insurance against the failure of new technology.9
The hydraulic approach produced the H8 catapult, which entered service on board
rebuilt carriers after World War II. It sufficed for first-generation jet fighters, and its
limits influenced the design of the first postwar heavy carrier bomber, the AJ-1 Savage.
BuAer seems to have realized that the H8 represented the limit imposed by wire
strength in the size and weight allowable on a carrier.10 When BuAer needed more
power for the postwar heavy attack carrier, it saw a pair of H8s working together
(under the designation H9) as a fallback solution, but that proved so unsatisfactory
that it was soon abandoned.
As the bureau encountered problems in catapult development, however, it seems to
have relied on the H9 as a form of insurance. Thus the H9 survived longer in BuAer
statements to other organizations in the Navy than in reality. The BuAer Confidential
Correspondence file in the National Archives mentions that a test installation of the
H9 for use at the aircraft flight test center at Patuxent River was ordered in March
1948.11 In addition, as of January 1949, the Naval Air Material Center—the catapult-
developing organization—informed the Navy’s Bureau of Ships that the planned car-
rier United States would carry the H9. That same month, however, the chief of BuAer,
Rear Admiral Pride, noted in a letter to the head of NAMC that slotted-cylinder cata-
pults would eventually replace the H9.12 The ultimate hydraulic catapult, H9D, a mon-
ster composed of two H9s, was described by BuAer in 1951 as entirely impractical. It
was also not powerful enough to launch the A3D heavy attack bomber, which by 1951
was the standard for new catapult requirements.13
An electric catapult was proposed by Westinghouse in 1943, and it was pursued for a
time as the XE-1 Electropult, a prototype of which was set up at the aircraft test center
at Patuxent River. Representatives of BuShips inspected the device on 3 October 1946.
The catapult consisted of an electric “shuttle car” riding along a track. The track, 1,495
feet in length, was the fixed element of what amounted to an electric motor. Power was
supplied by an aircraft engine driving a direct-current generator, which in turn drove a
flywheel alternating-current motor-generator that supplied the necessary burst of
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launch power. BuShips considered the aircraft engine inadequate as a prime mover and
suggested instead either two of the host ship’s regular generators, driven by boiler
steam, or a separate generator, or a 7,500 hp gas-turbine unit. As installed at Patuxent
River, the Electropult could launch only one airplane every five minutes.14
A small version of this device was evidently used at NAMC. A similar catapult using a
hydraulic clutch was tested in 1944–45, but scaling up the prototype proved difficult.
The drawback of electric-drive catapults was the time it took between releasing the
energy stored in the flywheel in one launch and building up energy in the flywheel for
the next. But the idea seemed worth studying, and work on it continued into the late
1940s.15 Another contract, for a linear turbine catapult, went to the M. W. Kellogg
Company. Work was stopped in December 1948. The catapult was described as promis-
ing for guided-missile launching but as requiring too expensive a launch car, which
would be difficult to recover after firing.16
The slotted cylinder offered the greatest promise, not least for future growth. It was
also the simplest type of catapult. Some power source would drive a piston along the
cylinder, and a hook would be attached to a shuttle connected to the piston. Until
October 1951, BuAer envisaged firing the catapult aft from the bow of a carrier, driving
the shuttle attached to the airplane the other way (forward), presumably by a wire pass-
ing over a single pulley. It called this “direct drive,” because there would be no attempt
to amplify mechanically the motion of the piston. But after October 1951, the Naval
Aircraft Factory, then designing the C10 powder (explosive driven) catapult, put the
explosive chamber aft, so that the shuttle would go in the same direction as the piston.17
Power was taken off using a projecting tab emerging from the piston through the slot.18
The larger the cylinder, the more powerful the catapult—apparently almost without
limit, though such a catapult would need to be cooled while it was being used, and the
slot greatly weakened the cylinder, requiring designers to find a means to use the car-
rier’s structure to support the cylinder.
BuAer’s catapult designers were authorized to go ahead with a slotted cylinder, soon
designated XC1, in November 1945. The Naval Aircraft Factory submitted its prelimi-
nary design study on 26 December 1945. By this time the Navy was vitally interested in
surface-to-surface missiles. Like the Germans during the war, it expected to use a cata-
pult to launch them. A missile could be accelerated much more violently than a
manned aircraft. BuAer thus developed a second slotted cylinder, XC2, specifically for
this purpose, to achieve up to supersonic end speeds—for example, for ramjet-powered
surface-to-surface missiles. An XC4 version was intended to launch antiaircraft missiles
but was stopped in March 1949 because components required for the envisaged high-
acceleration launching were not available. XC6 was designed specifically to launch
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Grumman’s Rigel (XSSM-6) ramjet surface-to-surface missile. Other slotted cylinders
were devised for smaller missiles and for targets. Another slotted-cylinder catapult was
built to accelerate aircraft on the ground for crash tests (it was installed at the Patuxent
River Naval Air Test Center).
The great question was the source of power. For BuAer, the alternatives seem to have
been internal combustion (as in a car engine or a diesel), hydrogen peroxide (as in the
German catapult), and explosives. BuAer was already familiar with explosively driven
catapults, because they had been used in battleships and cruisers since before World
War II. Steam from a ship’s boiler, which is what the British used, seems not to have
been on the bureau’s list. (In view of later developments, it was ironic that while a
power source was being developed, one of the small slotted cylinders was tested using
steam from a small boiler.) BuAer catapult developers would later argue that it was
impractical to take steam from a ship’s boiler. The ship would be slowed unacceptably,
presumably because so much steam would be lost through the slot. Later, BuAer cata-
pult developers also argued that the interval between launches would be excessive. Both
of these problems also concerned British engineers at RAE.19
In 1947 BuAer chose explosives, with liquid fuel as a backup. It characterized both as
“pressure generators,” so presumably their gas products would be vented into the cata-
pult cylinder. For initial tests compressed air was used, but it could not provide suffi-
cient power to launch aircraft. BuAer’s focus on explosive catapults was stimulated by
the need for a device to launch light loads (five hundred pounds) at unusually high
acceleration (170g—that is, exerting 170 times the force of gravity), with an end speed
of 1,200 ft./sec. (about seven hundred knots). Such a catapult, the XM1, was built for
use at the naval testing ground at Point Mugu, California. It had an expendable piston
and launch car, which meant that its designers did not have to brake the piston in a rea-
sonable distance after the end of its stroke.20
Between 1945 and 1948, catapult requirements exploded. In 1944–45 BuAer was con-
templating accelerating fifteen-thousand-pound jet fighters to end speeds of 120 mph.
In 1946 BuAer became interested in hundred-thousand-pound bombers (the largest it
bought weighed about seventy thousand). Thus in January 1947, BuAer changed the
requirement to a forty-five-thousand-pound airplane at the same speed, but with twice
the launching interval. Its catapult designers estimated that a much more massive
hydraulic catapult—weighing 675,000 pounds—would be needed. That was simply
too heavy.21
In November 1947 the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz,
approved the design requirements for a new carrier that would operate fifty-thousand-
pound fighters and hundred-thousand-pound bombers. That December BuAer
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 1 0 5
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:00 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
reported to the CNO, now Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, that it had completed a design study
of a catapult capable of launching hundred-thousand-pound aircraft at a hundred
knots airspeed, including twenty-five knots of wind over deck due to the motion of the
ship. This far exceeded the performance of any earlier or developmental catapult.
BuAer pointed out that using two fifty-thousand-pound and two hundred-thousand-
pound catapults would save about a hundred tons in flight-deck weight in comparison
to the likely hydraulic design. Although that might not seem like much for what turned
out to be a sixty-five-thousand-ton ship, it was so high in the ship that it could have
considerable impact.22
In January 1948 the bureau further increased desired performance, to a hundred thou-
sand pounds at ninety knots and a maximum speed of 105 knots with a 73,500-pound
airplane. (Note that ninety knots is about 103 mph and that 105 knots is the earlier
maximum of 120 mph.)23 BuAer decided in April 1948 that the limit of hydraulic cata-
pult performance had been reached with the H9 and that all future effort should go
into slotted cylinders. The C1 slotted-cylinder catapult now seemed too small for
future aircraft but too large for experimental work. It was therefore redefined as a test
catapult, suited to but not intended for shipboard installation, with a capacity of eigh-
teen thousand pounds and an end speed of a hundred knots (maximum acceleration
3.5g). For the future, lessons learned in its design would be applied to a catapult capa-
ble of launching a two-hundred-thousand-pound airplane at 150 knots. Somewhat
later there were references in BuAer correspondence to three-hundred-thousand-
pound aircraft.
A revised development schedule produced in January 1948 showed plans to complete
the final design of the XC1 prototype on 1 April 1948 and the final design of the ship-
board version on 1 April 1949.24 The Naval Air Material Center on 29 June 1948 sub-
mitted its design proposal, which was formally approved for development on 21 July. In
its proposal, NAMC noted that the XC1 was to serve as the basis for a larger catapult,
and its configuration (the shape and size of the braking pit, for example) was modified
so that it could be readily scaled up. There was even the possibility that NAMC could
develop a twin-tube catapult, to double power in the simplest way. However, braking
such a driven-piston device required absorbing 650,000 foot-pounds of energy in
four feet, and so BuOrd suggested firing a second powder charge at the oncoming pis-
ton. BuAer rejected the idea because a misfire would badly damage the catapult.25
In September 1948 BuAer placed an order for the XC1 powder chamber with the Naval
Gun Factory at the Washington Navy Yard.26 Powder tests, presumably using only part
of the catapult, began in October 1949.27 As of October 1949 the catapult was
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scheduled for completion in March 1950. Tests of a version powered by compressed air
were reported in January 1950.
Slotted cylinders seemed to free BuAer to pursue designs for long-range supersonic
bombers. At this time the required payload was the early ten-thousand-pound atomic
bomb. Given the massive power that supersonic flight seemed to require, any airplane
delivering such a weapon had to be enormous. BuAer envisaged a one-way mission, the
crew escaping in a smaller aircraft that might return to the carrier or else ditch.28 This
concept recalled the German wartime Mistel composite aircraft, used to deliver
ultraheavy warheads. The one-way trip made it unnecessary for BuAer to develop
equivalent arresting gear. Two hundred thousand pounds was the maximum takeoff
weight of the big B-47 medium jet bomber the U.S. Air Force was then beginning to
buy. In some documents the limit was set at three hundred thousand pounds; slotted-
cylinder performance seemed potentially limitless. Such hopes collapsed with the
cancelation of United States in April 1949.
Notwithstanding all this activity, unfortunately, catapult development did not keep
pace with aircraft development. Despite its importance for the BuAer aircraft program,
catapult work seems to have been underfunded, particularly after deep Defense Depart-
ment budget cuts were mandated in 1949. The decision to limit C1 to a prototype
made sense as part of a protracted development plan, but not if slotted tubes of various
sizes were to equip the carrier United States, scheduled for laying down in 1949. Since
sketch designs of the ship showed slotted tubes, it is not clear what would have been
done had the project proceeded.
When the ship was canceled, some of the urgency of heavy catapult development was
lost. On 31 May 1949, about six weeks later, BuAer sent BuShips, via the Chief of Naval
Operations, a proposal to rebuild the Midways, so as to keep the Navy heavy-attack
program alive. Thus in June 1949 the chief of BuAer, Rear Admiral Pride, wrote NAMC
that in the near future catapults might be needed to accelerate eighty-thousand-pound
aircraft to 125 knots. That was roughly the capacity of the H9D catapult then being
developed—whose weight, however, Rear Admiral Pride now said, was prohibitive if
applied to existing carriers. The H9D could have been accommodated on board the
massive United States, but now high performance would have to be provided for exist-
ing, but rebuilt, ships of the Essex class, and they could not possibly accommodate an
H9.29 The only alternative was a slotted-cylinder catapult.30
The new catapult was designated C7 (in its developmental phase, XC7). By January
1950 the projected date for completion of the design was 30 June 1951, and the pro-
jected date for completion of all XC7 tests (including calibration) was 30 June 1953. In
March 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, wrote BuAer
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that it should be pursued with the highest possible priority, for use in all new and con-
verted carriers (i.e., including carriers smaller than the Midways), “in order to permit
unrestricted operation of certain aircraft currently programmed, and in order to
remove limitations which are seriously restricting new developments and advances in
aircraft design.”31 It would launch aircraft weighing between 12,500 and 80,000 pounds
at a maximum end speed of 125 knots (average acceleration 3.25g, maximum 3.5g) and
a minimum end speed of sixty knots. Specifications included a launching interval not
to exceed 30 seconds for aircraft weighing up to forty thousand pounds and not to
exceed a minute for those weighing forty to eighty thousand pounds. Apparently the
new A3D Skywarrior heavy (twin-jet, swept-wing) attack bomber was the important
airplane that could not be launched without a C7 catapult. In 1950 the A3D was
expected to enter service within a few years; it was given a particularly high priority.
The XC7, however, had not been included in the fiscal year 1950 budget (drawn up in
1949), which was already very tight; given the program’s high priority, BuAer had to
transfer considerable funds from other projects. For example, work on catapults for
surface-to-surface missiles was canceled on 3 May 1950.
Even at this stage,
BuAer considered an
alternative to the
slotted cylinder, one
that it called the
“solid piston.” Pre-
sumably the rod
extending directly
from its piston would
have driven the cata-
pult shuttle its com-
plete length, so that
the catapult as a
whole would have
been twice as long as
the catapult track.
That this alternative
was seriously con-
sidered in 1950 sug-
gests that building a
slotted cylinder was
anything but a trivial
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USS Forrestal (CVA 59), the first of the new postwar U.S. Navy carriers, with an angled
deck, steam catapults, deck-edge elevators, and a mirror landing aid. Note the large
Douglas A3D Skywarriors.
Thomas C. Hone
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proposition, at least using the explosive power source that BuAer envisaged. As it was,
the solid cylinder was soon rejected as impractical.32
The Navy was already modernizing the Essex-class carriers, under a program begun in
1946 with the incomplete Oriskany. The program involved the H8 hydraulic catapult,
but it made sense to replace it with slotted cylinders. Thus in August 1950 BuAer called
for a second type of slotted-cylinder catapult. It would have half the performance of
C7—an end speed of 125 knots for a forty-thousand-pound airplane, with a thirty-
second launch cycle. Heavier airplanes could be launched at lower speeds. The Essex-
class ships could not accommodate as long a catapult as the C7, so greater acceleration
was accepted, 5g maximum (4g average).33
Yet development of this catapult proved protracted. Initial powder tests were con-
ducted in May 1950, but apparently they applied only to the catapult combustion
chamber. The Naval Air Material Center had to inform BuAer that the catapult would
probably not be ready before 1 April 1951. The contractor could not provide cylinder
liners, cylinder link forgings, or the sealing strip (to keep the propelling gas from leak-
ing through the slot) quickly enough.34 Plans to use the C7 as the modernized-Essex
catapult made such delays particularly unfortunate. BuAer’s chief called for completion
by 1 November 1950. He also commented that XC1 was very close to what was wanted
for the Essex class, the main deficiencies being its length, its cooling capacity, and the
zipper used to seal it against cylinder reaction. He wanted all tests completed by 1 April
1951, and the XC1 used as the prototype for the Essex catapult. Design of the new cata-
pult was scheduled for completion by 31 January 1951. To make this possible, the pri-
ority of the XC1 project was raised from three to one. According to a handwritten note
in the file, by moving up the priority of the XC1 project, “we stand reasonable chances
of providing a very adequate catapult to 27A [Essex] conversions by June 1952. This
action has full endorsement of CNO.”35 The new catapult was designated “C10,” per-
haps simply to indicate development from C1. Later documents mention C8 and C9 as
target catapults.
In August 1950, the chief of BuAer summarized the situation in response to an urgent
oral request (presumably by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, Vice Adm.
John H. Cassady):
New model aircraft are designed to take advantage of all the capabilities of our carriers (deck strength,
elevator dimensions, arresting capacity, launching capacity, etc.). This procedure is used in the expec-
tation that the carrier construction program and the carrier conversion [i.e., modernization] program
will keep reasonable pace with the aircraft development program as they have done in the past. Un-
fortunately, during the last few years the carrier construction program has been nonexistent and the
carrier conversion program has only recently been accelerated. This situation has resulted in the Fleet
being supplied with aircraft which crowd very seriously the limitations of the operating carriers. Fur-
thermore, the seriousness of these limitations has been aggravated by the urgent necessity of operating
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the new type aircraft at gross weights considerably above the gross weights characteristic of the basic
missions for which the aircraft were designed.36
The H8 catapult, which was considered a bare minimum to handle new jets, had
recently been delivered for installation aboard the first modernized Essex, USS
Oriskany, and it seemed to be developing on schedule. Four more sets were being made
for the next four carriers in the program (Kearsarge, Lake Champlain, Essex, and Wasp).
Further jet-operating carrier modernization had been slowed by pre–Korean War bud-
get cuts, now being reversed. The BuAer chief told DCNO (Air) that, given work
already done on the XC1 catapult, XC10s could be available for further ships by June
1952 “if the project is prosecuted at maximum priority and emergency procurement
methods are used.” That would be possible only if the CNO ordered the other bureaus
involved—Ordnance (for the powder charges), Ships, and Yards and Docks (for ship-
yard work)—to give the catapult project “overriding priority over conflicting projects.”
As an indication of what scaling up from XC1 meant, each of a hundred C1 charges
weighed 2.5 pounds, but each C7 charge was expected to weigh five hundred pounds,
and each C10 charge 250 pounds.
At this time the most powerful catapult on board unmodernized carriers was the H4-1
aboard the three Midways, weighing 357,000 pounds. It could accelerate a 52,500-
pound airplane to sixty-one knots, or a 23,000-pound airplane to eighty-seven knots.
The H4B on board an unmodernized Essex (weighing three hundred thousand
pounds) could accelerate a thirteen-thousand-pound airplane to eighty-seven knots, or
a seventeen-thousand-pound airplane to seventy-eight knots. The difference in power
could be traced to different track lengths: 239 feet in a Midway versus 170 feet in an
Essex. In the earliest modernized Essex-class carriers, the 245-foot-track H8 (weighing
411,500 pounds) could accelerate a fifteen-thousand-pound airplane, such as a jet
fighter, to 104 knots, or a 52,500-pound airplane to sixty-six knots, a bit over what the
H4-1 on a Midway could do. XC1 had the same track length and similar performance
(eighteen thousand pounds to a hundred knots), but it was far lighter, at 213,000
pounds. At this stage XC7 was expected to use a 360-foot track to accelerate an eighty-
thousand-pound airplane to 125 knots. Its weight would be 550,000 pounds, probably
the upper limit for a flight-deck installation.
Enter the British
By this time the British were well along in developing a steam catapult. The unclassified
BuAer catapult file for 1950 thus includes a cover letter from the British Joint Services
Mission in Washington, dated 8 August 1950, enclosing “Notes on British Steam Cata-
pults” and eight classified Brown Bros. (manufacturing) drawings. In November 1949,
Cdr. R. W. Tunnell and Mr. J. C. Perry from BuAer had visited the United Kingdom,
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and they may have heard of or even seen the British developments, but they did not
return with evidence that sparked interest within BuAer.37
Meanwhile XC1 progress was delayed, so that in September 1950 the projected comple-
tion date was 15 January 1951, two months later than had been hoped—while the car-
rier modernization program began to accelerate. However, on 18 January the Naval Air
Material Center reported additional delays. With one part still not available, it could
promise high-capacity air tests or low-capacity powder shots only beginning about 31
January 1951. The progress of the program was considered unacceptable, and in mid-
February BuAer ordered it accelerated.
About February 1951 Rear Admiral Pride listed catapult alternatives for DCNO (Air),
Vice Admiral Cassady.38 He went through the existing program of powder or liquid-fuel
slotted cylinders, but this time he mentioned the British steam catapult, as “the only
other high capacity catapult development,” capable of launching a thirty-thousand-
pound aircraft at 126 knots, using 340 pounds of low-pressure steam per shot. “From
available data” the British direct-drive slotted cylinder was about 25 percent heavier
than its higher-pressure U.S. counterpart.
Due to the low pressures used . . . its size is sufficiently large to impose a difficult installation problem.
Latest information indicates that an aircraft will be launched from the catapult during March 1951
and that consideration is being given to equipping a sister ship of HMS ARK ROYAL with catapults of
this type. In any event, the excessive steam consumption, which has been roughly calculated to require a
steam rate of forty thousand pounds per hour, deserves special study before this catapult can be seriously
considered [our emphasis]. A previous study of the advisability of using steam for slotted tube cata-
pults made by personnel of the Bureau of Ships and of this Bureau [BuAer] led to the conclusion that
the use of powder has many important advantages over the use of steam.
An attached note describes the BuAer letter as “an attempt to inject a note of realism
into the program to replace H8s with C10s.” BuAer suggested replacing one rather than
two H8s in near-term Essex conversions. Delivery of the first production C10 was
scheduled, at the earliest, for June 1952. This unit could go aboard the eighth converted
carrier, but it could not be tested fully before that ship was completed in June 1953.
Thus no ship to be completed before that date could have two C10s. Whether such a
mixed installation made sense was important enough an issue for the Chief of Naval
Operations to decide. The rest of the letter listed factors that might make it impossible
to meet the envisaged schedule. As a further complication, BuAer hoped later to shift
from powder to liquid propellant. Although the bureau was not sure how to do this, it
expected the cost per shot to fall by three-quarters if it could, justifying extensive work.
The Perseus (i.e., British steam catapult) file in the BuAer Ships Installation Division
catapult papers contains an undated (probably early 1952) cost comparison of “C10-
C7” and “C10-H81” programs. The former would install one C10 in the port side of six
Essex (known as 27C) conversions and in the waist positions of the new carriers
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Forrestal and Saratoga. The latter two would have C7s in their bows. C10s would serve
as backups for H81 (presumably meaning H8 Mod. 1) catapults in the 27Cs and as the
only catapult in the new carriers. The C7 project would be abandoned. Adopting the
C10-H81 plan would have saved about seventy million dollars through fiscal year ’57.
Acceleration of the BuAer program proved impossible. On 4 April 1951 the Naval Air
Material Center listed a series of necessary changes that would delay the first powder
launches to 1 May. Apparently there were much worse delays, because a 4 October
BuAer conference on the catapult program heard that XC1 would begin ten firings
(over a two-week period) to “prove out mechanical details of [the] catapult” on 15
October, after which it would fire twenty times (over a week beginning 20 October) to
check its ballistics, after which it would undergo further tests of water-injection cool-
ing. Firings at maximum rate would begin only on 19 November 1951.39
On 17 May 1951, OPNAV approved a BuAer proposal to study a steam catapult, with
the caveat that “an extensive detailed investigation of the relative merits of all the vari-
ous types of slotted cylinder catapults should be made, however, before selecting steam
as an alternative propellant.” BuAer proposed completing the study during the next fis-
cal year, but OPNAV wanted it expedited.40 Presumably in support of this effort, on 22
May 1951 the new chief of BuAer, Rear Adm. Thomas S. Combs, asked OPNAV (Op-
32) to have the naval attaché in London “keep in close touch with the progress of
development of the steam catapult and keep this bureau informed . . . at frequent inter-
vals.”41 BuAer did not admit that it was stymied. Rather, it claimed, “great effort is being
directed toward the development of powder and liquid fuels as propulsion mediums
for slotted cylinder catapults. Present progress in these developments shows promise.
Early British results with the steam slotted cylinder catapult aboard HMS PERSEUS
have also been encouraging.” The bureau merely wanted to “keep pace with all slotted
cylinder developments [so as to] keep programs properly oriented.”
The Steam Catapult
BuAer set up a steam-catapult design program in June 1951, the stated rationale being
that the high cost and complex logistics of powder charges made an alternative source
of power economically attractive. At this time the bureau estimated that each naval air-
craft would be catapulted about ten times per month, which meant thousands of
charges.42 The bureau’s catapult-design R&D organization, the Naval Aircraft Factory in
NAMC, was to evaluate steam as a catapult propellant to determine the range of pres-
sures and temperatures most suitable for this purpose; compare the use of the ship’s
boilers to the use of separate flash boilers; and conduct a preliminary design study of a
steam equivalent to the C10 catapult, then under development (launching a forty-
thousand-pound airplane at 125 knots end speed, maximum acceleration 3.75g).
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Nothing in BuAer’s letter to NAMC referred to the existing British program. NAMC’s
response was less than enthusiastic. It assigned the steam catapult priority three, after
the powder C10 (priority one) and H8 (priority two).43
British development of the steam catapult was initially classified, and the secrecy sur-
rounding the British effort had prevented Royal Navy officers in the British Joint Ser-
vices Mission in Washington, D.C., from sharing information with their counterparts
in the U.S. Navy.44 However, though the Bureau of Aeronautics became aware of the
Royal Navy’s steam catapult work in 1948, its engineers chose to focus their work on
powder (i.e., explosive-driven) catapults.45 The BuAer file on the British steam catapult
includes an 8 August 1950 letter enclosing plans of the Type C (BS.4) version of the
British catapult, to be provided to BuAer “in accordance with verbal instructions. . . .
This procedure will be continued unless instructions to the contrary are received.” The
prototype steam catapult (BXS.1) was installed in the aircraft repair ship (ex-carrier)
HMS Perseus, which was reactivated in 1948 specifically for these tests. For simplicity,
all catapult machinery was installed on top of (rather than within) its flight deck, part
of which was covered by a false deck.
At Admiralty invitation, two U.S. officers, Capt. H. S. Clarke and Capt. F. H. Horn, vis-
ited the ship in Belfast Lough to watch catapulting. By the time of their report, another
ten steam catapults were on order for specific Royal Navy ships, with another ten for
future installation. The prototype had fired 727 times, including thirty-two manned
launchings. The report added that on 27 June 1951 the Admiralty offered to send the
ship to the United States the following November for two months of demonstrations.
The two captains and the naval air attaché in London, Rear Admiral Apollo Soucek,
warmly recommended acceptance, as “it is the opinion of this office that the steam cat-
apult has great possibilities.”46 On 14 July CNO extended an invitation. The attaché
worked out arrangements, such as payment for fuel (the British supply of dollars was
severely limited). NAMC drew up a test program using deadweights of fifteen, twenty-
one, and twenty-eight thousand pounds. The Perseus trials in the United Kingdom hav-
ing succeeded, Rear Admiral Soucek in London forwarded Admiralty catapult draw-
ings. That BuAer wanted them suggests that whatever had been forwarded earlier had
been lost, since they included a cross section through the catapult cylinder and various
basic system diagrams.
In August 1951, before trials had been run, BuAer asked BuShips to provide studies of
installation of direct-drive—as opposed to indirect-drive—catapults in existing and
planned carriers, the results to be ready by July 1952. No such change could be realized
until a direct-drive catapult had been proven. In January 1952 BuShips pointed out
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that the British catapult met exactly this requirement. Since the British had produced
the very first such catapult, BuShips proposed to include it in the study BuAer had
requested. This may not have pleased the NAMC catapult developers, who had already
complained of the steam catapult’s “excessive steam consumption.”47
In October 1951 the CNO, Adm. William M. Fechteler, circulated an announcement
that Perseus was coming (it was actually somewhat delayed). The ship arrived at Phila-
delphia Naval Shipyard in January 1952 and was expected to return to the United King-
dom late in February. However, at the U.S. Navy’s request (see below) further trials
were added.
During the Perseus trials, C. C. Mitchell, who had invented the British catapult, made
the startling claim that it could stand up to American steam conditions (550 pounds
per square inch, or psi). Moreover, using such higher-pressure steam it could match
planned C10 performance.48 An anonymous BuAer memorandum writer thought it
wise to take up Mitchell’s offer for tests not contemplated when Perseus had been sent
to the United States. The high-pressure steam could be provided by a USN destroyer
tied up alongside. “If these tests should verify that the British catapult has approxi-
mately the capacity predicted, and if BuShips will underwrite putting this catapult in
our ships [with the note, crossed out, “something they have not previously done for
any direct-drive catapult”], the Ships Characteristics Board might well be requested
[“directed” was crossed out] to examine the feasibility of employing British catapults in
our carriers.” Clearly this was a sensitive proposition, because the writer added that “in
making this recommendation, I do not wish to imply that our own catapult develop-
ment program will not yield thoroughly reliable catapults. In fact, if allowed to con-
tinue our own program aggressively, we will produce catapults by about 1956 which are
greatly superior to any possible extrapolation of the present British low pressure cata-
pult.” But the writer had to admit that the British had been actually firing their catapult
two months before development of the C10 even began. C10 development now was
moving rapidly; after only sixteen months the experimental model was ready, and
delivery of the production version was expected in December 1952. Even so, the British
catapult already existed and worked. The ship’s visit was extended specifically so that it
could run the high-pressure trials.
In January 1952 BuAer circulated a “brief comparison” of the British and U.S. catapults
by Capt. Sheldon W. Brown, head of the Ships Installation Division, the BuAer catapult
branch. “The British may make a determined effort to sell their steam catapult to us for
use in our carriers. [This] effort could conceivably be motivated by a desire either to
be helpful or to acquire dollars or to do both. The following . . . information . . . may be
useful in the event the British take this anticipated course of action.” The attached
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tabulation showed
that the British cata-
pults did not match
the desired capacity.
The experimental
BXS.1 aboard HMS
Perseus had a 203-foot
power stroke, launch-
ing a thirty-thousand-
pound aircraft at 123
knots (not taking into
account Mitchell’s
proposal to use higher
American steam pres-
sures). By way of
comparison, the C10
could launch forty thousand pounds at 125 knots, and C7 could launch eighty thou-
sand pounds at that speed. Both had 184-foot power strokes. The projected production
version of the British catapult, BS.1, was rated at only thirty thousand pounds at 105
knots using a 144-foot stroke. The British stored boiler steam in an accumulator before
firing. It took the accumulator time to build up sufficient steam pressure, and that lim-
ited the firing rate. BuAer planned to replace powder with hydrogen peroxide (as then
also planned for U.S. submarine propulsion, but later abandoned) or some other gas
generator. In contrast to the British, BuAer preferred indirect to direct drive.
The chief advantages of the British catapult were the low cost of its propellant and the
fact that it already existed. However, it drained steam from a ship’s power plant. BuAer
estimated that firing every thirty seconds (to provide C10 capability) it would need
about an eighth of the full steam capacity of an Essex-class carrier. Firing 150 times a
day, it would need 10 percent of the ship’s water capacity. BuAer conceded that steam
offered the British catapult a considerable logistical advantage but held that it would
disappear when the bureau replaced powder with internal combustion or even with
steam from a flash boiler. The direct drive used by the British placed much heavier
weights at flight-deck level and seemed to require a large cut in the flight deck. That
might not matter much in an Essex, but in the new carriers the flight deck was the
strength deck, and its structural integrity needed to be preserved. BuShips was being
asked to look into whether such cuts could be accepted. For Captain Brown, the British
catapult had flaws, and he apparently did not see it, before it was tested in Philadelphia,
as other than a backup for NAMC’s product.
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The higher-steam-pressure trials were carried out, up to fifty-five thousand pounds
deadweight, but no aircraft were launched at higher pressure (acceleration curves were
circulated under an 8 April 1952 cover sheet). Because Perseus was tested at Philadel-
phia and at Norfolk, senior U.S. operational officers watched—and were impressed.
The BuAer Perseus file includes pointed questions from Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Fleet, and from Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic: When will this catapult be
tested with U.S. aircraft, and when will it go aboard our carriers? The trials were con-
ducted on the highest-priority basis.
The BuAer memo suggests that the problem of flight-deck structure was in its view the
clinching argument against the British catapult. In February 1952 BuShips quashed this
objection. The BuAer catapults needed much heavier support to handle lateral loads
due to the firing of powder.49 For example, a C7 or C10 powder catapult had to with-
stand a chamber pressure of 4,000 psi, compared to 600 psi for a steam catapult. The
lateral load on a C7 using indirect drive was 19,500 psi; it was fourteen thousand for an
indirect-drive C10. Direct-drive catapults, whether powder or steam, carried no lateral
loads. A British-type steam catapult with C10 performance (forty thousand pounds at
125 knots) would weigh about 160 tons, about the same as a direct-drive version of
C10 but far less than the 227 tons of the indirect-drive version. Comparable figures for
C7 performance (seventy thousand pounds at 125 knots) were 239 tons for the British
catapult, 243 for a direct-drive C7, and 300 for an indirect-drive C7. Moreover, BuShips
pointed out that the flight decks of the U.S. carriers then planned could be reinforced
around the catapult slot to maintain structural strength. Finally, BuShips argued that
using hydrogen peroxide or liquid oxygen would take “considerably more weight and
space below decks.” BuShips also considered boiler capacity in the new carriers quite
sufficient.50 In short, the steam catapult was quite suitable for all the carrier classes
envisaged.
With the Perseus trials complete, the Naval Aircraft Factory reported details and perfor-
mance of the BXS.1 catapult. It suggested that considerable weight could be saved by
redesign. However, it seems clear that it much preferred its own solutions, drawing up a
sketch design of a steam indirect-drive catapult (like the C7 and C10) that, like the C10,
could launch a forty-thousand-pound airplane at 125 knots. At this point it still
expected the C10 to enter service as a powder catapult. Work was under way to design
an air plant to replace the current powder propulsion. The main advantages of the Brit-
ish catapult were its compact brake (at the end of the catapult stroke), its unique seal-
ing strip (possible because it operated at low pressure), and the fact that it needed no
cooling water. The C10 was lighter. Its forty-nine-foot (rather than five-foot) brake
stroke made it possible to recover the tow bridle after launching (U.S. steam catapults
were later fitted with simple “bridle catchers”). To the U.S. catapult developers,
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deficiencies such as the massive brake could be blamed on an urgent development
schedule, and they would be easy to remedy. Once that was done, the U.S. catapult
would clearly be superior to the British.
Contrary to the expressed hopes of officers like Captain Brown, the U.S. Navy adopted
the British steam catapult, testing it successfully in 1952–54 aboard Essex-class carriers.
The “C7” and “C10” designations were taken over for British-style direct-drive steam
turbines. The record of just how these decisions were taken is not clear, not least
because BuAer correspondence files for the period after 1951 have not been declassified
as of this writing. Until now, all U.S. carriers have had steam catapults descended from
Mitchell’s BXS.1 prototype rather than from the intense BuAer effort of the late 1940s
and early 1950s.
After World War II, BuAer funded several different catapult technologies through
NAMC. Initially, NAMC engineers believed that incremental improvements in existing
hydraulic catapult technology would meet BuAer’s requirements for power and acceler-
ation. Even before it became clear that those improvements would not be adequate for
a loaded A3D Skywarrior, NAMC engineers considered alternative catapult concepts—
though the engineers’ preference appears to have been to stay with what was known
versus what was new (and therefore more of a risk). The British engineers at
Farnborough also improved existing hydraulic catapult technology, but they eventually
ran up against the same physical limits that the Americans had encountered: “The
greatest single shortcoming of the hydro-pneumatic under-deck gear was that of
increasing weight and inertia of its moving parts, with the unavoidable increase in
demands for power.”51 The catapult engineers at Farnborough, however, had an ally that
their counterparts at NAMC did not—Colin C. Mitchell, the steam catapult pioneer.
What “saved” the catapult engineers working for both navies was their willingness and
ability to move from the theoretical analysis of the physics of catapult design to actual
tests of prototypes. In addition, the engineers were supported by senior officers who
were willing to spend scarce funds on actual experiments, especially those carried out
on board HMS Perseus in the United Kingdom and later in the United States. Both
navies relied on parallel development efforts, though the range of parallel efforts was
greater for the USN than for the RN, and, as it happened, the most successful parallel
effort in the United Kingdom was that conducted by Colin Mitchell, who was
something of an “outsider.”
At the same time, the surviving documents in the National Archives suggest that there
was an element of “not invented here” in the minds of BuAer’s catapult experts. One
suspects that they did not believe that their British counterparts could develop an
effective and efficient steam catapult, especially one that would work at the higher
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steam pressures generated in the boilers of U.S. carriers. It was fortunate that Rear
Admiral Soucek was the USN’s air attaché in London in 1951. He grasped what the
engineers back in the United States did not—that the USN had to gamble on Mitchell’s
steam catapult, because the risk of not doing so outweighed the risk of spending funds
to support Perseus on its journey to the United States and its tests in Philadelphia and
Norfolk.
By the late 1940s the U.S. Navy was not inclined to buy foreign innovations, the main
exception being the radical aircraft and missile technology the Germans had intro-
duced during World War II. Thus, after a very successful demonstration of the new
British Limbo antisubmarine weapon in 1949, the Americans apologized: they knew
that the Bureau of Ordnance would prefer its inferior Weapon Alfa. The British under-
stood. The last foreign innovations that BuOrd had willingly adopted had been Swedish
and Swiss antiaircraft guns immediately before the United States entered World War II,
and the German electric torpedo—all answers to very urgent operational problems. In
effect, the steam catapult was the beginning of a short era of adoption of British-
invented innovations by a grateful U.S. Navy. Besides carrier improvements, these inno-
vations included the far less well known method of “rafting” to silence a nuclear sub-
marine—a technique adopted in the face of Adm. Hyman Rickover’s considerable
preference for turboelectric drive, a technology with which he was personally involved.
Finally, catapults were not BuAer’s only way of launching the new heavy aircraft. Solid-
fuel rockets for jet-assisted takeoff, developed during World War II, represented
another alternative. For missiles, they in effect superseded catapults, to become the
boosters that are now so familiar. Apparently JATO was considerably less acceptable for
carrier aircraft, although it had been used in wartime. In 1949, when it wanted to dem-
onstrate the potential of heavy carrier bombers but had no suitable catapults, the Navy
used JATO to launch three Neptune bombers from Midway-class carriers. These air-
craft became the core of an interim Navy nuclear-attack capability. As such they would
have been launched from the same type of carrier in wartime, in the same way. BuAer
interest in solid propellants for catapults could be seen as a way of domesticating JATO,
to suit it to regular carrier use.
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Analysis
Our method . . . can be compared with that used by people assembling a
complicated jigsaw puzzle. We will first put together the pieces of one
corner, then pieces of another corner. Gradually, we will link our assem-
bled sections.
HONE, FRIEDMAN, AND MANDELES,
AMERICAN & BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER DEVELOPMENT, 1919–1941
In one corner of our complicated jigsaw puzzle are engineer Lewis Boddington and his
colleagues in the Naval Aircraft Department at the Royal Aircraft Establishment.1 As
we pointed out in chapter 4, they had accepted as early as February 1945 the concept
that future naval fighters would have to be “pure” jets and that therefore launching and
recovering them from carriers would demand significant changes in equipment and
procedures. In June 1945, Boddington and his colleagues had decided to embark on a
program to experiment with jets without undercarriages in order to increase the very
limited range of the early jet aircraft. By mid-July Boddington had noted that future
carrier aircraft would need assisted takeoff and that they would land at higher speeds
than propeller-driven planes. By mid-September, he was certain that it would be best
if jet aircraft landed with their engines running at 90 percent of full power, and he
knew that having them do so would require somehow separating the landing and take-
off decks.
The Individuals: Royal Navy
But there were more people involved in this string of developments than engineer
Lewis Boddington. Test pilot Eric Brown noted in his memoir, Wings on My Sleeve, that
in January 1945 Maj. F. M. Green, whom Brown identified as “the veteran aero-engine
inventor,” described in detail to an audience of engineers and test pilots a “carpet deck”
that would accept jets without undercarriages. The idea clearly caught (or had already
captured) the attention of Boddington, because he ran with it during the summer and
fall of 1945. What matters to us is that Boddington, his colleagues, and his superiors
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had identified the military requirement (jets on carriers as routine) and had also recog-
nized that some dramatic changes would have to be made to carriers if they were to
operate jets safely while generating enough sorties to fulfill the required mission.
Boddington continued to be influential in the effort to adapt carriers to jet aircraft. On
7 August 1951, a meeting was held in the Ministry of Aviation to discuss ways of han-
dling aircraft on carriers with “flexible” decks. Capt. Dennis R. F. Cambell of the RN, a
naval aviator and assistant chief naval representative to the ministry, was chair, and
Boddington and others attended. Just before the meeting, eating his lunchtime sand-
wich, Captain Cambell had been staring at a large model of the carrier Illustrious on his
desk. As he recalled, “I kept trying to picture how this crazy deck [i.e., the flexdeck]
could be installed to allow a reasonable speed of successive landings. I sketched a few
ideas[,] . . . none of which looked really practicable.”
But then, “right out of the blue it came to me—why not angle the deck about 10
degrees to port?” Later, in the meeting, Captain Cambell waited until “it had become
clear to all that the paramount need in accepting the rubber mat idea was to retain the
deck park. When it was coming to be seen that no simple solution was in the offing, I
presented a large sketch . . . showing the mat and the four arresting wires offset 10
degrees to port. I admit I did this with something of a flourish, and was accordingly
somewhat miffed at not getting the expected gasps of gratifying amazement.” But
Boddington was taken with the idea, and he stayed after the meeting to look carefully at
Cambell’s sketch.
On 28 August 1951, Lewis Boddington sent detailed drawings of an angled deck
applied to the planned carrier Ark Royal to the Deputy Director of Naval Construction
and to Captain Cambell.2 The drawings were sent on to the Board of Admiralty. In Sep-
tember, during the semiannual air show at Farnborough, Cambell mentioned his
angled-deck concept to visitors from the U.S. Navy. He remembered “that they
exchanged significant looks.”3 What Cambell apparently didn’t know at the time was
that Brown had taken the idea of the angled deck with him when he was sent to the
Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River.4 As Brown later recalled, the idea of the angled
deck “was seized on eagerly by the Americans.” They were ready for it. In his Nuclear
Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, retired vice admiral Jerry Miller noted that Capt. James
D. Small, who in 1951 was a young engineering officer in the Navy’s Bureau of Ships,
admitted years later that “it is too bad that our naval architects, naval aviators, or
bystanders didn’t see [the angled-deck concept first]—but they didn’t.”5 Yet they
quickly took advantage of it, converting the Essex-class carrier Antietam to the angled-
deck configuration by mid-December 1952.6
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Boddington and
Cambell first tested
the angled-deck con-
cept by directing the
painting of a ten-
degree-offset landing
path on the deck of
the carrier Triumph.
Royal Navy pilots then
made touch-and-go
landings along the
path. As Cambell
would recall, “These
trials were completely
successful, and the
pilots concerned were
most enthusiastic.” Yet
it took a visit of and demonstrations by USS Antietam in May 1953 to convince “the
Admiralty that retrofit action [on existing RN carriers] should be started forthwith.”7
Cambell and his assistant, Cdr. Nicholas Goodhart, polished a scheme of Goodhart’s to
replace a carrier’s landing signal officer with “visual indication of the optimum
approach and landing path . . . [using] a steady light source.” According to an article in
Naval Aviation News in 1955, Goodhart had served as an exchange pilot at the Patuxent
Naval Air Test Center in 1948–49, and he had witnessed U.S. Navy efforts to find a way
to improve the coordination between landing signal officers (LSOs) and pilots of jet
aircraft.8 Engineers at Farnborough had already been working on a mechanical replace-
ment for LSOs, and Goodhart took his idea to them.9 The first component of his sys-
tem was a large light placed at the after end of the flight deck. About 150 feet from the
stern, Goodhart and the Farnborough engineers set up the second component—a large
concave mirror, eventually gyrostabilized, that would reflect the light at an angle suited
to the type of aircraft coming in to land. On each side of the mirror would be a row of
three green lights. The pilot’s task would be to keep the reflection of the light level with
the green lights.
Cambell’s account of how they tested the idea in the office he shared with Goodhart is
classic: “We borrowed a small vanity mirror from Miss Montgomery, our secretary, and
propped it up at a simulated 3 degrees approach angle. . . . [W]e then borrowed
Monty’s lipstick and stood it on end a few feet away. Looking at the lipstick in the mir-
ror, we found it easy to keep it in view while we moved forwards and downwards.”10
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An unmodified carrier, USS Leyte (CV 32), on the left and a carrier given an angled deck,
USS Antietam (CV 36), on the right, October 1954. As Vice Adm. Robert Dunn noted to
the authors, the angled deck eliminated the demand from pilots for a flush-deck carrier.
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Cambell and
Goodhart realized
that it was “blindingly
obvious that the two
revolutionary inven-
tions [angled deck
and landing mirror]
would be comple-
mentary.”11 When this
“visual glide slope
system” was tested
first at Farnborough
and then at sea on
HMS Illustrious in
November 1953, two
U.S. Navy pilots were
part of the test team,
and one, Lt. Cdr. Donald D. Engen, wrote a report to the Chief of Naval Operations
recommending “that the Navy procure the mirror immediately.”12 Engen was at that
time one of two U.S. Navy exchange pilots at the Royal Air Force’s Empire Test Pilots
School at Farnborough.
Eric Brown was involved in more than the development of the angled deck and the
mirror landing aid. He also had a hand in the U.S. Navy’s adoption of the steam cata-
pult. When HMS Perseus, modified but not used for regular fleet operations, arrived at
the Philadelphia Navy Yard in February 1952, Brown was at Patuxent River as an
exchange pilot. He was ordered north to Philadelphia to fly an F9F Panther jet from
Perseus, moored to a dock at the Navy Yard. Brown was probably selected for this task
because, as he noted, he had worked closely with C. C. Mitchell “many times on cata-
pult trials in Britain.”13
On the day of the test, there was no headwind blowing over the flight deck; instead,
there was a five-knot tailwind. As Brown later wrote, “A huddle of frustration gathered.
The Americans shook their heads firmly at the idea that a jet could be shot off with the
ship tied up and a tail wind blowing over the catapult.” Developer Mitchell, however,
insisted that the trial launches take place as scheduled. As Brown stood by, the senior
engineer officer on Perseus said, “We’ll risk the British pilot if you’ll risk the aircraft.”
That was it. There was no backing down. Brown, “the innocent in this drama,” climbed
into his cockpit and “was flung off . . . through a maze of dockyard cranes and work-
shop chimneys.” But he and the other pilots made it, and they repeated their
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The mirror landing aid on USS Bennington (CV 20) in August 1955. It is stabilized to remain
steady while the ship rolled and pitched.
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performances the next day—when the tailwind was even worse.14 His success garnered
Brown an interview with the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. William M. Fechteler. As
Brown remembered, the admiral “expressed his gratitude for the way in which the
British had co-operated in handing over the steam-catapult, the angled-deck and the
flexible-deck ideas.”15
The individuals in the Royal Navy who were prominent in the development of the
steam catapult, angled deck, and mirror landing system and in the sharing of these
innovations with individuals in the U.S. Navy left a trail of papers, memorandums,
drawings, and recollections. In reviewing this material, we infer that one reason the
British naval officers and civilians were able to come up with their innovative concepts
was that at least some of them—in particular, Eric Brown, Lewis Boddington, Dennis
R. F. Cambell, and Nicholas Goodhart—had worked together effectively over an
extended period of time. They weren’t strangers to one another, and they were also not
strangers to the problems. They appear to have realized in 1945 or soon thereafter that
jet aircraft were both the future of naval aviation and also a challenge to launch and
recover safely and quickly from aircraft carriers. They then built on their shared knowl-
edge of the problem—mating the new jet aircraft to a carrier’s flight deck—to find
ways to recover and launch jet aircraft rapidly.
The Individuals: U.S. Navy
In the U.S. Navy, individuals also mattered, but they worked within a setting that was
very different from that of their counterparts in the RN. In early 1945, while senior
officers in the Royal Navy had already accepted the idea that British carriers would have
to operate jet aircraft, U.S. Navy officers at sea and ashore were thinking about current
operational problems in their fight against Japan. Could the carrier force fight off the
kamikazes? Could its strike aircraft actually succeed in attacking the Japanese main-
land? Could the carriers be constantly supplied with new aircraft, fuel for those planes,
and enough ordnance?
It wasn’t clear in January or February 1945 that the war against Japan would end that
August, and U.S. Army and Navy ordnance specialists had begun developing new weap-
ons to attack targets in Japan, including missiles with conventional warheads. The Navy
was also concerned that the Japanese might develop missiles that their manned aircraft
could launch against any U.S. invasion force, much as Germany had used radio-guided
bombs and missiles against Allied forces in the Mediterranean in 1943. In July 1944, for
example, the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance had asked the scientists who had developed
the antiaircraft proximity fuse to evaluate the possibility of using ship-launched mis-
siles for fleet air defense. In early December 1944, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
Adm. Ernest J. King, had directed BuOrd to push ahead “on an urgent basis” with work
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to develop and field antiaircraft missiles, and he simultaneously created a committee
to study the postwar implications of wartime missile developments in the Allied and
Axis nations.16
More importantly, the Manhattan Project had developed nuclear weapons. The need to
have a carrier-based bomber that could carry nuclear weapons drove both aircraft and
carrier development after World War II. In January 1946, the Navy’s Bureau of Aero-
nautics issued a request for proposals to major aircraft manufacturers that specified a
carrier-based bomber able to carry an eight-thousand-pound weapon. In the interim,
while the new aircraft was being designed and built, the Navy reconfigured P2V Nep-
tune patrol bombers so that these large machines (wingspan one hundred feet, loaded
weight over sixty-one thousand pounds) could actually take off from the large Midway-
class carriers.17
The story of the
development of the AJ
carrier-based attack
plane has been told in
some detail by various
authors, especially
Vice Adm. Jerry
Miller, USN (Ret.), in
his Nuclear Weapons
and Aircraft Carriers,
published in 2001.18
From our perspective,
what matters is how
the development of an
airplane capable of
carrying an early-
design (and therefore
bulky and heavy) nuclear weapon consumed the attention of some of the finest minds
in the U.S. Navy. After the end of World War II, the Chief of Naval Operations, then
Admiral King, and the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had to decide just
where in the Navy’s organizational hierarchy to put an office for nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems. Rear Adm. William R. Purnell, who had served during the
war on the Military Policy Committee, which had advised President Franklin D. Roose-
velt on nuclear weapons issues, apparently favored creating a special office within
OPNAV to be headed by Capt. William S. Parsons, an ordnance expert who had
armed the bomb dropped on Hiroshima and had worked closely with the atomic
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scientists at Los Alamos. Captain Parsons had already recruited Cdrs. Frederick L.
Ashworth and Horacio Rivero to assist him in fashioning a postwar Navy policy cover-
ing nuclear weapons. Parsons was apparently able to persuade Purnell to convince
Admiral King in November 1945 to establish a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations/
Special Weapons, appoint Vice Adm. William H. P. Blandy to the post, and ensure that
Captain Parsons and his assistants served under Blandy.19
With Blandy’s support, Parsons prepared a memorandum in March 1946 for the Dep-
uty Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy in which he predicted that reduc-
tions in the size and weight of the “fission bomb,” coupled with advances in the range
and accuracy of long-range surface-to-surface guided missiles, would allow the Navy to
launch nuclear attacks from submarines and surface ships.20 Vice Admiral Miller, in
Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, notes that Commander Ashworth had “started
thinking about mixing carrier aircraft and the atomic bomb not long after he con-
cluded his duties with the wartime operations of the atomic weapon program.”21 Par-
sons and Ashworth were supported by Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, who was then
(1946) the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) and later (1947–48) the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations.
The focus on the nuclear mission for aircraft carriers and the resulting conflict between
the Navy and the newly created U.S. Air Force over which service should have control
of nuclear bombardment took the time, energy, and talent of a number of Navy avia-
tors, especially those with scientific or technical backgrounds. In addition to the offi-
cers mentioned thus far, there were others, including the war hero Rear Adm. Daniel V.
Gallery. Gallery’s antisubmarine group, built around the escort carrier Guadalcanal,
had captured the German submarine U-505 in June 1944, garnering for the Navy its
first war prize since the war against Great Britain in 1812. Gallery was a colorful char-
acter, articulate and outspoken, but he was also a good writer and a specialist in avia-
tion ordnance, and he waded energetically into the debate over how nuclear weapons
should be delivered. His advocacy almost cost him his commission. It apparently did
cost him his third star.22
Navy aviation in World War II had developed a powerful land-attack capability, and, as
we have shown in an earlier chapter, the Navy had already experimented with the
launching and recovery of large, twin-engine carrier aircraft. After the war, both avia-
tors and nonaviators (such as Captain Parsons) argued that carriers could serve as
nuclear-strike platforms. In the summer of 1946, President Harry Truman granted the
Navy permission to begin “planning to equip its ships and aircraft for atomic opera-
tions.”23 This meant that much of the Navy’s aviation community would focus on
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developing planes for carrying nuclear weapons and on modifying carriers so that they
could store nuclear weapons and launch the large aircraft that carried those weapons.
An illustration of this focus on nuclear capability is the composition of the Navy’s team
that reviewed North American Aviation’s mock-up of the XAJ (Savage) in October
1946.24 The leader of the BuAer team was Cdr. Roger B. Woodhull, the project officer
for the XAJ. Woodhull had served as a combat aviator during the war and was Design
Branch head for torpedo planes in BuAer’s Engineering Division at war’s end. Also on
the team was Capt. Joseph N. Murphy, who headed the Armament Branch of BuAer’s
Engineering Division. As a young lieutenant before World War II, Murphy had both
studied and taught at the California Institute of Technology. During the war, as a lieu-
tenant commander, he headed the scout bomber branch in BuAer. By 1947, he was
head of BuAer’s Piloted Aircraft Division. Working with Woodhull and Murphy were
civilians William Z. Frisbie and George A. Spangenberg. Frisbie led BuAer’s Design
Coordination Branch and Contract Airplane Design Branch in 1942. Spangenberg
became his deputy during the war. Both were talented engineers.
Acting as an observer was Cdr. John T. Hayward, then, like William Parsons, one of the
more technically astute officers in the Navy.25 Before World War II, Hayward had
worked as a lieutenant at the Naval Aircraft Factory on aircraft navigation instruments
and flight controls. He taught at the Royal Air Force’s navigation school in Canada in
1940 and in 1942 organized the Navy’s first long-range, land-based bomber squadron.
In 1944, he was selected to be the Navy officer in charge of experiments at the new
Naval Ordnance Test Station at Inyokern, California, including work on the trigger
mechanism for a nuclear weapon. Before taking his position there, he developed con-
tacts with the science faculty at the California Institute of Technology and began work-
ing on a graduate degree in physics. He studied the effects of the nuclear explosions at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan right after the war, and then he managed high-speed
photography of the nuclear weapons tests at Bikini in the summer of 1946. By the time
he examined the XAJ mock-up in October 1946, he had a reputation as one of the best
heavy-attack aircraft evaluators in the U.S. Navy. He also knew enough about the early
nuclear weapons to evaluate the XAJ’s capability to carry them.
Not surprisingly, given the haste in developing the XAJ, the airplane turned out to be
less than satisfactory. In 1949, retired Navy test pilot James Pearce, just hired by North
American Aviation, flew the XAJ and wrote this evaluation of the aircraft: “When
everything was working properly—it handled like a fighter. The problem was that
everything was working properly only about five percent of the time; the rest of the
time the pilot was coping with some sort of problem ranging from some minor annoy-
ance to struggling to stay alive. . . . Amongst those of us who tested the AJ, none were
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left without vivid memories of some moment of terror.”26 In his memoir, Vice Admiral
Hayward notes that he had recommended that the XAJ be rebuilt with jet engines but
that Rear Adm. Theodore Lonnquest, assistant chief of BuAer for research and develop-
ment, rejected Hayward’s recommendation.27 Given the troubles with turbojet engine
development described in chapter 5 of this study, Lonnquest—under pressure to help
get the XAJ into the air—was understandably unenthusiastic about reworking the XAJ
around jet propulsion.
Individual officers such as Parsons, Hayward, Rivero, and Ashworth knew each other by
war’s end and were familiar with one another’s abilities. During World War II, Hayward
had worked for Rear Adm. Mitscher when Mitscher commanded Fleet Air Wing 2 in
Hawaii. In fact, Hayward, by his own account, had first met Mitscher in 1934 and had
worked with him again in 1940, when Mitscher was assistant chief of BuAer. At that
time, the Naval Aircraft Factory was manufacturing models of the Curtiss SO3C
(Seamew) two-seat amphibian. “Chick” Hayward flew one out of the Navy’s air station
at Anacostia, Maryland, and dumped it into the Potomac. In his memoir Hayward says
that he promptly went to BuAer headquarters on Constitution Avenue in Washington,
“wet flight suit and all,” to tell Mitscher that the SO3C was “a lousy airplane.” Mitscher
had then christened the SO3C “Chick’s airplane.”28 That was Mitscher. Hayward was a
character, but he was also very bright and a good pilot. Mitscher liked him, and Admi-
ral King, whose airplane Hayward had flown, evidently listened to him.
Under the leadership of Admirals Blandy and Radford, officers such as Parsons,
Ashworth, Rivero, and Hayward developed Navy policy regarding nuclear weapons and
managed the aircraft and ordnance projects that gave the Navy its nuclear striking arm.
They were aided by aircraft designers like Douglas Aircraft’s Edward H. Heinemann.
Heinemann began designing bombing aircraft for the Navy in the 1930s, including the
very versatile and reliable SBD-1 Dauntless dive-bomber. George A. Spangenberg,
one of BuAer’s best aircraft design evaluators and eventually something of a legend in
his own right, noted years later that “Heinemann’s real strength was a good under-
standing of the entire airplane. He did a superb job of trying to find out what the Navy
needed and trying to give them what they needed and he also had a superb engineer-
ing organization.”29
Heinemann also knew the officers and civilian engineers in BuAer. His memoir, Ed
Heinemann, Combat Aircraft Designer, is peppered with the names of BuAer personnel.
Heinemann also spent several weeks in the fall of 1944 on carriers in the Pacific, where
he met and talked at length with then–rear admiral Arthur Radford and Capt. Freder-
ick M. Trapnell, who was the first Navy pilot to test the Bell Aircraft XP-59A jet proto-
type (in April 1943). In addition, Heinemann was a member of a delegation of Douglas
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engineers who headed for Germany in 1945 to examine the results of wartime German
aeronautical research.30 In short, he was an “insider” when it came to the development
of Navy aircraft, especially attack aircraft.
As a consequence, he was one of the first to consider what it would take to create a
nuclear-armed jet bomber that could be flown off a carrier and then recovered after its
mission.31 After watching Navy tests of the Douglas AD-1 attack plane on board the
light carrier Saipan in 1948, Heinemann “went to Washington to visit BuAer.” As he
recalled, “I had seen the CNO’s memorandum regarding weight parameters for the
[successor to the AJ Savage] and was aware that other company representatives had
been in and out of Navy offices getting a feel for what the final requirement figures
would be.” Heinemann learned that BuAer would accept design proposals from the air-
craft manufacturers using one of three turbojets—the Westinghouse J40, Pratt & Whit-
ney’s J57, and Curtiss-Wright’s J65.32 He returned to Douglas determined to design a jet
bomber weighing the existing upper limit on loads for the Midway-class carriers—
sixty-eight thousand pounds.
With a concept in hand, Heinemann returned to Washington and showed—unoffi-
cially—drawings of the proposed Douglas aircraft to Captain Murphy, who had been
one of the BuAer officers involved in developing the AJ Savage. Heinemann’s account
has Murphy reacting with disgust: “You know good and well that you can’t produce an
airplane of that capability for that weight!” Heinemann was furious, but he persuaded
Murphy to keep the drawings and weight estimates. The next day, Heinemann was in
BuAer’s spaces and was accosted by Ivan H. Driggs, the director of BuAer’s Design
Research Division. Driggs was quick to apologize, telling Heinemann that “we have
checked your figures [and] your concept looks valid.”33 According to George Spangen-
berg, Driggs and his colleagues had assumed that the successor to the AJ Savage would
have to rely on turboprop engines to carry the heavy nuclear weapon (at least eight
thousand pounds) the necessary range and would therefore weigh in at takeoff at about
a hundred thousand pounds.34
Heinemann had gambled that both the size and weight of nuclear bombs would come
down, and his gamble paid off.35 Douglas got the contract for the follow-on to the AJ
and produced a mock-up in 1949. The airplane was huge—seventy-six feet long, with a
wingspan of over seventy-two feet and a loaded weight of about seventy thousand
pounds. By comparison, the Navy version of the B-25 that had flown off the carrier
Shangri-La in November 1944 had been about fifty-three feet long, with a wingspan
of just over sixty-seven feet and a loaded weight of thirty-five thousand pounds.
Heinemann was not surprised to find Capt. John Hayward on the team inspecting the
mock-up.36 It was the same cast of Navy characters who had been trying to make real
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the visions of 1946–47. As Vice Admiral Miller puts it, the nuclear bombing mission
was the “only game in town,” and it attracted the best Navy and industry designers and
engineers.37
Note the difference with the Royal Navy, which did not have the nuclear bombing mis-
sion. We believe that this is important. In effect, the “best and brightest” within the U.S.
Navy’s aviation community were focused postwar on using carriers as mobile nuclear-
strike platforms. For that to happen, BuAer and industry technical and technically
sophisticated personnel had to come up with aircraft that could fly from carriers and
carry the early, very heavy and bulky nuclear weapons. In 1946, it was not clear that this
effort could succeed. To reduce the chance that it would not, senior Navy leaders such
as Rear Admiral (and then Vice Admiral) Radford supported a cluster of intelligent,
accomplished subordinate officers and civilians as they labored to do what often
seemed the impossible.
The Organizations: U.S. Navy
We begin an assessment of organizational factors with those of the U.S. Navy, because
we are more familiar with them. There were two key events for the USN. First, the Gen-
eral Board, which had been a key integrator of technology and operational concepts in
the 1920s and 1930s, lost during the war much of its influence and therefore also its
ability to compel developers and fleet operators to review the evidence generated by
their own actions. Second, the Secretary of the Navy created the post of Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations (Air) in August 1943. Rear Adm. Julius A. Furer, who wrote
Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, summarizes the change as fol-
lows: “Broadly speaking, naval aviation planning, training of flying personnel, logistics,
planning and aviation operations were now responsibilities of DCNO (Air); BuAer was
responsible for all that related to aviation materiel of the Navy, including ‘designing,
building, fitting out, and repairing Naval and Marine Corps aircraft, accessories, equip-
ment, and devices, connected with aircraft.’”38
The first DCNO (Air) was Vice Adm. John S. McCain. His counterpart at BuAer was
Rear Adm. DeWitt C. Ramsey. In effect, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
would set Navy aviation policy, while BuAer and its subordinate organizations would
provide aircraft, aircraft engines and controls, aircraft maintenance manuals and
training, and the equipment needed by aircraft carriers to launch and recover their
air wings.
In the office of the DCNO (Air), officers such as Arthur Radford, assistant to DCNO
(Air) in early 1944, worked to tie together all the elements of Navy aviation. This was
no small feat. Before the war, BuAer had begun a program of expanding aircraft
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production, pilot training, and the training of all the skilled technicians who supported
air operations ashore and afloat.39 This planning, though successful, had not been ade-
quate for the huge surge in the size and missions of the Navy’s air forces during the
war.40 There was a perceived need for reorganization, and the first step was the consoli-
dation of the Naval Aircraft Factory, the Naval Aircraft Modification Unit, the Naval
Air Experimental Station, and the Naval Auxiliary Air Station into the Naval Air Mate-
rial Center, in July 1943. Before the war, BuAer and its subordinate organizations had
focused on solving problems ranging from how to design an effective tailhook for car-
rier aircraft to how to maneuver carriers as a group in wartime. Once war began, how-
ever, the practice of identifying and solving problems had to compete with the obvious
need to expand naval aviation dramatically. Getting the resources for such an expan-
sion required senior Navy aviators to win the battles of resource allocation that took
place in the offices of the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. To do that, the aviators
needed direct access to these individuals—hence the August 1943 reorganization.
But the aviators, along with the rest of the Navy, also needed a substitute for the Gen-
eral Board. In late 1944, for example, Vice Admiral Mitscher argued that the new
DCNO (Air) needed an informal advisory board to capture both the lessons of war-
time experience and the future potential of wartime research and development. In May
1945, the type commander for Navy air forces in the Pacific, Vice Adm. George D.
Murray, suggested that the Essex-class carriers still under construction be modified to
carry and launch large bombers. That same month, BuAer began studying the feasibil-
ity of large carrier bombers. There was a need to bring the thinking behind these initia-
tives together, and, as we have shown, Capt. W. T. Raisseur, working in the new office of
the DCNO (Air), did just that with a paper he wrote at the end of June 1945. That
paper emphasized the heavy-attack mission and noted that a carrier could generate
more sorties if its aircraft elevators were located at the edges of the flight deck, thereby
leaving room for longer, more powerful catapults.
In early July 1945, the informal board that Vice Admiral Mitscher had proposed
approved the concept of carrier operations presented by Raisseur. In October, BuAer
engineers at the newly created NAMC suggested to BuAer headquarters that turboprop
engines might give carrier-launched bombers both increased range and heavier bomb
loads. After reviewing the available evidence, BuAer chief Rear Adm. Harold B.
Sallada endorsed in December the idea that carriers be modified to accept very large
and very-long-range aircraft. That led the Chief of Naval Operations to authorize the
requirement for what became the XAJ Savage on 28 December. In January 1946, the
informal board advising DCNO (Air) suggested that the Navy develop a new carrier
for the much larger aircraft, and the DCNO (Air), Vice Admiral Mitscher (who had
suggested that the informal board be created in the first place), supported Rear
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Admiral Sallada’s recommendation. The Bureau of Ships began working on new car-
rier designs in February 1946.41
In short, the new organization seemed to work well when it had the functional equiv-
alent of the General Board. The aviators had a new concept of operations (large air-
craft, escorted by long-range fighters, conducting strike operations against land
targets), based on an assessment of wartime experience, and that concept had triggered
new designs of both aircraft and aircraft carriers. But somehow the insights that had
emerged from the Royal Navy’s analyses had not come out of the analogous process in
the U.S. Navy. It was obvious that the new, heavier, and larger aircraft would need to be
catapulted off any new carrier’s deck, but that conclusion ran into the fact that the
hydraulic catapults then in use had nearly reached the limit of their effectiveness.
This collision of an operational imperative with a technological limit was apparently
not appreciated in the office of the DCNO (Air), despite the work of Mitscher’s com-
mittee. Evidence for this inference is the fact that the new concept of carrier operations
first developed by DCNO (Air)’s Captain Raisseur in June 1945 required a clear flight
deck. The aircraft elevators would have to move to the edge of the flight deck so that
two catapults could work sequentially and rapidly. But which catapults? What catapult
technology would work best? Answering those questions was left to BuAer, but the doc-
umentary evidence suggests that the effort to develop effective jet aircraft for carriers
focused BuAer on improving the reliability of jet engines.
In April 1947, for example, Rear Admiral Pride later recalled of the period just before
taking charge of BuAer, “It then dawned on me that I would be up to my neck in jet
procurement and that I had better find out a little about them at first hand. Further-
more, since no flag officer seemed to have soloed the things, it seemed appropriate that
the Chief of the Bureau set the pace.” So Pride drove to the Naval Air Test Center at
Patuxent River and asked to fly one of the new McDonnell XFD-1 Phantom prototypes,
but “the Patuxent boys were not taking any chances with their new pet.” Pride ended up
flying an Army P-59, which got into the air but had an engine failure, forcing him to
return to the runways at Patuxent.42
As a younger naval aviator in the 1920s and 1930s, Pride had been an innovator. In
August 1921, as a lieutenant, he had developed the first arresting gear system for the
experimental aircraft carrier Langley. As BuAer chief, however, he “had to defend the
naval aviation budget. That took most of [my] time.”43 But the bureaucratic infighting
that characterized budget negotiations was not new to Pride. In World War II, for
example, he had strongly and successfully opposed drone attack aircraft as neither par-
ticularly “valuable, nor reliable.”44 Once he took over BuAer, Pride tried to acquire the
rights to the Rolls-Royce Nene jet engine and ended up purchasing a number of the
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engines for Navy use. He also pressured the Marine Corps to adopt jet aircraft, and he
rejected the concerns of officers in BuAer that jets would not work on carriers. As he
put it in his oral history interview, “There were a lot of people out in the fleet that were
very dubious about getting [jets] back up to revs again after you came in for a landing
and you had to take a waveoff. They were quite convinced that the jet would never be
able to take a waveoff [i.e., to resume normal flight after being ordered to abort a land-
ing attempt just before touching down]. Well, I said, ‘By God, they’ll have to or be
made to, or we might as well go out of business now.’”45
In his championing of jet aircraft Pride did not consider himself a visionary or a radi-
cal, but he “liked new ideas.”46 At the same time, he stayed with BuAer’s traditional
practice of having the government provide engines that the aircraft designers could
build their airplanes around. He also ended the Navy’s lighter-than-air program, and
he admitted that the angled flight deck was an ingenious British innovation—and one
that the U.S. Navy had not foreseen.47 He acknowledged that the steam catapult was a
significant innovation, but he did not approve of the British “flexdeck” or “mat deck.”
What is easily forgotten when considering the activities of BuAer under Rear Admiral
Pride’s leadership is the menu of possibilities that wartime expenditures had produced.
There were the obvious ones: jet propulsion, rockets, radar for night fighters, air-
breathing missiles, and new supersonic-aircraft designs, such as the delta wing. But
there was much more. The BuAer “Research and Development Master Program” for fis-
cal year 1947—a document put together early in 1946—contained some breathtaking
proposals. Perhaps the most audacious was Project JUPITER, an “airborne aircraft car-
rier” that would carry both “parasite” manned fighters and pilotless aircraft. This flying
carrier was to have been “an airplane in the 4–600,000 lb. class, powered by gas tur-
bines, cruising at 35 to 40,000 feet at 400 to 475 MPH, with a radius of action of 2500–
3500 miles.”48 The Army Air Forces analog to this behemoth was the November 1945
general operational requirement for the next generation of heavy bombers. Meeting
this requirement led U.S. Air Force officers to develop a 1948 design of a swept-wing jet
aircraft weighing over three hundred thousand pounds, carrying a ten-thousand-
pound payload to forty-five thousand feet, and flying almost seven thousand miles at a
speed of approximately 450 knots.49
The “Research and Development Master Program” also contained proposals for refin-
ing the liquid-fuel and solid-fuel rocket engines for the Gorgon, Super Gorgon, and
Lark missiles, plus money proposed for work on pulse-jet engines for missiles and tar-
get drones. What drove BuAer’s investment in both Project JUPITER and missiles was
the need to extend the range of a carrier’s striking power against land targets. A 1947
BuAer memorandum argued that “carrier striking power cannot be limited to a range
1 3 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:06 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
of six to seven hundred miles, otherwise the carrier program would stand in a precari-
ous situation when compared to the long range bombardment plans of the Army Air
Forces.”50 As Malcolm Muir notes in his history of Navy surface warfare after World
War II, the Bureaus of Aeronautics and Ordnance “advanced a bewildering variety of
missile projects during the immediate postwar period.”51 One of Rear Admiral Pride’s
more difficult tasks, therefore, was to wade through all the proposals and research-and-
development efforts and decide which ones really mattered.
But the “Research and Development Master Program” did identify a key short-term
problem: “continuous development of installations aboard ship which will permit the
safe arrestation [sic] of any future type of carrier airplanes making normal or approxi-
mately normal landings.” In the words of the master program, “the shipboard arresting
gear programs should be kept ahead of the development of the carrier airplane itself.”52
The program also singled out the need to develop a crash barrier that would work with
twin-engine planes with tricycle landing gear (like the F7F). As it observed, “The mag-
nitude of the problem of arresting heavy twin-engine airplanes, or jet-propelled air-
planes, with high stalling speeds, and tricycle landing gear is very great.”53
The master program also proposed “utilizing the slotted cylinder principle” for carrier
catapults, but admitted that the slotted-cylinder concept was “a considerable departure
from the conventional catapult” and needed careful investigation.54 At the same time,
the section of the R&D master program devoted to improving launching techniques on
carriers noted that “as the operating speeds of aircraft continue to increase, a decreased
launching interval is required to maintain the operating efficiency of the carrier.”55
Here were the same hints that had provoked British engineer Lewis Boddington in the
summer and fall of 1945 to move away from the axial (straight) carrier deck and
toward an angled deck with a rubber mat. At the same time, these hints were accompa-
nied—and perhaps overshadowed—by more dramatic concerns, especially the need to
strike land targets from great distances at sea by the use of missiles or pilotless aircraft
launched by a flying aircraft carrier. In effect, what came to be called the “heavy attack”
mission had become institutionalized—embedded in the planning and thinking of offi-
cers in both OPNAV and BuAer. Moreover, as the 1947 master program pointed out,
the need for increasingly powerful catapults appeared to be met by incremental
improvement to existing hydraulic systems—just as in the case of arresting gear, where
older equipment had been superseded by incrementally improved designs.56
One of the most important tasks that leaders of an organization like BuAer have to
undertake is determining the priority of the problems that the organization is sup-
posed to deal with. To do this effectively, senior personnel must be able to evaluate reli-
able evidence about the performance of existing and planned systems in a realistic
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operational setting. In the case of the Royal Navy, the basic problem was how to adapt
carriers to the new jet fighter aircraft, because the postwar mission of the Royal Navy’s
carriers was the protection of seaborne trade from air attack. In the case of the U.S.
Navy, the mission was long-range strike, especially nuclear attack, and that forced the
U.S. Navy to focus on near-term, high-risk programs like the XAJ Savage, long-term
missile programs, and high-performance jet fighters with the range to accompany
carrier-launched bombers. In his oral history, Vice Adm. Robert B. Pirie, who was
DCNO (Air) from May 1958 until November 1962, praises four postwar BuAer chiefs:
Rear Adms. Alfred M. Pride, Thomas S. Combs, Apollo Soucek, and James S. Russell.57
We think Pirie admired these officers because they set and then imposed sensible prior-
ities on BuAer.
We ask readers to place themselves in Rear Admiral Pride’s shoes in June 1947. On the
one hand, demobilization was still taking its toll on Navy aviation. For example, the
number of combat aircraft was dropping—from a high of 29,125 in 1945 to 9,889 in
1948—and the number of Navy pilots was being reduced from a wartime high of
49,819 to 10,861 in 1948.58 At the same time, the advent of jet aircraft and missiles had
made, or would soon make, many Navy aircraft obsolete. The future sketched out in the
1947 “Research and Development Master Program” was both dramatic and expensive.
Moreover, the development of nuclear bombs threatened to make the concept of a con-
centrated task force or fleet obsolete. Finally, the bureaucratic and political conflicts
over military service unification and service roles and missions ate up the time and
talent of a number of the Navy’s most experienced and capable officers. Vice Admiral
Miller may have been correct to say that the nuclear mission was the “only game in
town,” but it was a risky game. The potential for error was high, as was the cost to the
Navy if errors were made. Moreover, as Admiral Pride said years later, some of the
more stubborn opponents of change were actually younger officers in BuAer: “I got
more opposition from juniors than I ever did from seniors in trying to get new pro-
grams in.”59
Pride may have been exaggerating. There were reasons why some BuAer personnel
thought that jet aircraft—especially jet heavy attack aircraft—might not be suitable for
carriers. As civilian engineer George A. Spangenberg recalled, “The Navy had a very
real problem in attempting to get into the jet age” and therefore, “most of us were kind
of in the middle. The pure jets at the time [1947] couldn’t quite do the job and every-
body recognized a composite way to go was [a] poor choice. All of us recognized I
think that you couldn’t get there from here with a turbo prop if the other guy without
carrier constraints was going to be using jets. We would be in trouble.”60 Two things
saved jet aircraft on carriers. The first was the persistence of Cdr. (later rear admiral)
Alfred B. Metsger, a torpedo-plane pilot who became head of the Fighter Design
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Branch in BuAer in the fall of 1945.61 The second was a simulated-combat test at
Patuxent River in the spring of 1946 that pitted an F8F-1 Bearcat against a Navy P-80
Shooting Star. The highly maneuverable F8F-1 could turn inside the P-80, but the
report by the F8F-1’s pilot made clear the P-80’s advantage: “The F8F-1 is without
doubt one of the most outstanding performers in the conventional field. Yet I felt . . .
helpless. . . . I was completely on the defensive with no option but to counter the P-80’s
approaches.”62 As George Spangenberg recalled, “The F8F was solely at the mercy of the
P-80. You couldn’t get away from it. It should have taught a lot of people a lot of
lessons. . . . [I]t educated a lot of the people.”63
The emphasis on testing, along with the funds to conduct tests at fields such as Patuxent
River, is apparent in photographs from the early postwar years, especially in such books
as Thomason’s U.S. Naval Air Superiority (2007) and Strike from the Sea (2009), and in
the many articles published in The Hook over the last generation or so.64 Experimenta-
tion is a valuable tool for deciding among alternatives and in testing assumptions, and
BuAer had been committed to rigorous testing ever since its creation in 1921.
The inferences drawn from many such tests conducted when Rear Admiral Pride was
bureau chief were summed up in a memorandum he wrote to the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, in December 1949. Pride noted that piston-engine
fighters could not “successfully engage jet fighters, either offensively or defensively.” He
also listed other weaknesses of the piston-engine aircraft: they could not attack jet
bombers or “escort attack aircraft of any type in the face of jet fighter opposition.” If
the skies were free of enemy jet fighters, piston-engine attack aircraft, such as the AD-1
Skyraider, could be very effective. Based on exercises, Pride recommended against
building any turboprop fighters, and he informed Admiral Sherman that “jet aircraft
should be procured in the necessary numbers for all fighter tasks . . . so as to modernize
our fleet air forces as rapidly as possible.”65
Pride was clearly trying to head off criticism that jet fighters were not suitable for use
on carriers. He knew that the U.S. Air Force, the Soviet air arm, and the British had
already flown swept-wing jet fighters, and he knew that the Navy needed equivalent air-
craft if its carriers were to continue to be effective strike platforms. He also knew that
Douglas Aircraft was developing the A3D Skywarrior to take the place of the problem-
plagued AJ Savage for the nuclear mission; BuAer had awarded Douglas a contract for
two prototypes of the new jet bomber at the end of March 1949.
The Organizations: The Royal Navy
We have already mentioned the close contact between the Fleet Air Arm and the U.S.
Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics before World War II, when then–rear admiral John Towers
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was BuAer’s chief, culminating in the housing of the naval aircraft portion of the Brit-
ish Aircraft Commission in the spaces of the USN’s Bureau of Aeronautics. At the same
time, Royal Navy aviators were apparently concerned that the formation of the Minis-
try of Aircraft Production in their own government would keep them from obtaining
high-performance aircraft suited for use at sea by emphasizing the need for numbers of
good land-based bombers and fighters.66 What met the Royal Navy’s needs was the
quality and quantity of fighters and attack aircraft available from U.S. manufacturers.
What is most interesting, however, is the decision in the summer of 1942 by the RN’s
First Sea Lord, Adm. Dudley Pound, to create a Future Building Committee within the
Admiralty. At the same time, Pound appointed retired admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer to
the post of “Chief of the Naval Air Services.”67 Dreyer, as assistant chief of the Naval
Staff from 1924 to 1927, had opposed the takeover of the RN’s aviation by the Royal Air
Force, and Pound may have felt the need for an older air advocate in the Admiralty’s
wartime aviation staff. But what matters to us is that the FBC was charged to look
ahead and create a plan for the development of British fleet aviation during and after
the war.
The FBC was chaired by the Deputy First Sea Lord. The deputy chairman was the Assis-
tant Chief of the Naval Staff (Weapons). The other permanent members were the Con-
troller (Third Sea Lord); the Director of Plans; the Director, Tactical and Staff Duties
Division (responsible for organizing Admiralty staff requirements); the director of the
Gunnery Division; the Director of Naval Construction; and the Director, Naval Air
Division.68 As Norman Friedman has pointed out, the FBC “tried . . . to re-think the
fleet’s air needs as a coherent whole,” a remarkable task for some of the most senior
officers on the Admiralty staff while war was raging.69
There was no organization like it in the U.S. Navy at the time. The USN’s General Board
had performed a similar function at intervals in the years between World War I and
World War II, but once Congress had approved and funded the “two-ocean Navy,” the
main focus of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations had been on fulfilling a plan
for naval aviation, not on developing a new one.
The leaders of the Royal Navy, however, did not have to produce all new aircraft once
its carrier commanders and pilots realized that existing British-made aircraft were
inadequate. The RN’s leaders could devote their attention to assessing war experience
and looking ahead to the implications of new technology. The FBC was an “early pro-
ponent of the catapult as the primary means of launching aircraft.”70 It also pressed for
the RN to have the most modern fighter aircraft on its carriers. In February 1943, an
“interim report” insisting that the carrier was the core of the fleet “shaped British naval
aircraft policy for the remainder of the war.”71 In 1943 and 1944, the FBC compared
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U.S. Navy and Royal Navy carrier operations, and the Fifth Sea Lord (with responsibil-
ity for naval air), Adm. Denis W. Boyd, became convinced by those studies “that a car-
rier had to be able to fly off her entire air complement in one continuous operation.”72
This meant that the Royal Navy would have to adopt the “open hangar” common to
U.S. carriers, so that aircraft could be warmed up while still in the hangar, and also the
deck-edge elevator, to move aircraft from the hangar to the flight deck.
In 1943, the position of “Director of Airfield and Carrier Requirements” was created
under the Fifth Sea Lord, and the head of that organization joined the new Naval Air-
craft Design Committee, which had been a subcommittee of the Future Building Com-
mittee.73 But this change, and other administrative changes, did not disrupt the work of
the FBC. The FBC, along with its aircraft design subcommittee—later a separate but
still allied organization—assumed that jet aircraft represented the future of military
aviation and that carriers would have to launch and recover them.
In effect, the Royal Navy had had to build a new aviation organization once the Fleet
Air Arm had moved back into the RN from the RAF in 1938. There were many details
that had then to be worked out—matters of training, promotion, personnel, bases, and
the like. This took a great deal of time and energy, as Stephen Roskill notes in his sec-
ond volume of Naval Policy between the Wars. Moreover, the aviation doctrine that the
RN had developed before the war, wherein carriers complemented battleships, had
turned out to be inadequate, and so the aviation officers in the RN had in some sense
to start all over again in 1942–43.
That they could do so was the result of the existence of an effective ally, the USN, and
effective organization—at the flag-level Future Building Committee inside the Admi-
ralty, and at the Principal Supply Officers Committee, which supported the Committee
of Imperial Defence. As G. A. H. Gordon shows in his British Seapower and Procure-
ment between the Wars, the RAF and RN fostered an aviation industry in the 1930s that
was both innovative and capable of the sustained serial production of aircraft.74 Like
the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy relied on domestic aircraft manufacturers to build naval
aircraft. Unlike the U.S. Navy, however, the RN had not been able to foster a British
naval aviation industrial base separately from the other military services. Yet the RN
had the necessary technical expertise when it needed it—when the Future Building
Committee was casting its plans, especially in 1943 and 1944.75
The differences in the approaches to jet aircraft in the USN and RN seem to have been
due to the ways in which the two navies defined the problems they faced. A consensus
was reached within the Royal Navy by 1945 that jet aircraft—especially fighters—
would have to operate from British carriers. Once that decision was made, the focus of
attention turned toward finding ways to fit RN carriers to jet aircraft. In the U.S. Navy,
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by contrast, the argument about whether to equip carriers with high-performance jet
fighters continued into Rear Admiral Pride’s term as the head of BuAer.
By contrast, the U.S. Navy officers who wanted the Navy to embrace the nuclear-attack
mission reached an early consensus on the need to develop aircraft—first a mixed-
engine design and then an all-jet design—that could carry large nuclear bombs, but
their focus was on showing that a carrier could serve as an adequate launching plat-
form for nuclear-armed bombers. The first aircraft selected by this group to fly off a
carrier with a dummy nuclear bomb was a modified version of the Lockheed P2V Nep-
tune. The bombers were not meant to land back aboard the carriers that had launched
them; in case of war, they were to hit their targets and then ditch in the water when
they got back to their carriers. The experiments with the modified P2Vs were very visi-
ble, because the USN wanted to play a role in nuclear deterrence, but the consensus
about that policy choice took time, energy, and resources away from investigations of
catapults, the angled deck, and visual landing aids.
What we see in comparing the two navies is a successful committee system in the RN
and the absence of one in the USN. That does not mean that the RN’s process for deal-
ing with an uncertain future always worked, while the USN’s did not. As we’ve seen, the
engineers at Farnborough, who were responsible for turning the policy of arming carri-
ers with high-performance jet fighters into a working system, went down what later
was recognized as a dead end—flying aircraft without undercarriages into rubber
decks. Remember too that the lack of consensus, even within BuAer, about the need to
fly high-performance jets from carriers did not mean that the U.S. Navy lacked a sensi-
ble process for making decisions.
An example of effective decision making was the sequence of steps that led up to the
adoption of the steam catapult. The 1947 BuAer R&D master program had provided
for work on improving existing catapult technology and on building and testing slotted-
tube catapults.76 The Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin for April 1947 confidently
predicted that improved hydraulic catapults would handle jet aircraft, though the short
article admitted that the increased weight of the prototype XH8 was a problem for the
Naval Air Material Center engineers.77 The 1949 BuAer research and development plan
contained funds for new barriers for aircraft that failed to catch an arresting wire; a
system for recovering “wheelless” aircraft, “instrumented tests of full scale dummy
models and aircraft to determine arresting and catapulting characteristics”; develop-
ment of both hydraulic and slotted-cylinder catapults; development of a “smokeless,
high specific impulse, solid propellant”; and improvement of jet-assisted takeoff
units.78 As we have pointed out in an earlier chapter, catapult development was not, as
had been anticipated in 1947, keeping up with the increasing size and performance of
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jet aircraft, despite the work of engineers at BuAer’s Naval Aircraft Factory (part of the
Naval Air Material Center).
In 1948, the Royal Navy brought the light carrier HMS Perseus out of mothballs and
built an experimental steam catapult on a platform on the ship’s flight deck. The Admi-
ralty offered to send Perseus to the United States in June 1951. In response, Rear Adm.
Apollo Soucek, the U.S. naval air attaché, sent Capts. Ralph S. Clarke and Peter H. Horn
to observe catapult launches on the ship. They reported positively on what they wit-
nessed. Rear Admiral Soucek then advised the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Fechteler, to accept the Admiralty’s offer, which Fechteler did at the end of August.79 On
28 August 1951, Royal Navy rear admiral John Stevens, in the British Joint Services
Mission in Washington, wrote to Rear Admiral Felix Johnson, the Director of Naval
Intelligence, saying that the Royal Navy would reduce the security classification of the
documentation on the RN’s steam catapult so that the diagrams and performance data
could be examined by civilian engineers at NAMC.80
On 27 September 1951, Rear Adm. Thomas S. Combs, the head of BuAer, notified the
commander of the NAMC that the tests on Perseus were “Priority 1.”81 Preparations for
the trials on Perseus included arranging berths for the British ship, preparing NAMC
personnel for their participation in the tests, finding funds to cover the costs of the
tests, planning the delivery of fuel for the test aircraft, and drafting a program of test
launches. The Royal Navy officers on the staff of the British Joint Services Mission
arranged to have information provided to the U.S. Navy regarding the steam catapult
but also cautioned BuAer that it would take a relatively long time (five minutes) to
charge up the experimental catapult on Perseus between launchings.82 That is, the
experimental steam catapult was not up to sustaining the usual operating tempo on
USN carriers.
On 8 January 1952, with the expected arrival of Perseus less than a week away, Capt.
Sheldon W. Brown, director of the Ships Installation Division in BuAer, sent a memo-
randum to Rear Adm. Lucien M. Grant comparing “British and American Slotted Cyl-
inder Catapults.” Brown’s concern was that “the British may make a determined effort
to sell their steam catapult to us for use in our carriers.” Captain Brown noted that the
Navy’s own C10 powder-driven catapult “has been built and will be installed in a facil-
ity at the Naval Air Material Center . . . in March 1952” and that “the C10 for the USS
HANCOCK is under contract with a delivery schedule to the Puget Sound Naval Ship-
yard of January 1953.” The catch was that the C10 was a powder-driven (not hydraulic)
catapult, and it had not yet been tested with the gas generator that it was supposed to
have. Put another way, significant improvements to the hydraulic catapult were becom-
ing harder and harder to achieve, and now the Navy’s catapult developers had placed
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their hopes in a catapult powered by hydrogen peroxide “or other gas generating
devices under investigation.” Captain Brown’s assessment of the British steam catapult
was that “the proper attitude to take toward the British catapult is to regard it as a
back-up equipment which can be purchased in case of need.”83
Brown’s cautionary memorandum was not “out of bounds” as the process of bringing
Perseus to the United States moved along. A primary purpose of a staff process is to
reveal and consider options. Brown’s point was that the Royal Navy’s steam catapult
was just one option, and not necessarily the best. However, an undated and unsigned
“Progress Report on the Perseus Program” prepared—perhaps by Brown—at the con-
clusion of the initial tests on Perseus at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was much more
positive. It said that “at capacities even approximating that expected of the C10, the
British catapult becomes an object of very definite interest, one which we can not
afford to regard any longer as merely a back-up to our own programs.” Moreover, “the
British catapult is a bird in the hand which our own instrumentation tells us really
works, whereas the C10 is a bird in the bush which we have been unable to shoot to
date for lack of a facility.”84 The Naval Aircraft Factory responded on 12 February 1952
by doing its own comparison of the BXS British steam catapult and the C10. Its memo-
randum argued that, with improvements, “the C-10 catapult will be, in the opinion of
the Chief Engineer, far superior and more suitable for use in the U.S. Fleet than the
British BS type catapult.”85
But the pressure to adopt the British steam catapult offset the desire on the part of
Naval Aircraft Factory personnel to pursue their own program. One of the witnesses of
the tests conducted on Perseus was a young Navy engineering officer named Daniel K.
Weitzenfeld. Weitzenfeld was working on developing the C10 at the Naval Aircraft Fac-
tory. As he would recall years later, Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, then commander of
Navy air forces in the Atlantic, watched the demonstrations of Colin Mitchell’s steam
catapult and insisted that the Navy acquire it.86 Ballentine had had a very impressive
career: first commanding officer of the Essex-class carrier Bunker Hill during World
War II, two years (1947–49) as a carrier-division commander in the Mediterranean
after the war, and then two years (1949–51) as the commander of the Sixth Fleet before
taking his post as the type commander for aviation in the Atlantic. He was a friend of
Rear Admiral Pride, who had been BuAer’s chief from May 1947 to May 1951, and
Ballentine had made it a point to visit Philadelphia to monitor the tests on Perseus.87
Weitzenfeld, who eventually became the vice commander of the Naval Air Systems
Command (a successor organization to BuAer), believed that the pressure from officers
like Ballentine overcame the commitment of Naval Aircraft Factory engineers to their
own catapult development program.
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The engineers in the USN’s Bureau of Ships too were impressed with the tests of the
British steam catapult. On 14 February 1952, the assistant chief of BuShips informed
the chief of BuAer and the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations that an analysis by
BuShips engineers “has determined that a steam catapult installation of the [British]
type . . . is technically feasible in the CV 9 Class [Essex] conversions, the CVB 41 [Mid-
way] Class conversions, and the CVB 59 [Forrestal] Class new construction.”88 The staff
of BuShips at once began planning a series of conferences on how best to procure and
then install the British steam catapult. On 21 February, the Chief of Naval Operations
approved a further series of tests of the British catapult at Philadelphia. The goal of
these additional tests was to find out whether the BXS.1’s performance could be
improved by simply increasing the steam pressure used.89 It was so improved, and the
U.S. Navy decided in April 1952 to purchase the manufacturing rights for the RN’s
steam catapult. An American contractor was hard at work developing pilot models for
the USN by March 1953.90 In December 1953, Captain Brown was awarded the Navy
League Award of Merit for his work as Director, Ships Installation Division, in BuAer.91
Work with the new steam catapults at sea began in the late spring of 1954 and contin-
ued through the rest of that year on the Essex-class carriers Hancock and Intrepid.92
We have worked through the story of HMS Perseus and the steam catapult in detail in
order to highlight how organizational factors—particularly organizational structure
and process—influence innovation and the diffusion of innovation. Organizations are
effective to the degree that their standard operating procedures allow the personnel
governed by those procedures to
• Formulate programs of action
• Identify discrepancies between what they anticipate and what they see when they
take action
• Adapt, if necessary, future action to reach the organization’s goals.
When we began our study, we wondered whether the creation of the office of the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Aviation in 1943 might have inhibited innova-
tion in U.S. naval aviation after World War II by separating the makers of aviation pol-
icy from the officers charged with aviation procurement and with the fitting on carriers
of equipment that would allow carriers to operate modern jet aircraft effectively. It is
clear to us that the leaders of BuAer aggressively pursued high-performance aircraft.93
But did this pursuit—this focus on aircraft power plants and supersonic flight—keep
BuAer from paying enough attention to shipboard catapults, arresting gear, and flight
deck barriers? The answer seems to be no.
Engineers in the organizations that made up the Naval Air Material Center tried very
hard to fit arresting gear, barricades and barriers, and carrier catapults to the new
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aircraft. Plans to modify the Essex-class carriers for heavier aircraft with higher landing
speeds were made toward the end of World War II;94 BuShips and BuAer continued that
planning after the war ended. So why did the USN have to borrow the steam catapult,
the angled flight deck, and the mirror landing aid from the Royal Navy? Was it because
NAMC’s engineers didn’t see the problems associated with mating high-performance
jet aircraft with carriers? It would be tempting to say that the Naval Aircraft Factory
(even NAMC generally) failed as an organization. But a review of the evidence by Prof.
William F. Trimble of Auburn University suggests otherwise.95 Was it because the USN
lacked effective professional contacts with the RN? No. There was often a very intensive
back-and-forth between the two navies.
In 1948, for example, there were several senior Royal Navy staff officers serving as liai-
son officers in support of Rear Admiral Combs, then the deputy chief of BuAer.96 They
were joined in November of that year by two senior RN civilian engineers. As the engi-
neers later noted in their report of their trip, “We obtained a mass of information,
drawings and pamphlets, including the only set of plans of C.V.A. 58 [the carrier
United States] outside America.”97 BuShips also provided the visitors with the plans for
modernizing the Essex-class carrier Oriskany, which was incomplete at the end of
World War II and was finally completed at the end of 1950 to a postwar standard, with
a strengthened flight deck, stronger catapults, and new antiaircraft guns.98 In their turn,
the RN engineers gave the USN information and drawings of the control valve of the
carrier Ark Royal’s arresting gear.99 There were also useful exchanges regarding what
were known as “safety barriers” to the RN engineers, who were surprised, for example,
that the idea for a water brake for steam catapults was “quite new to the Americans.”100
But they were pleased with what their USN counterparts had learned about strengthen-
ing aircraft arresting-gear hooks to bear the loads imposed by increasingly heavy air-
craft, and they were impressed with the relatively low landing speeds of the McDonnell
F2H Banshee and the North American FJ-1 Fury. As they asserted, “there is no doubt
that the Americans have a much more effective control of the landing speeds of their
Naval aircraft than we have for our own.”101
Exchanges were not always so productive. The quality of the exchange depended a great
deal on the personalities on both sides, but the cooperation was extensive. In late June
and early July 1953, for example, the “Officer-in-Charge of the [RN’s] School of Air-
craft Handling, the Senior Instructor, and a party of twenty senior ratings of the School
of Aircraft Handling” went aboard carrier Antietam to observe operations with the
ship’s new angled deck.102 This delegation was impressed with a number of the aircraft
handling procedures used on Antietam and made a number of recommendations.103
The RN also had a copy of the 5 February 1953 report from Antietam’s commanding
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officer to the type commander for aircraft, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.104 The report was sent to
London by the RN staff serving on the British Joint Services Mission in Washington.
If there was extensive sharing of information between the RN and the USN, and if the
creation of the DCNO (Air) position within the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions did not isolate BuAer from OPNAV, then what was it, if anything, at the organiza-
tional level that kept the U.S. Navy from developing in parallel with the Royal Navy the
innovations that made it possible for the USN to adapt carriers to modern jet aircraft?
The two navies exchanged pilots and technical and operational information. But was
there something about the RN’s organization that gave it an edge in developing these
innovations? We don’t know. We do know that USN officers almost immediately
grasped the potential of the angled flight deck once they saw drawings of it, being
already aware of the challenges of operating jet aircraft from an axial deck. They were
ready for a solution to the many problems it created, and the angled-deck innovation
caught hold quickly within the USN. As Norman Friedman points out, the contract for
the carrier design that became Forrestal (CVA 59) was signed on 12 July 1951, over a
year before Antietam was modified for tests of the angled-deck concept. Forrestal’s
design was altered while it was being built, in 1953, as soon as OPNAV realized that the
experiments with Antietam were a success; the new carrier received both an angled deck
and steam catapults.105
One organizational factor that worked to the RN’s advantage was the creation of a spe-
cial committee by then–rear admiral Abel Smith, Chief of Naval Air Equipment, to
consider the problems of using jets on carriers. The committee sought out and evalu-
ated empirical evidence from tests and experiments. The members of this committee
included three RN captains (one was Dennis Cambell) who later attained flag rank and
Mr. Lewis Boddington, whose papers in the summer and early fall of 1945 so elo-
quently laid out the problems of operating jets from carriers.106 In effect, Rear (later
Vice) Admiral Smith put together a “winning team,” and that team more or less stayed
together—the sort of advantage that a smaller navy can have over a larger one. More-
over, because both Cambell and Boddington “were also ex-officio responsible for the
occasional carrier trial in Triumph,” it was possible to move quickly from the formation
of a concept to a test of that concept.107
The Institutional Level of Analysis
The individuals and organizations examined in our study worked within a framework
of rules and expectations set by institutions, the most important of which were the RN
and the USN. We have noted the very different expectations that applied to the RN and
the USN after World War II. Specifically, the RN did not have the mission of nuclear
strike, or even what the U.S. Navy aviators referred to as “heavy attack.” In a
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memorandum written in November 1952, Rear Adm. Arleigh Burke (later admiral and
Chief of Naval Operations), the head of OPNAV’s strategic plans division, argued to
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations that “the British do not believe in, nor do they
know how to conduct, fast carrier task force operations.”108 In some sense, this was true,
and it is a sign of the different expectations that the U.S. Navy had of its aviation arm.
But because of this, the RN may have found it easier to think about jets on carriers.
Eric Brown, the RN’s deservedly famous test pilot, recalled years later that he first flew
a jet airplane in May 1944, at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. After
gaining experience with the early jets, he made suggestions that were acted on in modi-
fying a de Havilland DH-100 Vampire, chosen to be the first jet flown on and off a
Royal Navy carrier. In an article he wrote for Air International many years later, he
commented that there was an air of competition with the U.S. Navy as both services
worked to modify jet aircraft for carrier operations.109 The RN had been very much in
second place behind the USN in terms of carrier operations during World War II, but
the advent of jets meant that both navies were in some sense starting from scratch in
the race to fly a jet from a carrier. As Brown recalled, the RN “won the race to be first to
operate a pure jet aircraft from a carrier, a feat that was not to be emulated by the US
Navy until seven-and-a-half months later.”110
There is a note in his remarks of the poorer but still very professional navy showing off
its talent to its richer and larger ally. But competition will lead nowhere unless there is
talent to sustain a race and rules to decide who has won, and what was common to
both navies was the emphasis on professionalism and on listening to the “real” profes-
sionals, who knew what they were doing. In our earlier book, American & British Air-
craft Carrier Development, we described just such a sense of competition tempered by
professionalism in the late 1920s, when the U.S. Navy was trying to come from second
place and overtake the Royal Navy’s lead in carrier aviation.111 We see the same evidence
of friendly competition in this case, though it was the RN that was pushing the
competition in the ’20s.
The RN may actually have found the competition easier to engage in because of the
smaller size of its air arm. Proximity can facilitate serendipitous creativity. For example,
RAE put engineers, pilots, and new jet aircraft side by side. They were all together—for
thinking, debating, working, flying, and testing. In the USN, the testing was done in
one place (Patuxent River), while the thinking tended to be done in Washington (at
BuAer and within OPNAV), and the catapult and barrier development was carried on
in Philadelphia. Just how important geography (defined as physical separation or the
lack of it) was we cannot determine, but the productive interaction among a relatively
small group of pilots and engineers at RAE is striking. What really matters, though, is
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that the interaction was governed by certain rules, especially informal ones that did not
discourage frank discussions among individuals like Boddington, Cambell, and Brown.
What is impressive on the U.S. side is the rapidity with which both the angled deck and
the mirror landing aid were adopted by the USN. Part of this was due, we are sure, to a
growth of knowledge regarding the problems involved. American naval aviators were
well aware of the hazards of using jets on an axial carrier deck, and they were also well
aware of the problems of communication between pilots and LSOs posed by the higher
landing speeds of jets. Having the angled deck and the mirror landing aid—which
actually aided LSOs—were obvious improvements. That did not mean both could be
incorporated into carrier operations quickly and effortlessly, but a preexisting consen-
sus that there is a problem can often speed resolution by focusing attention and spur-
ring remedial action. The availability of resources is also a major facilitating factor, and
the U.S. Navy, though demobilized, was not as desperately short of funds after World
War II as the RN.
We have commented already on the way in which the issues of nuclear war, military
service unification, and service roles and missions dominated the agenda of the post-
war U.S. Navy. In effect, higher-level issues created what might be thought of as a
“noisy” or “cluttered,” even “distracting,” background to discussions about adapting jets
to carriers. In our study of RN and USN carrier developments between World Wars I
and II we noted a similar problem affecting the RN before World War II. What was the
real danger facing Great Britain then? An attack from a rearmed and hostile Germany?
A confrontation with Italy over Italian military operations in Ethiopia? An attack by
Japan in the Far East? The “worst case” for the British then was a war on three fronts,
and that is exactly what they got, but the British economy could not sustain, in peace-
time, forces adequate to deter all three dangers simultaneously, and so it was difficult
for the officers leading the RN to plan effectively for future operations.
Something like that affected the USN after World War II. Senior officers had to struggle
simultaneously with a number of thorny issues. We have mentioned demobilization,
service unification, and the responsibility for nuclear operations, but there was also
what came to be called the Cold War, the creation of the Defense Department, the hot
war in Korea, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the
deployment of the fighting power of the U.S. fleet to the western Pacific and the Medi-
terranean. One crisis or dramatic change followed another.112 As retired Navy captain
Peter Swartz noted some years ago, “the pace in the U.S. Navy in the first postwar
decade was hectic—even frenetic—operationally, organizationally, and technically.”113
What sustained the U.S. Navy during this time was its commitment to professionalism,
which meant a commitment to fairly and reasonably evaluating the evidence of tests
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and experiments. Professionalism also implied a willingness to adopt proven innova-
tions, even if they were developed—as indeed they were in this case—by another navy.
Stephen Roskill put it very well in his discussion of the disagreements within the Brit-
ish government over the issue of transferring naval aviation personnel from the RAF
and to the RN in 1936 and 1937: “How extraordinarily difficult it was to frame sound
policy as long as experience was confined to theoretical argument backed only by the
sometimes dubiously valid experience of peacetime exercises.”114 Both navies in our
story had officers who well understood this. War experience had demonstrated a lot,
yet both navies had to look beyond that immediate experience and make some hard
choices for the futures of their respective air arms. Both could do this difficult task,
because both possessed officers who were seasoned professionals—who had the ability
to evaluate evidence because they could generate evidence through analysis,
demonstrations, experiments, and exercises.
Moreover, the links between the two navies were strong. The end of World War II, and
especially the end of Lend-Lease, did not shut down the many organizational and per-
sonal contacts that had grown up during the war. People and ideas went back and
forth. We have mentioned aviation exchanges, but information regarding steam boilers,
steam turbines, fuel filters, electrical systems, submarine propulsion, sonobuoys, and
even midget submarines was routinely exchanged and shared.115
There were definitely policy differences between the two governments that affected their
respective navies, especially when it came to the U.S. government’s efforts to encourage
postwar European rearmament. In 1952, for example, the British service chiefs agreed
that the United Kingdom could not “afford the American technique of building up
large naval forces to support continental land battles,” and that the role of the Royal
Navy was to “keep open communications.”116 But two governments can have policy dif-
ferences while their respective navies can continue cooperating. Away from the atten-
tion of the media, communication and exchanges can and do continue unabated. As
Captain Swartz puts it, after World War II “U.S. Navy leaders appreciated British tech-
nological prowess and exploited that strength, even when budget problems prevented
the Royal Navy from doing so.”117
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Conclusion
The story of the development of the steam catapult, the angled flight deck, and the
mirror landing aid—the innovations that made the modern aircraft carrier possible
after World War II—is usually given little attention in general histories of the U.S.
Navy.1 We believe that this relative lack of attention is in fact a sign that senior U.S.
Navy officers were confronted by so many new developments—in technology, strategy,
and operations—after World War II that the Navy as an institution had difficulty find-
ing time to deal adequately with them all. The stories behind the three innovations that
we have studied look insignificant when compared to the debates over service responsi-
bilities and unification or the arguments within the U.S. government regarding what
became known as the Cold War. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon argued almost forty
years ago that attention, not information, is the really scarce resource in complex orga-
nizations. As historians of the U.S. Navy’s actions and policies after World War II have
found, Navy leaders were constantly time pressured.2
Looking at the Evidence
Moreover, the way the Navy was managed changed during World War II. In our earlier
comparative study of British and American carrier aviation, we identified three organi-
zations that played the key roles in the development of the U.S. Navy’s carrier arm: the
Bureau of Aeronautics, the General Board of the Navy, and the Naval War College.3 Of
the three, only one—BuAer—retained a central role in the development of postwar
carrier aviation, and its influence in the process of developing naval aviation policy was
much diminished. The primary organizational actor after World War II was the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations. But officers in OPNAV had to develop Navy policy in
a number of other significant areas as well, including nuclear war and deterrence, ser-
vice unification, and when and how Navy task forces would be deployed on a regular
and recurring basis to the western Pacific and the Mediterranean.
The quality of officers assigned to OPNAV somewhat made up for the lack of multiple
organizational “actors,” but the Navy nonetheless lacked in 1946 what an earlier gener-
ation of Navy leaders had possessed in 1926, which was a systematic means of identify-
ing conceptual errors and possibilities. In the 1920s, Navy doctrinal development began
at the Naval War College, where existing and possible doctrines for fleet deployment
were tested in rigorous war games. Inferences drawn from the war games were then
tested in the annual “fleet problems,” where the U.S. fleet was divided into two
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“teams” and the “teams” engaged in operational maneuvers and mock battles.4 The
results of the fleet problems were funneled back to both the Naval War College and the
Navy’s technical bureaus, such as BuAer. Thus the Navy had a rolling cycle of concept
development, war gaming, tests of concepts at sea in major maneuvers, and post–fleet
problem assessment. Then there were more war games, fleet problems, and postexercise
assessment.5
This rolling cycle was complemented by the way the General Board conducted secret
hearings on ship design and other issues of interest to the senior civilian and military
leaders of the Navy. In the hearings, those called to testify were asked to present evi-
dence to support their claims, and the members of the General Board encouraged those
present to voice their views and to disagree when they felt the evidence could be inter-
preted in a different way. In effect, the board’s rules of procedure for its very confiden-
tial hearings promoted and sanctioned a give-and-take regarding problems of strategy,
technology, and doctrine. The board kept a stenographic record of its hearings, and
that record was made available to both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations. The combination of the give-and-take at the hearings and the ability of the
CNO and the secretary to monitor that debate gave the Navy an effective organiza-
tional tool in Washington to identify problems and then weigh the value of potential
solutions. That organizational tool complemented the institutional tool of the cycle of
war game/fleet problem/maneuver assessment used in the 1920s and 1930s.6
These tools were not available after World War II. Major policy and doctrinal issues
had to be dealt with by officers assigned to OPNAV. Though the quality of these officers
was high, the organizational distance between them and the engineering specialists
charged with, for example, adapting aircraft carriers to jets was great.7 If a particular
issue mattered enough, that distance could be closed. That was clearly the case with the
development of the AJ Savage nuclear-capable bomber, first ordered in June 1946 and
first flown just over two years later. But officers in OPNAV could not deal effectively
with every problem facing the Navy after the war. For example, Captain George B.
Chafee, the director of BuAer’s Ships Installation Division, gave a speech in 1947 in
which he acknowledged that the effort to develop new barriers on existing axial-deck
carriers that would safely handle jet aircraft “has been the No. 1 priority project at the
Naval Air Material Center for nearly 2 years.”8 Chafee also admitted that “designs of
future aircraft are being hampered to a degree by catapult capacity,” though he also
noted that the Naval Air Material Center was working on a slotted-tube device.9 Chafee
informed his listeners that the aircraft elevators of future carriers would need to be “of
the deck-edge type,” and that they would need to be able to lift a 60,000-pound aircraft.
Aircraft hangars on carriers would have to be larger to accommodate the bigger planes,
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and large jet bombers would “require so much fuel that it will be necessary to double
the stowage capacity of carriers.”10
Chafee’s list of new requirements for future carriers suggests the need to design the car-
rier to the aircraft, yet he also told his audience that the AJ Savage “was designed
around the Midway class characteristics.” The design of this aircraft did not provoke a
reassessment of the way in which carriers were designed because the Savage “was
conceived as a plane for a special operation with no requirement for entry into the
hangar.”11 Reading this speech in hindsight, we wanted to shout, “You need to redesign
the whole flight deck! Stop adapting and start innovating!” The signs of a major prob-
lem are there, from the inability to develop a satisfactory barrier to the limits of
hydraulic catapults, and from the need for dramatically more fuel to the need to find
ways to load new and larger (10,000 and 12,000 lb.) bombs. But Captain Chafee made
it clear that BuAer was constrained both by a lack of funds and by the need to examine
wholly new concepts, including “the submarine aircraft carrier and the airplane aircraft
carrier,” pilotless aircraft, and guided missiles.12 Put another way, there was almost too
much on the Naval Air Material Center’s plate.
The engineers and other specialists responsible for the new carriers and for the aircraft-
related equipment on the new ships believed that incremental improvements to exist-
ing technologies would work satisfactorily with the new aircraft being developed. It
took OPNAV intervention—when Rear Admiral Soucek dealt with CNOs Sherman and
Fechteler—to shove the engineers in a new direction.
As we have shown, matters were different in the Royal Navy. Senior RN officers recog-
nized the deficiencies in their aircraft carrier forces during World War II and then set
aside the past and grasped the nature of the future, seeing the necessity for jet aircraft
in their postwar carrier force. As they did this, the engineers in the United Kingdom
charged with developing catapults and arresting gear realized that operating jet aircraft
from a carrier meant changing the carrier. The engineers were able to show a logical
progression from “Jets are the future” to “The carrier must be suited to jets.” That logi-
cal progression led to a set of interrelated problems, including efforts safely to recover
the jets, which landed at higher speeds than propeller planes, and the adoption of the
steam catapult, which was needed by the jets because they accelerated more slowly than
propeller-driven aircraft. Because the first jets consumed so much fuel compared with
their propeller-driven predecessors, engineer Lewis Boddington and his colleagues at
Farnborough worked to adapt the carrier to jets that lacked landing gear, hoping that
the weight saved by eliminating the landing gear could be devoted to fuel. The impera-
tive to conserve fuel led to the undercarriage-less airplane, which led to the flexible
deck, which led to the angled deck.
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When we first looked at the evidence, it appeared that the Royal Navy’s invention of the
angled deck was the result of an accident. In some sense, that was a consequence of the
way that Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, RN (Ret.), told the story of its adoption.13
However, as Geoffrey Cooper’s detailed Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm shows,
Boddington and his colleagues had laid the groundwork for the angled-deck idea
through their careful work on the “flexdeck” concept and prototype.14 For that reason,
we choose to consider the angled deck less an accidental discovery than a serendipitous
development. The terms “accidental,” “serendipitous,” and “fortuitous” are near syn-
onyms, but “accidental” suggests finding something by chance, whereas we believe that
“serendipitous” implies the ability to recognize something as new or innovative while try-
ing to solve a problem. Our point is that Boddington was prepared to perceive the impli-
cations of Cambell’s sketch design because of his earlier extensive work on the flexdeck.
The notion of serendipity also accounts for the speed with which the U.S. Navy’s avia-
tors adopted the angled-deck idea from the British. Its aviators were prepared for the
idea by their experiences landing jets on the existing axial flight decks of the Essex- and
Midway-class carriers. The USN’s carrier aviators in OPNAV were already committed
to modifying a number of Essex-class carriers for jet aircraft operations, and so they
were open to, and even eager for, ideas that they could “borrow.”
Contrast that situation to the initial resistance of BuAer’s catapult engineers to the
British steam catapult. The Americans were strongly committed to an explosive or gas-
driven catapult design, because they could not see a workable solution to the seepage of
steam from a slotted-tube catapult. Indeed, when the Navy tested steam catapults on
the Essex-class carrier Hancock (CVA 19) under operational conditions off San Diego,
California, in July
1954, the jet aircraft
being launched were
usually enveloped by
clouds of steam from
the catapults. It took
time for an effective
seal to be developed
that would work with
the higher-pressure
steam generated by
the U.S. carriers’ pro-
pulsion plants. As we
have pointed out,
BuAer catapult
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The first test of a U.S. Navy steam catapult at sea, July 1954. USS Hancock (CVA 19) is
launching . . . what? The plane is completely obscured by steam leaking from the catapult.
Navy Department, National Archives
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engineers continued to consider the British steam catapults only an interim solution to
the problem of launching very heavy bombers from carriers.
But the BuAer engineers were not in charge of USN aviation policy. It was aviators like
Rear Adm. Apollo Soucek who identified the steam catapult as a viable alternative to the
hydraulic systems used in U.S. carriers, and it was apparently a senior aviator—Vice
Adm. John J. Ballentine, the type commander for aviation in the Atlantic—who
insisted that the steam catapult be adopted. In the case of the mirror landing aid, we
find a similar pattern. Both navies had been experimenting with new ways of guiding
the faster jets safely to carrier flight decks, and hence the U.S. Navy was “ready” to con-
sider a system that complemented or replaced the landing signal officers then employed
on carriers. When Lt. Cdr. Donald Engen tested the British “optical landing system” on
HMS Illustrious in November 1953, his recommendation was enough to convince
senior officers to procure it for use on U.S. carriers. Engen was then one of two U.S.
Navy pilots assigned to the famous Empire Test Pilot school at Farnborough, and both
were directed to test British innovations.15
Our study has examined both innovations and adaptations. At the end of World War II,
the Royal Navy’s engineers at Farnborough decided that the introduction of jet aircraft
would require an innovation in carrier design—a different kind of carrier suited to the
characteristics (landing speed, takeoff speed, fuel consumption rate, etc.) of the new jet
aircraft. The U.S. Navy’s counterparts to the engineers at Farnborough decided that
their task was to adapt existing carriers and aircraft-handling equipment to the new jet
aircraft. But the senior aviators in OPNAV were innovators; they wanted to create
“heavy attack” jet bombers that could carry the large and heavy nuclear weapons that
had been used in World War II. Launching and recovering those bombers required a
very different approach to a carrier’s flight deck and its equipment.
The Royal Navy’s aviators and its engineers shared a common vision and also shared an
understanding of the obstacles that would have to be overcome to turn that vision into
reality. We do not see that same level of shared vision on the U.S. side, except between
the Navy’s aviators and the aircraft designers in industry. Perhaps one reason for the
apparent gap between aviators in OPNAV and the catapult engineers in BuAer was that
the two groups were not in constant contact, as the BuAer aviators were with industry
aircraft designers and engineers. The human, or personal, link between aviator officers
in OPNAV and BuAer, on the one side, and BuAer catapult engineers, on the other, was
weak—probably too weak for the innovators to challenge and stimulate the engineers
who thought their task was to adapt.
In World War II, Adm. Ernest J. King shunted aside the Naval War College and the
General Board. Major decisions about acquisition and the future of the Navy were to be
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made within OPNAV, which meant that innovative proposals from the fleet or from
BuAer had to catch the attention of the senior admirals there in order to be evaluated.
As Friedman has shown, the origins of the Navy’s heavy and large carrier-aircraft attack
program stemmed from a detailed memorandum sent by the BuAer chief, Rear Adm.
Harold B. Sallada, to the CNO in December 1945.16 Adm. Marc Mitscher, then the Dep-
uty Chief of Naval Operations for Air, was a strong supporter of Rear Admiral Sallada’s
recommendation and also of a flush-deck carrier concept suited to the new and as yet
undeveloped large carrier bombers.17 The General Board still operated in late 1945,
but it did not play the same analytic role that it had before the war, and therefore
Mitscher’s support was essential if the Navy’s leaders were to endorse the heavy-attack
concept for carrier aircraft.
With the end of the prewar war-game/fleet-problem/problem-assessment cycle, the
process of carrier-concept development was open to influence from officers in OPNAV,
BuAer, and the fleet. Disciplining this process was left in the hands of a new organiza-
tion of bureau representatives called the Ship Characteristics Board (SCB), and major
decisions taken by this board were decided by voting—one vote for each bureau,
including the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.18 In the immediate postwar years, the
members of the SCB, as well as the OPNAV staff, were officers with wartime opera-
tional experience. The same went for the chiefs of BuAer. That shared experience gave
the members of the SCB and the staff of OPNAV a shared set of reference points—a
common grounding. But that common grounding did not lead to a carrier design built
around heavy-attack aircraft until serious planning for the “supercarrier” United States
began in June 1946.19 Put another way, the postwar carrier program was more a prod-
uct of the views of senior officers than it was the result of back-and-forth before the
General Board based on consideration of systematically gathered evidence. And those
senior officers in OPNAV decided after World War II that they would not concede the
nuclear strike mission to the Army (later Air Force) land-based bomber commanders.
It is ironic that BuAer, which had lost its policy-making responsibilities to OPNAV dur-
ing the war, nonetheless continued after the war as an organization with major influ-
ence within the Navy, because Navy aviation leaders like Admiral Mitscher came out of
the war convinced of the importance of the heavy-attack mission. In effect, the require-
ment for a carrier aircraft that could carry large (ten-thousand-pound and more)
bombs merged with the desire of Navy aviators for a carrier-based nuclear bomber. As
Lewis Boddington had decided in the summer of 1945, it was time that the characteris-
tics of the carrier’s aircraft determined the design of the carrier. The result in the U.S.
Navy was the large but canceled United States and the later somewhat smaller but still
very large Forrestal (CVA 59).
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In 1944–45, the Royal Navy considered the U.S. Navy the world leader in aircraft carrier
technology and operations, and thus the last wartime British carrier design, for the
never-built Malta class, was inspired by U.S. Navy carrier characteristics, which facili-
tated the rapid launching and recovery of multiple strike missions. When the RN was
forced by financial limitations to rebuild its existing carriers instead of constructing
new ones, it made efforts to incorporate such U.S. Navy features as the deck-edge eleva-
tor, which greatly simplified the flow of aircraft between the hangar and flight decks.20
The two navies diverged, however, when in 1949 the British chiefs of staff rejected an
RN proposal that its carriers be given the nuclear-strike mission.
By that time, the mission of RN carriers was well understood. They would shield ship-
ping en route from the United States and Canada from attack by Soviet surface war-
ships and land-based attack aircraft. RN carrier aircraft could also intercept Soviet
minelaying aircraft trying to close European and British ports. To perform these mis-
sions RN carrier aircraft had to have the necessary range, hence the strong interest by
Lewis Boddington in carrier fighters without landing gear.
The strategic context in which engineers such as Boddington and officers like Dennis
Cambell worked was a classified planning assumption that the Soviet Union would not
be capable of attacking Western Europe until 1957. In British parlance, 1957 became
the “year of maximum danger.” This assumption mattered, because it allowed time for
the British economy—as well as the Soviet economy—to recover from World War II.
Once the economy was back on its feet, the British assumed, their military services
would have the funds to purchase quantities of advanced weapons. Until then the Brit-
ish would invest in research and development and, they hoped, stay in roughly the
same technological league as the comparatively wealthy Americans. When the Soviet
Union tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, however, the “year of maximum danger”
seemed much closer. When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, military
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic feared that the Korean conflict might be the first
round of World War III. The United States was already rearming and quickly increasing
its spending on research, development, and acquisition. The British government could
not do the same.
The steam catapult, angled flight deck, and optical landing aid made Forrestal an effec-
tive carrier and a strategic weapon. However, by the mid-1950s (the end point for our
research), the size and weight of nuclear bombs had been dramatically reduced; it no
longer took a massive (eighty-two-thousand-pound loaded weight) aircraft like the
Douglas A3D Skywarrior to deliver nuclear weapons. New “tactical” nuclear weapons
could be carried by such fighters as the North American FJ-4B Fury, and a lightweight
attack plane—the Douglas A4D Skyhawk—was designed specifically for nuclear
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attack.21 Deep attack, however, did still require a large, supersonic airplane, and for that
purpose the North American A3J Vigilante was supposed to serve as the successor to
the A3D. However, by the mid-1950s the Navy had another way to deliver strategic
nuclear weapons—the Regulus cruise missile. As Naval Warfare Publication 10, Naval
Warfare, noted in 1954, “Newer submarines have been equipped with missiles and will
provide a tremendous strategic deterrent capability to our Navy.”22
The first Navy Long-Range Objectives Group (Op-96) study, completed in 1955, envis-
aged a fleet using such missiles for long-range attack, hence no longer requiring heavy
bombers—or heavy carriers.23 In effect, just as the new carriers were entering service, it
seemed, they and their heavy-attack aircraft would soon be unnecessary. But as it
happened, the combination of the large carrier and the heavy-attack bomber had kept
alive the heavy-attack mission itself long enough for the Navy to demonstrate the stra-
tegic value of its dispersed nuclear striking force. Within five years, the Navy shifted
from reliance upon heavy-attack aircraft for the nuclear-strike mission to air-breathing
cruise missiles and then to ballistic missile–launching submarines.
But the large carriers survived, because fleet air defense required carriers to operate
large, high-performance fighters, and the newer, heavier fighters were every bit as
demanding of flight-deck equipment as the heavy-attack aircraft. They were probably
even more demanding in terms of landing requirements. The F-14, at a loaded weight
of fifty-five to sixty thousand pounds, was three times as heavy as a loaded Douglas
AD-2 Skyraider and about 70 percent as heavy as a loaded North American RA-5C Vig-
ilante. The routine of bringing it back aboard a carrier would not have been possible
without the angled
flight deck and the
optical landing aid.
These innovations,
along with the steam
catapult, made it pos-
sible for the large car-
rier to continue to
field modern, high-
performance aircraft.
Lessons
In his Military Trans-
formation Past and
Present, Mark D.
Mandeles observes
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A Regulus-1 air-breathing, long-range missile catapulted from Hancock in 1957. The trolley
holding the missile and pulled by the steam catapult is lost when the missile is launched.
Navy Department, National Archives
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that “in the real-life world of people in organizations considering military problems,
nothing is simple.” Moreover, “risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity are constant compan-
ions,” and therefore the “key to unlocking the process of innovation is attention to
multiple sets of relationships among individuals, organizations, and multiorganiza-
tional systems.”24 Our study has followed this plan; we have examined the actions of
individuals, how individuals have influenced the organizations in which they have
worked, and the interactions of different organizations.
One obvious “lesson learned” from this study is that it is difficult for people working in
a complex organization like the Navy to identify correctly a technical or tactical prob-
lem unless they have procedures and organizations that facilitate their doing so. This is
particularly important when—as was the case for the USN after World War II—an
organization is confronted almost simultaneously with multiple challenges. So we find
that BuAer approached the problem of developing effective and efficient jet engines the
way it had approached the problem of developing powerful and reliable piston engines
in the 1920s and 1930s—by financing engine development. The new jet engines were
provided to the airframe manufacturers as “government furnished equipment.”
OPNAV, which after the war was the center of aviation policy making, did not object to
BuAer’s relying on an established method of engine procurement. OPNAV officers also
did not object when BuAer proposed testing the RN’s flexdeck. There were established,
reliable procedures for testing new equipment.
On its part, the RN had a system of committees to review wartime experience and
anticipate postwar requirements. Norman Friedman has discovered that the Aircraft
Design Subcommittee of the RN’s Future Building Committee initiated the study of
aircraft without landing gear and the use of flexible carrier-landing decks.25 Once the
subcommittee had identified that possibility as legitimate, Lewis Boddington could
begin the studies that led to his papers in the summer of 1945 on what modifica-
tions to carriers would be necessary in order to operate jets from them successfully.
Boddington’s papers did not result from a flash of individual insight. They were based
on a good deal of quantitative analysis conducted over a period of several months in
pursuit of a possibility approved by a standing committee of experienced officers. But
what guided that analysis was a consensus among the relevant military and civilian per-
sonnel that jets were the future and that bringing them on board aircraft carriers would
be difficult and quite dangerous unless a different approach to landing was developed.
The subcommittee’s deliberations were essential to developing that consensus.
In the U.S. Navy, by contrast, it took longer for a similar consensus to emerge. One
reason was that there were significant “distractors,” including competing problems that
ate up the time and energy of the people charged with making the transition from
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piston-engine aircraft to jets. Perhaps the most important of these was the desire to
turn carriers into nuclear-strike platforms. Related to this distractor was another—the
larger debate about the proper organization of national defense in the United States
after World War II. There were still others, including the USN’s role in what became
NATO, whether the Navy would have what are now called “forward-deployed forces,”
and, of course, the war in Korea.26
For example, why wasn’t Rear Adm. Alfred Pride, BuAer chief (May 1947–May 1951) in
the critical years after World War II, more concerned about the bureau’s catapult pro-
gram? When the first jets came in, he went down to the Naval Air Test Center to fly
one, and he stayed actively involved in BuAer’s engine and supersonic-aircraft develop-
ment efforts. It was under his leadership that BuAer spent scarce funds on some very
innovative and secret carrier-launched nuclear bomber designs.27 Though Rear Admiral
Pride had made his mark as a young officer by designing catapults, as BuAer chief his
concern was more effective aircraft. One reason—perhaps the main reason—for that
concern was the need to show that the Navy’s new carrier (the ill-fated United States
program) and even its modified Essex carriers could launch nuclear-weapon-armed
bombers that could rival or exceed the performance of bombers being fielded and
designed by the U.S. Air Force. But another reason for his focus on aircraft was the lack
of what might be called an “integrating mechanism,” an organization like the General
Board that, through its investigations, could look across different areas of technology
and operations.
What else have we learned? We have learned something obvious, something so very
obvious that people usually don’t stop to consider it—the value of experimentation. The
perception of a need to experiment and an imperative to learn from experimentation
are critical to innovation. The classic illustration is the visit of HMS Perseus to the
United States in 1952. The USN spent funds (by 1952 not so scarce as before the
Korean War) to bring the ship to the United States and support it and its crew during
critical experiments in Philadelphia and Norfolk, in an episode we have already
described. What is so impressive is the willingness of all the professionals involved to
accept the results. The USN catapult experts were concerned that the British steam cat-
apult would not work using steam at six-hundred-pound pressure, so the USN sup-
plied steam at that higher pressure, and Colin C. Mitchell’s steam catapult was tested
once more—again successfully. That was it. The steam catapult became the primary
U.S. carrier catapult, from being an alternative to what BuAer’s catapult developers had
been working on. Experiments cost money. They take time. They must be carefully
planned. But they are priceless as tools for learning—and for convincing the stubborn
that something they think little of can actually work.
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We have also learned that innovations will be communicated faster if there is an exist-
ing “track” to take them from one organization or institution to another. In this case,
the track was built during World War II, through the close cooperation between BuAer
and the British Mission in Washington, through the Joint Aircraft Committee. Much of
the credit for this goes, we believe, to then–rear admiral John H. Towers, who was
BuAer chief.28 But the track was maintained by a whole crowd of military and civilian
officials engaged in the war effort. Some of them kept up their contacts after the war.
For example, Rear Adm. James S. Russell, who was BuAer chief in 1955, was a good
friend of Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, and Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, already
mentioned as keenly interested in the steam catapult in 1952, made sure that Antietam
went to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1953 so that Fleet Air Arm pilots could
get some exposure to landing and taking off from an angled deck.
Maintaining this track, or path, has become harder as innovation has shifted out of
government organizations and into private ones. Recent studies of defense cooperation
have focused on the policy-making role of government rather than on its role as an
innovator.29 Or they have emphasized the “global context” within which defense indus-
tries must compete and work.30 Put bluntly, private, even semipublic, manufacturers
and research establishments take great risks in communicating innovations with their
present or perhaps future business rivals. Recent policies for “outsourcing” in the
United States have therefore probably reduced the likelihood that multiple tracks for
communicating innovations will exist. After the Cold War, the going assumption in
Washington was that much of Europe’s defense industry would wither for lack of fund-
ing and that therefore there was little need for a clear link with the research and devel-
opmental organizations of allies. Put another way, the advocates of outsourcing in the
United States have assumed that there is little to be learned from even close allies, such
as the United Kingdom—despite the cases we have described (as well as others,
including the Martin-Baker ejection seat, midair refueling, and the submarine-
launched Harpoon).
In an age when aircraft are flown by software, those who doubt the value of close con-
tacts with allies in the development of high-tech sensors, software, and weapons may
be right, though we have our doubts. Software development is still very much a matter
of lines of code, and a relatively small number of firms control the production of code
relevant to the operation of manned and unmanned aircraft from aircraft carriers.
Indeed, the military may today be doing as good a job as private industry in contract-
ing for the production of reliable software for aircraft and carriers. It is very hard to
know for sure. We do know that “military professionalism” in modern navies, as
understood by the professional officers of those navies, includes an emphasis on
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experiments, technological education, and open-mindedness. These traits were essen-
tial to navies in the years right after World War II. We believe that they still are.
At the end of an earlier book, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–
1941, we noted that the U.S. Navy mastered carrier strike aviation as it went along,
using experimentation (including war games at the Naval War College) and fleet exer-
cises to develop, refine, and even sometimes cast off carrier operating concepts. We did
not find the same pattern in postwar U.S. Navy aviation. Postwar, the naval forces of
the United States continued a practice that had been required by war—forward deploy-
ment. The agenda, the mission, of U.S. naval aviation changed dramatically—from tak-
ing on an enemy carrier force to launching nuclear strikes against the heart of the
Soviet Union. But the way in which the Navy explored problems changed too. Postwar,
there was no longer a concentrated fleet that could divide itself in half to try out new
tactics and operational concepts in exercises that set one half of the fleet against the
other. Postwar, the Naval War College did not resume its role as an “idea generator” or
“idea filter” through the use of extensive and repeated war games. Instead, ideas came
from officers in OPNAV, from the fleet, from test centers (like that at Patuxent,
Maryland), and from industry reacting to “seed money” sowed by BuAer. This was a
confusing and almost disorganized situation, especially given the high level of secrecy
that cloaked information about nuclear weapons. The amazing thing is that this
disorganized, ad hoc process led to a carrier force that was effective throughout the
Cold War.
Why was that? First, both the RN and the USN had some wonderfully talented profes-
sionals, from test pilots like Eric Brown to engineers like Lewis Boddington, to aircraft
designers such as Edward Heinemann, and on to naval officers like the relatively junior
Donald Engen and the senior Arthur Radford. Second, both navies had the benefit of
the talent that aircraft manufacturers and their own organizations (such as BuAer) had
trained during the war. Third, both benefited from having test centers, wind tunnels,
and other facilities (to say nothing of the carriers themselves) that had been built with
wartime funds. This “stuff ” is called “infrastructure,” and it matters.
Finally, leadership matters, and at multiple levels. It is difficult to follow all the twists
and turns involved in the development of the modern carrier in the U.S. Navy.
Forrestal, the modern carrier prototype, was developed, and it “worked”—but it was
not a sure thing. There again were multiple and pressing “distractors.” There was even
the possibility that key individuals, like Eric Brown, would be killed or seriously injured
in flying accidents.31 It was impossible to say at the end of 1945 just how things would
come out ten years later. Very different people pushed things along in ways that could
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not have been predicted beforehand. The idea that certain technology developments
are preordained is mistaken.
Some of the leaders in our story were relatively easy to identify. There was, for example,
Rear Admiral Soucek’s monitoring of the Royal Navy’s experiments with the steam cat-
apult in 1950 and his subsequent recommendation to the Chief of Naval Operations,
Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, that the U.S. Navy pay to bring HMS Perseus to the United
States for tests. There was also the decision by Admiral Sherman’s successor, Adm.
William M. Fechteler, to take up where Sherman (who perished suddenly from heart
failure) left off. These are obvious examples of senior officials willing to take some risk
in order to solve clearly identified problems.
But there is a more subtle form of leadership, one found especially within an organiza-
tion, such as BuAer or the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, and it involves
an honest give-and-take between civilian specialists and their uniformed colleagues. In
the papers of engineer Lewis Boddington, for instance, one sees an intelligent mind at
work on a problem—working hard because the work mattered. Behind his work is the
assumption that the inferences he drew from studies, analyses, and trials would be
understood and acted on. This assumption is at the heart of a professional organization.
Because it is so widespread in truly modern navies, it can easily be taken for granted—
assumed, as it were, to exist as an essential element of modern life.
But it is not a given. The willingness (and opportunity) to listen to technical specialists
must be sustained in organizations through day-to-day leadership within those organi-
zations. We have already argued that the sharing of innovations across organizational
and institutional boundaries is not to be assumed, and neither is innovation itself, nor
the ability to know which innovations to gamble on and which to ignore. The U.S.
Navy invested in a number of innovative aviation concepts after World War II, includ-
ing the Convair XFY-1 Pogo (a vertical-takeoff-and-landing turboprop fighter intended
to be flown from the decks of cargo ships) and the very beautiful Martin P6M
SeaMaster, designed to be the world’s first supersonic, seaplane, nuclear-capable
bomber.32 In some sense, the 1920s pattern in military aviation was repeated in the late
1940s and early 1950s: airplanes showed up everywhere, as designers, engineers, and
Navy officers tried to get the greatest military benefit from the new technologies that
wartime research had spawned.
Yet there is always the danger that funds, even lavish funds, will not produce the inno-
vations that the funding sources hope for and need. Choices have to be made. A classic
case is the Grumman TB2F concept from 1942, which was abandoned in the spring of
1944 because it no longer could perform the mission for which it was designed. In the
late 1940s and early 1950s, many aircraft designs were rejected at some stage of
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development, and others did not work out well once in service. In our story, the cata-
pult designers and developers responsible to BuAer kept to their own approaches to a
catapult for jet aircraft because they thought that just a bit more effort would produce
success. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics researchers were right in that
boat with them.33
Why? It happened because there was no “test” of the available alternatives—no “forcing
function” that could show the BuAer catapult developers that there was another, better
alternative available to them. Indeed, the hydraulic catapults were actually dangerous,
as serious hydraulic fluid fires on both Leyte (CV 32) in late 1953 and Bennington (CV
20) in May 1954 showed.34 Why was that danger not foreseen? We do not know for cer-
tain, but we do know from study and experience that it is often not easy for people in
an organization to admit that what they have worked on has failed. It takes a special
kind of leadership—usually exercised through some mechanism such as the General
Board’s pre–World War II hearings—to convince them that they have.
Our last comment echoes one we made in American & British Aircraft Carrier Develop-
ment, 1919–1941. Flying is exciting. Pilots wanted to fly jets on and off carriers despite
high accident rates in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Eric Brown flew almost everything
he could climb into, and his memoir, Wings on My Sleeve, is full of accidents, near acci-
dents, and hair-raising aerial adventures. Running through the memoirs and stories
from this period in aeronautical history is a strong sense of adventure, coupled with a
grim determination to adapt jets to carriers and carriers to jets. It worked. Despite
great odds, it worked.
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Appendix A: The Physics of Jet Propulsion
Jets seemed revolutionary because instead of pulling their way through the air like pro-
pellers, they relied on the airplane’s reaction to a blast of hot gas emitted from their
nozzles. In fact the contrast in principle was not so great, because a propeller can be
seen as a fan accelerating air back over an airplane, creating a backflow just like that of
a jet engine. However, the propeller can also be understood as generating a forward
force by the flow of air over its moving blades, which are like wings turned on their
sides. This way of generating thrust gets an airplane into the air but ultimately limits
the speed of that airplane. This limit was not an issue for designers until military and
test aircraft started to reach very high speeds—above 400 mph.
In a propeller-driven plane, the movement of each propeller blade generates lift in a
direction that pushes the airplane forward. When the airplane is moving, this wing is
moving in a net direction (a combination of the forward motion of the airplane and
the rotary motion of the propeller). For a fixed pitch (propeller inclination to the
direction of the airplane), the faster the airplane the steeper is, in effect, the angle of
the propeller as it is presented to the air. Eventually the propeller, like a wing tilted too
steeply, stalls. If it is angled too close to the direction of flight, to avoid stalling, it pro-
duces too little lift (force) along the direction the airplane is flying. To make matters
worse, if the propeller is lengthened (to absorb more power) it runs the risk that the
area near the blade tips will be moving at supersonic speed, with disruptive effects on
the airflow over the rest of the blade. The practical limit for propellers appeared to be
about 500 mph, although some turboprop fighters flew considerably faster. It may be
that the 500 mph figure combined possible power outputs from piston engines with
propeller dynamics.
Because the propeller is moving even when the airplane is at rest, the propeller has a
considerable effect as soon as the engine is turned on. Even if it is mounted behind an
airplane’s wing, the propeller creates an airflow over the wing, which generates lift
before the airplane begins to move. (Once it is moving, the airflow created by the air-
plane’s forward movement is soon dominant.) A jet engine has less effect when the air-
plane is at rest, although it maintains its thrust as the engine moves faster and faster. It
is fair to say, therefore, that there are two ways of understanding the phenomenon of
lift. One way is to think about the low pressure generated on top of a wing because the
air flows more quickly there (Bernoulli’s principle). But it is also possible to think
about the downward thrust created by a wing as it moves through the air (hence the
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:11 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
wing-in-ground effect). If you think that an airplane rises because it creates a down-
ward thrust of air, then you are not too far from seeing a propeller as a generator of
thrust. If you think that an airplane is, in effect, sucked upward, then you probably
view a propeller as a means of carving a screw path through the sky. Hence you might
be more open to the suggestion that a jet turbine can do in a different way just what a
propeller does. But not many engineers thought this way before World War II.
It is also difficult to compare jet and piston engines directly. Power (e.g., horse-
power) is force multiplied by speed. For a jet, the conversion factor is that a pound of
thrust equals one horsepower at 375 mph. Thus at that speed an airplane with a five-
thousand-pound-thrust engine is developing the equivalent of five thousand horse-
power, well beyond what any fighter-grade piston engine could do. On the other hand,
the same thrust is equivalent to far less power at low speeds, and carrier aircraft needed
power at low speeds if they were given “waveoffs” by landing signal officers.
U.S. engine builders, mainly Allison, Pratt & Whitney, and Wright, concentrated on
highly successful piston engines. As abroad, there was no service pressure demanding
speeds so great that such engines could not provide them. The jet pioneers abroad had
to push very hard on closed doors to get official backing, as Britain’s Frank Whittle dis-
covered. Moreover, the main new area of aviation engine development in the United
States in the late 1930s was the turbo-supercharger, which made it possible for piston
engines to function effectively at high altitudes by compressing the “thin” air. The first
such devices were tested during World War I, and their descendants made it possible
for aircraft such as the B-17 to fly at unprecedented altitudes, which seemed to offer
them near immunity to interception by enemy fighters, though during World War II
that did not turn out to be altogether true.
Some aircraft researchers certainly were interested in high-speed flight, but their ideas
were generally rejected as visionary. Historians of the jet revolution remark that by the
1930s some aircraft engineers were noticing that each jump in engine power seemed to
buy a smaller corresponding jump in maximum aircraft speed. Some limit was
approaching. By about 1930, seaplane racers with thin wings and propellers set for very
fine pitch (for efficiency at high speed) were exceeding 400 mph. The speed records set
at the time were not exceeded for at least a decade, suggesting that propeller planes
faced a fundamental limitation in speed. The number of engineers who thought that a
new kind of power plant would make possible much higher speeds is not clear. What is
clear is that they could not find much—if any—financial support for their research.
The push to faster fighters in the 1938 BuAer competition (which produced the power-
ful piston-engine F4U Corsair) was explained on the basis of higher performance
already being demonstrated in Europe rather than on the abstract value of higher speed
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in U.S. aircraft. That is, U.S. fighters had to outperform those they might meet, espe-
cially those flying from land bases, but there was no particular standard of perfor-
mance they had to meet and hence no pressure to create reliable turbojets.
I N N O V A T I O N I N C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N 1 7 5
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:11 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:11 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Appendix B: The Impact of Jet Aircraft on Carriers
The following table lists the carrier aircraft employed as fighter-bombers or as attack
aircraft at the close of World War II and at the beginning of the “jet age.”
The stall speed is an indicator of landing speed because carrier aircraft slowed to nearly
stall speed as they touched down on their ship’s flight deck. Higher stall speed was sig-
nificant because the energy generated by the plane on landing is the square of the land-
ing speed. It’s this energy that the carrier’s arresting gear must absorb. Before World
War II, engineers at the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics thought that 60 knots was the
maximum safe landing speed for carrier aircraft. Higher landing speeds, however, were
the inevitable and unavoidable consequence of adapting jet aircraft to carriers, and
Navy officers procuring jet aircraft knew it. The graph of “stall speed vs. prototype
year” makes the relationship clear.
AIRCRAFT YEAR PROTOTYPE ORDERED STALL SPEED (KNOTS)
F4U-4 Corsair 1938 66.9
TBM-3 Avenger 1940 63.4
SB2C-5 Helldiver 1939 66.2
F7F-3 Tigercat 1941 74.2
AD-1 Skyraider 1944 76.0
AJ-1 Savage 1946 72.4
F9F-5 Panther 1946 94.0
F7U-3 Cutlass 1946 96.0
A-3B Skywarrior 1949 99.0
A-4C Skyhawk 1952 90.4
A-5A Vigilante 1956 106.0
Sources: Norman Friedman, Carrier Air Power (New York: Rutledge, 1981), app. 2; Swanborough and Bowers, United States Navy
Aircraft since 1911.
TABLE B-1
Carrier Fighter-Bomber/Attack Aircraft at the End of World War II
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The jets also were heavier than their World War II piston-engine counterparts, as the
following table shows.
1 7 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
FIGURE B-1
Stall Speed vs. Prototype Year
AIRCRAFT YEAR
TAKEOFF WEIGHT
(LBS.)
ROLL AT 25 KNOTS
WIND OVER DECK
MAXIMUM BOMB
LOAD
F4U-4 Corsair 1944 13,597 377 ft. 1,000-lb. bomb
TBM-3 Avenger 1944 16,761 455 ft. 2,000-lb. torpedo
SB2C-5 Helldiver 1945 16,287 584 ft. 2,000-lb. bomb
F7F-3 Tigercat 1945 21,720 495 ft. 2,000-lb. torpedo
AD-1 Skyraider 1945 18,029 455 ft. Three 2,000-lb.
bombs
AJ-1 Savage 1948 49,952 720 ft. Six 1,600-lb.
bombs
F9F-5 Panther 1949 17,766 1,435 ft. Two 1,000-lb.
bombs
F7U-3 Cutlass 1951 28,173 1,650 ft. Two bombs up to
3,500 lbs. or 32
2.75-inch rockets
A-3B Skywarrior 1955 72,000 1,940 ft. 12,800 lbs.
Source: Friedman, Carrier Air Power, app. 2.
TABLE B-2
Weight Comparison
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The accompanying graphs (of takeoff weight vs. year the aircraft was deployed and
then of the roll required at 25 knots “wind over deck” [WOD] vs. the year deployed)
are based on the numbers in the preceding chart.
It’s true that the first carrier jet fighter—the FH-1 Phantom—was not, at 11,292 lbs.,
heavier than the World War II F4U Corsair (13,597 lbs.), but the FH-1 did not carry
bombs. It was strictly a fighter, and the only advantage it had over the F4U was speed.
The next jet fighter, the F2H Banshee, weighed in at 19,602 lbs., and it was heavier than
the F4U largely because it had to carry more fuel for its thirstier engines. As in the case
of many new types of aircraft of innovative design, the first models often don’t out-
match—or outmatch by much—their predecessors. The proper comparison is between
the F4U-4 and the F9F-5 Panther. Both were fighter-bombers, but the F9F-5 was both
faster than the F4U and able to carry a heavier bomb load.
The table also gives the length of roll required by the aircraft when there was a 25-knot
wind blowing over a carrier’s deck. As Norman Friedman pointed out in the book
from which this information was taken, the long takeoff roll required by the slower-
accelerating jets mandated the use of high-capacity catapults. The roll required by the
propeller-driven SB2C-5 of 1945 was 584 feet on a carrier deck that did not quite
stretch to 900 feet. But the 1,435 feet required by the Panther was simply beyond what
wartime or early postwar carrier catapults could provide.
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FIGURE B-2
Takeoff Weight vs. Year
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As we’ve noted, the Navy was aware of the difficulties of operating these heavier jet air-
craft. The table that gives the years when BuAer ordered the prototypes shows that the
Navy went into the jet age deliberately. Indeed, the Navy had already chosen to adopt
larger attack aircraft for its carriers. The F7F Tigercat, powered by twin piston engines
and weighing in at over 21,000 lbs., is clear proof of that. The AJ-1, F9F, and F7U were
ordered in 1946—before jet engine technology was reliable. All three were analogs to
existing fighters and attack aircraft. The F9F was a jet-powered F4U. The F7U was a
swept-wing, twin-engine alternative to the F9F. The AJ-1, which was originally
designed as a heavy conventional carrier bomber, was modified and rushed into pro-
duction to prove that the Navy’s carriers could conduct nuclear strikes using the heavy
and large nuclear implosion weapons.
1 8 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
FIGURE B-3
Roll at 25 Knots WOD vs. Year
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Appendix C: Problem Solving within Bureaucracies
The scholarly literature on organizations assumes that there are certain patterns of
behavior common to all complex professional organizations. If so, organizational prob-
lems found in one area will probably show up in others. But can the solutions to those
problems be the same, or similar? For example, in 1972, in a study done for RAND,
counterinsurgency expert Robert W. Komer identified what he called “the inevitable
tendency of bureaucracies to keep doing the familiar and to adapt only slowly and
incrementally” to changed circumstances.1 It might seem inappropriate for us to draw
on the rich literature on counterinsurgency for insights into our case, but we don’t
think it is. Komer was an experienced and extraordinary bureaucrat, a perceptive ana-
lyst, and a dogged problem solver. As he recognized, “atypical problems demand spe-
cially tailored solutions, not just the playing out of existing institutional repertoires.”2
Did we see that in our study of USN–RN cooperation after World War II? Yes. In effect,
the Royal Navy was in the process of reconstructing its air arm even during World
War II. Its Fleet Air Arm (FAA) was an institution “under reconstruction” while the
Royal Navy was still fighting a war. As a consequence, it was somewhat simpler than it
would have been for the Americans—if very demanding in terms of time and energy—
for the FAA to start from scratch, so to speak. The RN recognized by 1942 that its pre-
war carrier aviation program was not meeting wartime challenges. It proceeded from
that recognition to positive action with the creation of the Future Building Committee
in 1942. As we have pointed out, the way that the FBC proceeded was rather extraordi-
nary. It defined the Fleet Air Arm’s future problem, changed Royal Navy fleet doctrine
(placing the aircraft carrier at the fleet’s center), and set out a “way ahead” that
assumed the need for jet aircraft on carriers.
One of Komer’s arguments in his 1972 RAND study was that dealing with “atypical”
situations requires “setting up autonomous ad hoc organizations to manage specially
tailored programs which are not in conventional organizational repertoires.”3 The
Future Building Committee was, we think, just such an organization. So was its off-
spring, the Naval Aircraft Design Committee. Moreover, as Komer well knew, innova-
tive ideas go nowhere if an organization lacks “flexible and imaginative conflict
managers at all levels,” and this requirement is one that the RN’s officers and engineers
seemed to meet—from Lewis Boddington and his associates at the Royal Aircraft
Establishment to the more senior officers on the Future Building Committee and its
postwar successor. This is not to say that the Royal Navy’s approach was perfect. It was
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:13 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
not, as our case study shows. But it built upon a tradition that Komer said in 1972
was essential if innovation was to take place: “a capability for thorough evaluation
and analysis.”4
That same capability existed in the U.S. Navy. If it had not, U.S. Navy officers would
not have embraced the angled flight deck and the mirror landing aid so quickly, and
they would have refused to accept HMS Perseus as a test bed for the Royal Navy’s steam
catapult. In the case of the catapult, engineers at the Naval Aircraft Factory thought
that they could do what Komer says people working in a bureaucratic setting always do,
which is to do more of the same but better. But the resistance to change or to a new
idea or piece of equipment can be overcome if competing alternatives can be put to the
test. This was done twice in the case of Perseus—first at Philadelphia using lower steam
pressures and then again, later, at Philadelphia using higher steam pressures.
The tests of the steam catapult on Perseus would not have taken place, however, if the
U.S. Navy’s aviation community had not had a history of rigorously testing aircraft and
carrier arresting gear, aircraft crash barriers, and aircraft catapults. We do not think
that it was an accident that the U.S. officer in London who promoted the use of Perseus
as a test platform for the British steam catapult was Rear Adm. Apollo Soucek. Soucek
had been a test pilot in the late 1920s and early ’30s, and in June 1930 he had estab-
lished an altitude record for military aircraft of over forty-three thousand feet. He was
“air boss” of the carrier Hornet in 1942 and served on a special board in the spring of
1943 to revise the cruising instructions of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The board “exceded
[sic] its instructions to the extent that all existing Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletins and
numerous Fleet confidential letters in effect, were overhauled and included in the new
instructions,” giving the Pacific Fleet as a result the new Tactical Orders and Doctrine
(known as “PAC-10”).5 In short, Soucek was an outstanding officer, and he understood
the need for what Komer called thorough evaluation and analysis. It is no accident that he
did or that he was where he was when a need arose for a new approach to catapulting
aircraft from carriers.
At the end of our previous book we cited a 1946 quotation from Adm. Marc A. Mitscher:
“Aviation was a relatively new weapon and we learned as we went.” After World War II,
jet engines made aviation a new weapon yet again, and a lot of learning was required—
again. For the U.S. Navy, learning about jets was made all the harder because of the
self-imposed requirement to adapt large, nuclear-capable jet bombers to carriers.
Meeting this requirement transformed naval aviation. It was an extraordinary
achievement—yet one understandable in light of what is known about complex pro-
fessional organizations.
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Appendix D: Chronology
Sources for U.S. Navy dates are U.S. Navy Dept., United States Naval Aviation, 1910–
1980, NAVAIR 00-80P-1 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Air Systems Command, 1981);
Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950
(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994); Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft
Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983);
and Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warriors: My Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington,
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).
Sources for Royal Navy dates are Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation (London:
Conway Maritime, 1988); Eric Brown, Wings on My Sleeve (London: Orion Books–
Phoenix, 2007); and Geoffrey Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm (Hersham,
Surrey, U.K.: Midland, 2008). RN entries are italicized.
1938 Steam catapult patented in the United Kingdom. In September, the
Royal Aircraft Establishment creates a separate Catapult Section, headed
by Lewis Boddington.
Sept. 1940 Tizard Mission to the United States. The mission brings the cavity mag-
netron and information on Frank Whittle’s jet engine. To further the ini-
tial work of the Tizard Mission, the United States and the United
Kingdom set up scientific liaison offices in Washington and London.
Feb. 1942 The chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics approves a decision within
BuAer to develop large single-seat attack aircraft.
1942 BuAer contracts with Grumman to build a twin-engine, long-range,
large-bomb-load bomber (XTB2F-1) that can operate from Essex-class
carriers. Its loaded weight is about forty-five thousand pounds.
1942 The Joint Technical Committee (RN and RAF) draws up new recommen-
dations for naval aircraft. For example, maximum aircraft weight goes
from eleven to thirty thousand pounds, and stall speed grows to seventy-
five knots.
Spring 1943 BuAer solicits proposals from industry for large, long-range, single-seat
attack aircraft.
Spring 1943 The RN tests rocket-assisted takeoff gear.
1943 Navy tests first jet-assisted takeoff units.
1943 First landing and takeoff of a twin-engine Mosquito on a carrier take
place. Approval is given to produce a modified Sea Mosquito.
Jan. 1944 Lt. Eric Brown is appointed naval test pilot at Farnborough.
Sept. 1944 Admiral Cunningham requests specially modified Mosquitoes from the
Chief of the Air Staff (RAF) for use on British aircraft carriers; wants
them early in 1945.
Nov. 1944 PBJ-1H bomber is launched from and recovered back aboard USS
Shangri-La.
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Dec. 1944 The Naval Aircraft Factory develops slotted-cylinder catapult to launch
target drones.
Jan. 1945 British test afterburner.
Jan. 11, 1945 Meeting at Farnborough to discuss ways to operate aircraft without
undercarriages from carriers. Maj. F. M. Green proposes a “carpet.”
Spring 1945 British give an American delegation plans of the M.52 supersonic air-
craft. (The British government will cancel the M.52 in February 1946.)
Late spring 1945 BuAer begins studying carrier aircraft capable of carrying eight to twelve
thousand pounds of bombs. This is triggered by the results of the U.S.
Strategic Bombing Survey, which showed that the twelve-thousand-
pound bombs could damage hardened submarine pens.
Summer 1945 Navy’s Bureau of Ships begins studying thirty-five-to-fifty-thousand-ton
carrier designs. Study completed in April 1946. Recommends 39,600-
ton carrier. Ship Characteristics Board created in 1945.
July 1945 SCB recommends a new carrier design with 1945 F7Fs (each weighing
twenty-five thousand pounds at takeoff) and thirty-six BT3Ds (each
weighing approximately fourteen thousand pounds at takeoff).
July 1945 An informal board reporting to DCNO (Air) endorses report by Capt. W.
T. Raisseur that carriers need a radically redesigned flight deck and a
new mode of operations.
Aug. 10, 1945 Hornet, a variant of the Mosquito, lands and takes off from HMS
Ocean.
Sept. 1945 Engineer Lewis Boddington provides conceptual justification for the an-
gled flight deck.
Oct. 1945 Navy Air Development Research organization proposes to BuAer that
BuAer develop turboprop aircraft for bombing from specialized carriers.
Oct. 1945 The Committee to Evaluate the Feasibility of Space Rocketry recom-
mends that the Navy study the possibility of an earth satellite. (BuAer
will respond to this recommendation by contracting with three firms
and one university for studies of possible launch vehicles and their liquid
fuels.)
Dec. 1945 BuAer chief Rear Adm. Harold Sallada tells CNO that carrier aircraft
must carry larger bombs and that BuAer had options for new aircraft
based on combined propeller and jet-turbine propulsion. Sallada recom-
mends development of a new bomber with a gross weight of forty-one
thousand pounds and a landing weight of twenty-eight thousand
pounds. (This proposed design will become the AJ-1 Savage.) CNO ap-
proves the program.
Dec. 1945 First jet takeoff from and landing on a Royal Navy carrier. This is only a
demonstration. There are no operational RN jet carrier squadrons.
Jan. 1946 Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher, DCNO (Air), recommends that CNO approve
the development of hundred-thousand-pound bombers.
1946 Admiralty decides to adopt slotted-cylinder catapults. (In 1942, the RN
had used catapults that were compatible with USN aircraft being pro-
cured through Lend-Lease.)
Feb. 1946 CNO directs DCNO (Air), Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, to begin de-
tailed design study of the hundred-thousand-pound bomber. (The
weight and size of this aircraft will drive the Navy away from the first
postwar carrier design and toward a very large ship—what will become
United States.)
Feb. 1946 BuAer technical divisions are aligned into two groups: Research, Devel-
opment and Engineering; and Material and Services.
March 1946 The Secretary of the Navy approves converting two submarines into air-
breathing guided-missile carriers and launchers.
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March 1946 The Chief of Naval Operations directs BuAer to adopt ground-controlled
approach equipment for landing aircraft in poor visibility.
Spring 1946 BuShips uses BuAer’s hundred-thousand-pound (gross weight) design
study ADR-42 in working out the characteristics of a new, large carrier.
Study completed in May 1946. (Friedman notes that the preliminary
characteristics were reviewed by the Ship Characteristics Board in June
1946.)
April 1946 Contract issued to Douglas Aircraft for the design and construction of
the night fighter XF3D-1.
June 1946 North American Aviation is given a contract for the design and con-
struction of three XAJ-1 aircraft (a long-range bomber able to carry nu-
clear weapons).
June 1946 Investigation begins of the suitability of jet aircraft for carrier use at the
Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River, with the Navy pilots using a P-
80A.
July 1946 First tests of jets on carriers take place. An FD-1 lands on and takes off
from carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt on July 21.
July 1946 DCNO (Air) recommends to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations that the
new carrier not be included in the 1948 shipbuilding program but be
funded as a design study.
Sept. 1946 DCNO (Air) is organized into four groups—Plans, Personnel, Readiness,
and Air Logistics. An Air Planning Group is also established. This reorga-
nization reflects the shift of aviation policy to the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Oct. 1946 Naval Air Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, California, is established.
Oct. 1946 First live test of a pilot ejection seat is conducted.
Oct. 1946 Development of XF9F-1 four-engine night fighter is halted. BuAer de-
cides to develop the XF9F-2 instead. (To get this plane, BuAer will sub-
stitute the Rolls-Royce Nene engine for Westinghouse 24Cs. Later, U.S.
firms will produce the Nene engine.)
Nov. 1946 Responsibility for guided-missile development is assigned to a newly
created Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Guided
Missiles).
Nov. 1946 A P-80A, piloted by a Marine, makes two catapult launches, four free
takeoffs, and five arrested landings on carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt. This
is part of the series of tests run at Patuxent River starting at the end of
June 1946.
Feb. 1947 SCB produces first preliminary characteristics for a new carrier.
Feb. 1947 A surfaced submarine fires a Loon guided missile for the first time.
March 1947 Serious work on the flexible deck begins at RAE, Farnborough.
June 1947 CNO approves the characteristics for a carrier improvement program
called “Project 27A.” This is the first modification of the Essex-class
ships. The modifications are designed to enable the carriers to launch
and recover jets, which requires blast deflectors, more fuel, and jet fuel
mixers. Oriskany, the first ship so modernized, begins conversion in Oc-
tober 1947.
June 1947 BuAer awards contract to Douglas Aircraft for a study of a delta-winged
fighter. (This study will lead to the XF4D-1.)
June 1947 BuAer awards contract to Chance Vought for development and con-
struction of three XF7U-1 aircraft. (This plane will later be produced as
the Cutlass.)
July 1947 Adm. Robert Carney, senior member of SCB, tells General Board that
Essex-class carriers must be modernized and that the new carrier (with
flush deck) must be in the fiscal year (FY) 1949 Navy program. (It will
be.)
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Aug. 1947 BuAer establishes an organization to develop guided missiles and air-
craft electronics.
Sept. 18, 1947 Executive Order 9877 defines the roles and missions of the newly cre-
ated U.S. Air Force. The National Security Act of 1947, which created
the USAF, had been signed by President Truman on July 26, 1947.
Sept. 1947 CNO approves new carrier characteristics.
Oct. 1947 Tests of operational Attacker jet fighter on HMS Illustrious occur.
Dec. 1947 The President’s Air Policy Commission, headed by Thomas Finletter, sub-
mits its report.
Dec. 1947 First landing of a jet fighter on the flexible deck at Farnborough takes
place.
1948 British Admiralty adopts a nine-year fleet modernization plan. Plans for
a test unit steam catapult are completed.
March 1948 Test Pilot Training Division is set up at the Naval Air Test Center,
Patuxent River.
March 1948 Carrier suitability of the FJ-1 Fury is tested on carrier Boxer with land-
ings and takeoffs.
April 1948 Two P2V-2 Neptunes make JATO takeoffs from the carrier Coral Sea.
May 1948 The Navy establishes first carrier-qualified jet squadron (using FH-1
Phantoms).
May 1948 DCNO (Air) presents new carrier design to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
USAF Chief of Staff objects. The Navy defends new (“6A”) design as a
prototype.
May 1948 The Michelson Laboratory for rocket and guided-missile research at
Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, opens.
June 1948 First landing and takeoff of a twin-jet Meteor on HMS Implacable take
place.
June 1948 Meetings of the Quarterly Air Board (DCNO [Air], BuAer, and the Com-
manders, Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific) begin.
June 1948 Congress authorizes construction of large (6A) carrier in the FY 1949
program.
June 1948 BuShips initiates development of the TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation)
system for carriers.
July 1948 The first carrier-based AEW squadrons (VAW-1 and VAW-2) are com-
missioned. (They will organize and train future AEW squadrons.)
July 1948 Construction of carrier United States is approved by President Truman.
Aug. 1948 Aeronautical Board is dissolved.
Sept. 1948 First “navalized” Sea Hawk jet flies. (Deck trials are in May 1949, but no
production aircraft will enter the fleet until the end of 1951.)
Nov. 1948 The Naval Aircraft Factory begins work on the design of the Mark 7
high-energy-absorbing arresting gear (to capture planes weighing up to
fifty thousand pounds and landing at speeds as high as 105 knots).
Nov. 1948 The Office of Naval Intelligence informs General Board that the Royal
Navy is “well advanced” in experimenting with a “flexible, rubber and
pneumatic” flight deck for carriers.
Nov. 1948 First sea trials of flexible deck with a prototype Vampire take place.
Nov. 1948 Representatives of the RN visit BuShips and BuAer in Washington. They
obtain a full set of deck plans for CVA 58 (United States) and detailed
drawings of USS Midway. They also get information on the slotted-tube
catapult for CVA 58 and detailed information about arresting gear be-
ing developed by the USN.
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March 1949 A P2V-3C is launched from carrier Coral Sea with a ten-thousand-pound
load. It flies across the country, drops its load, and then returns to
Patuxent River.
April 1949 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cancels the carrier United States.
Feb. 1950 A P2V-3C Neptune makes a 5,060-mile flight after being launched from
a carrier.
March 1950 The staff of DCNO (Air) informs General Board that the critical factor in
the modernization of the Essex-class carriers is the catapult.
April 1950 First carrier takeoff of the AJ-1 occurs, made from Coral Sea by Capt. J.
T. Hayward.
April 1950 A P2V-3C, weighing 74,668 pounds, takes off from Coral Sea.
July 1950 Navy pilots fly F9F Panthers from the carrier Valley Forge off Korea.
1950 NATO navies agree on a standard form of jet fuel.
Aug. 1950 The first squadron of AJ-1 Savage bombers qualifies on Coral Sea.
Oct. 1950 DCNO (Air) tells General Board that any new carrier must have a flush
deck.
Feb. 1951 The first heavy attack wing is commissioned at Norfolk.
March 1951 First test of ramjet Talos long-range antiaircraft missile is conducted.
March 1951 BuAer contracts with Convair for the propeller-driven vertical takeoff
fighter XFY-1. Three weeks later, BuAer orders an alternate design from
Lockheed.
April 1951 First Navy use of a jet fighter as a bomber takes place off Korea.
April 12, 1951 Langley Aeronautical Laboratory recommends “hydraulic jet catapult”
to BuAer for an aircraft with a gross weight of a hundred thousand
pounds.
June 1951 BuAer issues a contract to Convair for development of delta-winged,
hydro-ski seaplane fighter.
June 27, 1951 The Admiralty offers to send HMS Perseus to the United States.
July 1, 1951 The Naval Air Turbine Test Station is established at Trenton, N.J.
July 14, 1951 CNO accepts the Admiralty offer of a visit by HMS Perseus.
July 27, 1951 Rear Admiral Soucek, the naval air attaché, sends memorandum from
London to CNO via Office of Naval Intelligence detailing results of a visit
to Perseus by two USN captains.
Aug. 1951 Angled-deck concept presented at a Ministry of Supply conference by
Capt. Dennis Cambell. Lt. Cdr. Nick Goodhart, Cambell’s assistant, con-
ceives of a landing-light system.
Aug. 24, 1951 Preliminary discussions among representatives of BuAer, the Royal Navy,
and OPNAV regarding the trip of Perseus to the United States.
Aug. 28, 1951 Adm. Sir Cyril Douglas-Pennant, RN, corresponds with CNO regarding
the visit of Perseus.
Sept. 7, 1951 A Terrier surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired from test ship Norton Sound
intercepts target drone.
Sept. 27, 1951 Chief, BuAer makes Perseus visit a priority one.
Oct. 12, 1951 Work gets under way to accommodate Perseus at Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard.
Oct. 15, 1951 The shipyard at Philadelphia conducts catapult tests on the World War II
escort carrier Block Island. Because these could conflict with tests on
Perseus, the shipyard decides to put the Perseus tests ahead of those on
Block Island. The shipyard promises to have the dead loads ready by
November 15, 1951.
Dec. 1951 First test assembly of nuclear warheads on a carrier at sea takes place.
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Dec. 3, 1951 British Joint Services Mission–Air establishes an office inside the Main
Navy Building on Constitution Avenue. The mission plans tests of
Perseus at both Philadelphia and Norfolk. (Perseus had been launching
jets at five-minute intervals, but the target for launches at Philadelphia
is thirty seconds.)
Dec. 6, 1951 Schedules place Perseus in United States from mid-January to March.
Perseus will visit Philadelphia first and then Norfolk.
End of 1951–
early 1952
Eric Brown promotes idea of angled deck while serving as an exchange
pilot with Flight Test Division at Naval Air Station Patuxent River,
Maryland.
Dec. 13, 1951 A CNO letter establishes responsibilities of “interested commands” for
the Perseus visit.
Jan.–Mar. 1952 A British-developed steam catapult is tested at the Philadelphia Navy
Yard, at Norfolk, and then again (with six-hundred-pound steam) at
Philadelphia. A U.S. aircraft is launched from HMS Perseus.
Jan. 8, 1952 Capt. Sheldon W. Brown of BuAer compares U.S. and RN catapults for
Rear Adm. Lucien M. Grant, USN.
Feb. 1952 CNO approves a modification of the “Project 27A” carrier conversion
program to give each ship more powerful arresting gear, better cata-
pults, and a deck-edge elevator in place of its number-three centerline
elevator. (Three Essex-class conversions will be completed in 1954—Proj-
ect 27C, axial deck).
Feb. 12, 1952 W. W. Ford of the Naval Aircraft Factory/NAMC writes to Ships Installa-
tion Division of BuAer (headed by Capt. Sheldon Brown), asking
whether BuAer wants the British steam catapult for the 27C conversion
instead of the U.S.-developed C10 (powered by a powder charge).
Feb. 1952 Eric Brown flies an F9F Panther from anchored Perseus in Philadelphia
Navy Yard.
Feb. 14, 1952 BuShips says steam catapult will work structurally in CV 9 and CVB 41
conversions, and also in CVB 59 (Forrestal).
Feb. 15, 1952 First BuShips steam catapult conference is held.
Feb. 20, 1952 Second BuShips steam catapult conference is held.
Feb. 20, 1952 Tests of Perseus are made part of a program called TED NAM SI 330.0,
established under a BuAer confidential letter of September 27, 1951.
Feb. 21, 1952 DCNO (Air) extends Perseus’s visit schedule to permit additional tests.
1952 HMS Eagle’s arresting gear takes a twenty-thousand-pound aircraft
landing at ninety-two knots. (Compare this with the standard set by the
Joint Technical Committee at the end of 1942.)
March 19, 1952 Chief, BuShips notes successful conclusion of “an extremely high prior-
ity Chief of Naval Operations directed project.” This is the test of the
steam catapult on Perseus.
March 26, 1952 Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet asks in a letter to CNO whether
the British steam catapult will be installed in USN carriers.
April 1952 The USN announces that the steam catapult will be adopted, with the
first installation on Hancock.
May 1952 Tests of a simulated angled deck on carrier Midway.
June 25, 1952 Capt. Sheldon Brown arranges a July trip to Brown Bros. in Scotland
(the builders of the British steam catapult) and asks for data from the
firm.
July 1952 Keel of carrier Forrestal is laid.
Aug. 8, 1952 U.S. embassy in London asks Brown Bros. to forward catapult drawings
to BuAer directly rather than through NAMC.
Sept. 3, 1952 First test of fully configured Sidewinder air-to-air missile takes place.
1 9 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_37.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP37\_VP\NP_37.vp
Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:54:14 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Dec. 1952 An air-breathing Regulus missile is launched successfully from a ship at
sea and guided to a safe landing ashore.
Jan. 1953 Landing and takeoff tests are conducted on board the first angled-deck
carrier, Antietam.
Mar. 1953 Tunny (SSG 284) is outfitted to launch Regulus surface-to-surface mis-
siles. (The first successful live firing will be held on July 15, 1953.)
April 1953 The first flight of XF2Y-1 experimental jet seaplane fighter occurs.
June 1953 Antietam’s pilots demonstrate angled-deck landings to the RN in the
English Channel. RN jets also participate. (Engen)
Aug. 1953 The first successful shipboard launching of Terrier SAM against a target
drone occurs.
Aug. 1953 The D558-2 Douglas Skyrocket sets a new altitude record.
Sept. 1953 A plan is promulgated officially to covert the Midways to an angled-
deck configuration. But they will have modified C11 steam catapults in
the angled-deck area.
Sept. 1953 The first successful interception of a drone by Sidewinder air-to-air mis-
sile takes place.
Nov. 1953 USN pilots land jets on HMS Illustrious in the United Kingdom.
Dec. 1953 The Steam Catapult Facility at Philadelphia is commissioned.
May 1954 CNO approves Project 125 to install angled decks and enclosed bows
on the carriers that had been modernized under Project 27A.
1954 The landing light (or mirror) system is tested on HMS Albion.
June 1954 Initial at-sea tests of C11 steam catapult on carrier Hancock.
June 1954 The Naval Air Development and Material Center is established at
Johnsville, Pennsylvania.
Aug.–Nov. 1954 Tests of the vertical-takeoff-and-landing XFY-1 delta-wing experimental
fighter.
July 1955 The P6M SeaMaster jet seaplane bomber makes its first flight.
Aug. 1955 VX-3 successfully tests the mirror landing system on Bennington.
Sept. 1955 Guided Missile groups 1 and 2 are commissioned to train detachments
to launch Regulus missiles from aircraft carriers, cruisers, and
submarines.
Oct. 1955 USS Forrestal (CVA 59) is commissioned.
Nov. 1955 CNO decides to equip each angled-deck carrier with a mirror landing
system.
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